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Introduction 
Revolutions have occurred since the beginning of organized society.  People have been 
deprived of certain essential rights, have collaborated about their grievances and formed 
coalitions to rise against the government.  Knowing how previous rebellions have succeeded or 
failed can allow one to predict the success of another revolution.  Today through the increased 
communication levels between countries around the world, more information is available to the 
average person and political ideologies of people can be changed through media.  No longer are 
citizens content to be complacent and sit by while their leaders engage in corrupt actions that 
make those around them richer while the rest of the population lives in a state of poverty.  In late 
2010 and early 2011, people within the Arab world held similar grievances towards their 
governments and created a succession of protests that began in Tunisia and swept through North 
Africa and the Middle East.  Protesters began by demanding changes to government policies and 
structures, but soon people in every country wanted new leadership and the resignation of their 
current ruler.  This group of protests is known as the Arab Spring.   
While the increased communication technologies of satellite television, as well as non-
state run programming has added to the transfer of ideas from one nation to another within the 
Arab region, social media has made discussing grievances even easier than television.  In recent 
years social media, which is any technology or technique that can inspire and influence other 
individuals, has played a large role in politics.  Social media includes social networking sites, 
blogging sites, and mobile phones.  These devices allow for the spread of information to happen 
at a quick pace; furthermore, news can be received anywhere among those who have access to 
such technology.  News, pictures and updates from friends are instantaneous.  This is crucial 
during protests when events and circumstances are rapidly changing.   
 2 
The revolutions within the Arab Spring happened in quick succession.  All of the protests 
began within a three-month period.
1
  Tunisia, which was the first revolutionary country, began 
protests on December 18, 2010, and President Ben Ali left office on January 14, 2011.  Just days 
later the uprising in Egypt began and lasted for a mere eighteen days from January 25, 2011, to 
February 11, 2011.  The starting dates of the next two revolutions in Yemen and Libya were 
respectively February 3, 2011, and February 15, 2011.
2
  The people of Bahrain took action and 
organized against their leader in the capital city of Manama starting on February 14, 2011.  
Lastly the sixth nation to have demonstrators rise up against their leader was Syria on March 16, 
2011.  All of these revolutions learned from one another and began as soon as mobilization was 
possible.  Some scholars see the quick spread of protest from one country to another, the quick 
victories that occurred in some of the nations, and the authority figures who were caught off 
guard, as a sign that a new organizational technique was used to inspire the revolutions and 
ensure the success of these rebellions.  It is widely debated whether social media was that factor.  
The use of this new communication style as a political tool to rally people to the streets rather 
than as a social network could be the distinguishing element in these demonstrations. 
The purpose of my thesis is to discern what role social media actually played within the 
Arab Spring as a whole.  By looking at individual countries and analyzing when social media 
was used, how it was used within the country or to target those who were abroad, what types of 
social media were used, and what happened if and when the government tried to limit access to 
social media, I evaluated how important the new technology was in the entire region during the 
protests of late 2010 and early 2011.  Through these specific criteria a country can fall into one 
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of three schools of thought on social media’s impact in the nation’s rallies.  The first school 
indicates that social media was necessary for the revolution to begin and the revolutionaries 
could not have mobilized without the use of social media; the second school purports that social 
media was not essential to the success of the uprising and the use of social media was 
exaggerated; and the third and final school deems that social media was used to change the 
opinions of outsiders about the regime and those protesting against it rather than to organize 
protesters within a nation.  None of the schools indicate that social media was unused within the 
country during the time of the revolt; for social media was used, even if briefly, by all the 
countries but the extent to which it was utilized to help spur and add to the revolutions is what 
will be analyzed. 
 There is some support for each school of thought among the four countries that I studied, 
which makes concluding how social media impacted the Arab Spring as a whole a difficult task.  
Social media use in specific countries is easier to discern than the larger scale of impact 
throughout the region.  Small conclusions can be drawn; the use of mobile phones seemed to be 
successful when overthrowing a dictator, and the unity of the public who was rebelling helped to 
create a set of clear demands that could be met by the government.  However, since social media 
use in revolutions is so recent, it is hard to recognize one key factor that will always ensure 
success.  The people of some countries, such as Egypt and Syria, utilized Facebook or Twitter to 
organize and mobilize people, but even though both conducted similar actions only Egyptians 
dethroned their dictator.  Likewise, protesters in other Arab Spring nations like Tunisia did not 
use social media when creating the revolution or sustaining it but the citizens still succeeded in 
having their leader resign from office.  Additionally different types of social media were 
implemented in different countries to combat the regimes, so no one aspect can definitively lead 
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to the success of a revolution.  Not all of the countries that were successful in government 
change were successful in social media usage.  
 Once more time has passed and more research can be done on the topic of social media 
usage in revolutions, a more definitive analysis can be given as to what new technology factors 
contribute and can lead to the success of protests.  Whether social media impacted the Arab 
Spring is a complex question with many angles and levels.  What is known is that without social 
media the Arab Spring would not have happened so quickly or affected as many nations.  Only 
time will tell if the tweet will replace the street and how effective social media will be towards 
the success of a revolution.  For now speculations and small conclusions can be made but more 
information is needed to reveal if social media led to the success of the whole Arab Spring and 
how future rebellions can use this knowledge to ensure victories for demonstrators.   
 5 
Chapter 1: Literature Review of Social Media’s Impact on the Arab Spring 
 Mobilization is arguably the most important aspect of a successful revolution and social 
movement.  Getting people to rally behind a cause and to take action will help achieve a goal.  In 
late 2010 and early 2011, Middle Eastern countries had a succession of protests.  People in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria rallied for changes in the government 
structure and leadership.  The Arab Spring is comprised of these rallies that began over a three-
month period starting with Tunisia in December of 2010 and the ending with Syria, the sixth 
nation, in March of 2011.  It is generally perceived that six countries make up the Arab Spring, 
even though many more nations had political unrest during the time period.  Protesters in these 
six countries provided the largest and most organized demonstrations, which is why they are 
considered to be the political uprisings of the Arab Spring.
3
   The people of the six nations had 
the potential to overthrow their rulers, even though only four of the six have currently succeeded.   
 Leading up to the Arab Spring, also known as the Arab uprising, new media sources and 
social media had grown in importance in the Middle East.  These outlets were used for political 
organizations and common people to have dialogues among themselves, Western countries and 
other Arab states (Lynch 2011).  People with similar views and interests found each other online 
and could discuss problems and frustrations.  This new form of communication provided a way 
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to reach a vast and diverse group of people, who could quickly be engaged in action.
4
  The new 
media sources connected the Arab region.  
 In recent years social media, which is any technology or technique that can inspire and 
influence other individuals, has played a large role in politics.  Social media’s real contribution 
to politics is its threat to governments and regimes.  It can challenge leaders in the Middle East in 
four distinct ways by promoting collective action; attempting to limit state repression; impacting 
international support for the dictator; and changing the perception of the public sphere (Lynch 
2011).  These risks beg the question was social media the instigator behind the uproar in the 
Middle East?  Did the idea of protest begin on the Internet and what role did it play in executing 
demonstrations?  Is the importance of social media exaggerated to create headline stories?  To 
answer these questions the role of social media in the mobilization of people during the Arab 
Spring has been broken up into three categories.  Some scholars think that without social media, 
these demonstrations would never have occurred.  Others think that social media played no part 
in mobilizing or starting the protests; the outcome of the revolution would not have been 
unchanged whether social media was used or not.  A final group is somewhat in between these 
first two.  It thinks that social media played a role in the Arab Spring, yet it did not matter much 
in the Middle East because its influence was abroad.   
 By looking at the components necessary for revolution, the increased transparency in the 
Arab world, the impact of social media on politics around the globe and more specifically in the 
Arab region, one can begin to gauge the role that social media played.  How previous revolutions 
have been started can attest to what trends are necessary within a nation to spark rebellion.  
Knowing the factors that contribute to demonstrations will help answer the question of whether 
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social media has the potential to insight protests in average citizens or if something else is 
needed too.  Looking at the connected nature of the countries in the Arab region can indicate the 
similarities in all of the nations that started revolts in the last year.  Unrest in Tunisia could only 
have carried over to other countries if there was a sense of community and an ability to share 
information among nations.  The previous use of social media in politics and by angered groups 
is important when researching the Arab Spring too.  Deeming if social media has had the 
capacity to change or affect politics worldwide will add to its ability to impact the Arab Spring.  
Once former social media rebellions both abroad or in the Middle East are discerned then the 
likelihood that it contributed to the Arab Spring can be better analyzed.  All of these elements are 
outlined in the chapter because they are necessary to determine the impact of social media on the 
revolutions.  Without analyzing any one of these categories a false conclusion may be made 
where social media did not play a role but is falsely credited for one in an Arab Spring nation or 
vice versa.  Therefore all of this background information is necessary before a conclusion can be 
drawn about the importance of social media in the Arab Spring.  Ultimately my thesis will try to 
define what role, if any, social media including Facebook and Twitter, played in the Arab Spring 
that occurred in late 2010 and early 2011. 
Components of Revolutions 
 Revolutions do not just happen overnight.  There are set steps that occur before people 
mobilize.  They have arisen within every movement, no matter the time, place or technological 
circumstances.  Modernization has not changed these instigators or allowed for them to happen 
more often (Tilly 2003).  While it has been debated that modernity causes more rebellion that is 
not true.  Seeing what other countries possess that the deprived lack leads to revolution but there 
is no evidence that modernity will bring about a revolution (Tilly 2003).  In order for rebellion to 
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start internal and external causes must both be present.  Once people are angered by these causes 
they will look for others that share similar sentiments and organize against the government. 
 There are two components that lead to revolutions and protests.  They are internal 
feelings and sentiments, which are referred to as internal factors, and those that are presented by 
outside forces, which are external factors.  External factors do not always insinuate forces from a 
foreign area, they can include an action that is perpetuated by foreigners against those within the 
country or restrictions that an individuals’ own government puts on those residing in the nation.  
These actions placed on the citizenry are considered an external aspect because they are not an 
internalized feeling; these acts come from an outside force.   
External forces such as corruption from the government of high unemployment rate can 
contribute to interior beliefs that the government must be altered.  External factors can be 
present, but they become a cause for rebellion when the population stops being ignorant that they 
exist and calls for a change to the status quo.  People can live for decades under a corrupt regime 
but once they realize how they are suffering while others live lavish lifestyles, the citizenry will 
rise against those in power.  Once a person finds others who like them are internally hurt and feel 
a need to change, then action will be taken and uprisings will follow.  Previous authors have 
examined and concluded that internal feelings are caused by external factors.  These internal 
feelings are harsh enough that people need immediate change and rally to overthrow a dictator or 
“democratic” leader.   
 Previous literature about revolutions and protests determines that internal factors lead to 
collective violence.  Whether it is called grievances and deprivations or grievances, collective 
incentives and opportunities, it all represents a sense of unhappiness with the status quo.  No 
matter what component of grievances, deprivations, aspirations or moral obligations occurs, all 
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of the authors feel that internal factors drive the force needed behind protests.  To Pinnard (2011) 
this includes being deprived of basic necessities such as education and political freedoms to 
express ones own opinion.  This can be seen in Egypt in 2006, when the people staged a rally to 
gain political freedoms and change their leader.  Other authors consider deprivation to be the 
lack of aspirations.  These aspirations for goods consist of objects that could be obtained if the 
population was not deprived.  If the people were not deprived of a functioning political system 
then they could reap the benefits of political freedom.  People long for the rights and 
opportunities that they lack (Tilly 2003). 
 The last component is a sentiment of moral obligations and duty to make some 
contribution to the collective good and action (Pinnard 2011).  When everyone else is fighting 
for a common goal of a better nation, those who are not at the forefront feel guilty and join in the 
rally for a better lifestyle.  The appearance of other contenders who have alternative claims to the 
controlling government bring more people who are willing to oppose the regime (Tilly 2003).  
The expected success of the goals and actions being taken will also play a part in the number of 
people who mobilize to the cause (Pinnard 2011).  This takes the emphasis away from a new 
contender starting and structuring the mobilization process and focuses on joining an already 
existing challenger (Tilly 2003).  People follow others, and advertising the bandwagon is an easy 
way to appeal to the population to gain more supporters.   
 These internal factors of grievance, deprivation, aspiration, and moral obligation come 
from external factors that the government has created.  The political situation in a government 
can create these sentiments.  People across classes fight for the removal of deprivations, 
abandonment of dominating governments, control over one’s life and social decisions, and to 
create individual identities outside of the state (Pinnard 2011).  The removal of tyrannical 
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governments and regimes are often reasons behind uprisings.  This has been popular in Middle 
Eastern countries.  Prior to the 2011 uprisings, in Bahrain and Egypt people have been arrested 
for their beliefs and blog postings.  Opposition to the regime is not tolerated; therefore, control 
over one’s own life and social decisions causes people to rally behind a movement for a new 
government.  Lastly people want their own identity and the ability to think for themselves, rather 
than believe the propaganda that the government feeds them (Pinnard 2011).  With state 
controlled media, until recently people did not have the ability to question dictators (Rinnawi 
2006).  Fighting for these causes and eliminating the problems will ameliorate the lives of the 
public (Goldstone 2003). 
 Some factors do not always happen before protests but if they do it is extremely 
beneficial for those who are frustrated with the government.  It is not always necessary but if 
others, either elite civilians or military figures, in the country get involved because they share 
these grievances it expedites the mobilization process: “if the loyalty of the army should falter or 
be pressed by widespread popular mobilization against the regime in urban or rural revolts, 
revolution becomes nearly inevitable” (Goldstone 2003, 74).  These groups have more influence 
than the average middle class citizen and can obtain change faster.  With support from people of 
different backgrounds, success is more achievable. 
 Political issues that cause external factors can stem from three categories.  The external 
causes can be summed up as large-scale structural change that transforms power within the 
population and affects opportunities for mobilization within society, allotment of the resources 
available to the country, and unfair benefits for those who hold positions of power (Tilly 2003).  
Simple examples of the three categories include: an increase in unemployment and the inability 
for social mobility would constitute the first classification; benefits from oil, whether that be 
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wealth or owning the rigs, would fall into the second category; lastly a patron-client relationship 
that only benefits one specific ethnicity and allows them to hold positions of power within a 
government would fall into the last factor of external causes.  Yet, a more common way for the 
elite to maintain control of opportunities or mobilization is by cutting education and economic 
status to the populace.  If the elite are the only educated portion of the public, then they can 
maintain the land and labor force.  Without employment the average citizen cannot function in 
society or get angry about his position.  By keeping the population less educated, as well as poor 
it makes them unable to revolt easily.  Goldstone (2003) also discusses the temptation for elites 
and cronies to monopolize resources.  Hoarding resources enables the elite to get richer while the 
poor seep deeper into poverty.  Since the populace is uneducated they do not realize that their 
standing in the country is deteriorating while others are flourishing.  In both of these examples 
the rich benefit while the poor continue to suffer.   
 Another factor is when a state comes into conflict with traditional organizations 
(Goldstone 2003).  Conflicts between religion and state or between education and justice are 
traditional factors that clash with modern ideas.  These conflicts can lead to mobilization of those 
who oppose the state.  When it comes to fundamental Islam and Shari’a Law, different people 
and sects of Islam clash on how they want the government to operate; some want a more 
traditional view where Islamic law is the same as state law while others prefer a more modern 
approach to government.  In Iran in 1970 the government was a mixture of secular and Islamic 
rule but people rioted to the point where the Shah was removed and replaced by an Islamic 
Republic.  Differences in issues concerning the clash, of in this case mosque versus state, made 
people revolt against the government (Goldstone 2003).   
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 Economic contributors also play a role in the external factors that cause the grievances 
and deprivations that protesters feel before engaging in mobilization for rebellion.  Just as with 
political external factors, there are three economic aspects that contribute to the need for revolt.  
One cause is when foreign investors maintain a greater domestic control of the economy than the 
indigenous people.  The country must keep the foreign investors satisfied (Goldstone 2003).  To 
do this the general population can be forgotten about and the focus can be placed directly on 
pleasing the outside businesses.  Keeping foreigners happy will continue the flow of aid to the 
country.  The United States has given aid to many nations across the globe.  In the 1970s, it 
stopped supporting Nicaragua because it wanted the country to change its human rights policy.  
When aid stopped the country was not used to supporting its populace and revolutions began 
(Goldstone 2003).  Another common trend is relying too heavily on foreign economic or military 
support.  A country is not stable on its own and when aid stops, it plunges into economic 
upheaval.  When foreign forces pull out of the country it leaves an economic hole.  People 
become accustomed to a lifestyle that is no longer present.   Lastly government officials steal 
money for corrupt reasons and growth fails to trickle down to the masses (Goldstone 2003).  This 
is another example of where the elite become the only beneficiaries of the country and the poor 
cannot ameliorate their lives.  This is a popular tactic in corrupt one party ruled governments.  
The ruler will live a lavish lifestyle while his constituents reside in poverty.  The average man 
wants a change when these situations arise.   
 These internal and external causes of unhappiness will lead to a desire to change the 
government and current system of rule.  All of these motivating elements lead to a sense of 
activism.  Once people have realized the need to mobilize, actions can take many forms.  People 
often lump dissent, resistance and rebellion together but they are all slightly different.  The terms 
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have different meanings and are more than “protest is when I say I don’t like this and that.  
Resistance is when I see to it that things that I don’t like no longer occur.  Protest is when I say I 
will no longer go along with it.  Resistance is when I see to it that no one else goes along with it 
anymore either” (Hands 2011, 3).  Dissent is classified as a certain prescribed procedure to 
engage citizens, including protesting in the streets or disagreeing with someone in a position of 
authority.  In an authoritarian society, dissent can turn into resistance when the act of speech 
itself becomes a direct refusal of power (Hands 2011).  Refusal to pay taxes because a person 
does not agree with a large issue that the government supports, such as a war, is an example of 
resistance.  Resistance, on the other hand, suggests a more active and stubborn approach than 
dissent.  It is more defiance of authority or perceived injustice than just rallying people (Hands 
2011).  It is backed by the use of force.  Rebellion therefore includes both dissent and resistance, 
and cannot take place without them.  However, it also entails and even needs action.  This action 
must take the form of words and go further to achieve its goal (Hands 2011).  Mobilization of 
people to take action is rebellion.  Activism and revolution contain all three terms.  Revolution is 
also characterized as being sudden, violent, and ending in political succession (Hands 2011). 
 When external factors lead to internal unrest, the people of a nation are angry and ready 
to take action against their governments.  It is only when the two combine that people are 
inspired to change the government.  With the correct conditions under a crumbling government, 
the regime will unravel and those who are protesting will achieve their goals: “this combination 
of pressures can cause a patrimonial regime to unravel with astonishing rapidity” (Goldstone 
2003, 73).  Different areas of government can easily unravel when protests target them.  All of 
these events collaborated into successful revolts and in the Mexican, Cuban, Nicaraguan, 
Philippine, and Iranian revolution (Goldstone 2003).   The action that a population takes can be 
 14 
of various forms but the activism that ends in revolution will best change the country.  The 
political system will be removed and the changes will ameliorate the society. 
Increase in Communication Among Middle Eastern Countries 
 The idea of a united Arab region is a new phenomenon that has developed in the last 
fifteen years.  The Arab region is comprised of any Middle Eastern country and not just those 
that speak Arabic.  Before modern technology of satellite television, this diffusion of boundaries 
was not possible.  The Islamic world has become more educated in this time period too because 
it has broken out of its government propagated shell.  Satellite television made more objective 
information accessible to people within the Arab region.  Regimes could no longer hide facts or 
manipulate their populations because opposition television was available to the public.  Al 
Jazeera was the first news station to bring these facts to people within the Middle East.  This 
transition has had positive effects on the public while impacting the leaders negatively since the 
leaders are losing power and influence over their constituents.   
 Before the advent of satellite television and Al Jazeera, governments controlled, funded 
and censored all media sources in the Middle East.  All forms of news, whether print or 
electronic, were monitored by ministries (Rinnawi 2006).  Television and radio programs were 
comprised of two components, political propaganda and entertainment.  On these programs, most 
of the political content described the accomplishments of the leaders (Rinnawi 2006).  Even 
newspapers and magazines that provided opposing views were hard to find.  In the 1990s, these 
newspapers “were expensive and didn’t have wide circulation, so …the average person in most 
Arab countries just watched national TV and read national papers” (Rushing 2007, 130).  People 
were only getting the viewpoint of their governments, which was a biased account.  The 
censoring of news by ministries began to change as technology advanced.  Easily accessible 
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opposition information began with cassette tapes in Iran during the 1970s.  These tapes opposed 
the Shah and were monumental.  They were easy to maneuver and duplicate too.  Other 
technologies including fax machines, desktop publishing, photocopying machines, and most 
recently the Internet evolved and were beneficial for spreading information (Eickleman 2005).   
Nothing as transforming as Al Jazeera was seen until the 1990s. 
 Al Jazeera was the first independently Arab owned news station, and it began 
broadcasting in 1996 (Eickleman 2005).  It began when the former BBC Arabic Television 
network was dismantled.  Hamad bin Khalifa, who had worked with the BBC, recruited other 
staff members and with $140 million US dollars launched Al Jazeera.  Since 1996, the station 
has been present for the Iraq bombings of 1998, the Palestinian intifada in 2000, the US invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001, and the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003 (Seib 2008).  During these 
events, for the “first time, many Arabs did not have to rely on the BBC, CNN, or other outside 
news sources when a big story broke.  They could instead find news presented from an Arab 
perspective” (Seib 2008, 143).  The region had its own broadcasting network.  It quickly became 
the most watched and trusted channel in the region (Eickleman 2005). 
 The station was new and different because the owners had the ability to criticize countries 
during their programming.  The ability to criticize and allow for opposition in an open news 
source was monumental in the Arab world (Anderson 2003, 890).  It was “quite different from 
any Arabic-language television programming previously seen” because it was not owned by a 
government, it was owned by an individual (Rinnawi 2006, 38).  Since it was privatized Al 
Jazeera could be viewed without the permission of the government and people began to see 
opinions different from those that they were usually fed.  The station provided the region with 
independent news that bypassed most other available media, which was government censored 
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and controlled (Eickleman 2005; Rinnawi 2006; Rushing 2007).  It was a privatized network and 
did not have to serve the mandate of one specific country.  In this sense it could criticize and 
discuss topics about every Arab nation except its own, Qatar (Rinnawi 2006).   
 The news station put Qatar on the map, making it an important Arab nation because it 
was the headquarters of Al Jazeera.  Al Jazeera provides an objective base, which does not favor 
any country that it is allowed to discuss on air (Eickleman and Anderson 2003).  Two things 
have ensured the success of Al Jazeera: “the channel’s tendency to deal with issues that are often 
considered taboo, including the radical critique of Arab rulers, and above all the channel’s 
notable tendency to align itself with public opinion” (El Oifi 2005, 74).  The network discusses 
popular topics that people within the Arab region want to know about but may not have access 
to. 
 Al Jazeera has worked to create a sense of Pan-Arabism, which is also known as 
McArabism.  Television created by Arabs for Arabs helps to form a sense of community.  
Nationalism and a sense of Pan-Arabism increased the potential for community interaction and 
mutual recognition in networks, while breaking down differences between religious and political 
authority as well as space and distance between people (Eickleman 2005).  The idea of separate 
countries began to diffuse and a sense of an Arab identity arose.  The programs are aimed at 
Arab-speakers in the Islamic world, which means that it has both addressed the region as a whole 
and created a common bond among members of the region (Rinnawi 2006).  Influence can go 
beyond the boundaries of one nation and impact a whole region: “Al Jazeera emerged in an 
uncertain geo-political context in which the controversial ideology of the nation-state is receding 
in front of the more prominent trend toward transnational identities” (El Oifi 2005, 69).  The 
television station has helped with “the erosion of state sovereignty and borders as information 
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barriers and the greater accessibility of regional audiences” (Rinnawi 2006, 128).  This lack of 
boundaries makes it easier for one idea to start and bounce quickly to other nations. 
 Since its creation not only does the network critique behaviors of leaders in the Islamic 
World but it makes the leaders articulate their plans and policies more than they previously had 
to.  The use of Al Jazeera has brought speakers and audiences closer together by creating an 
“alternative to the ‘official story’ promulgated by state-controlled broadcast and print media, 
challenging other media” (Eickleman 2005, 47).  Authorities and commentators express their 
views on live broadcast, which enables them to be questioned and challenged in front of an 
audience (Eickleman 2005). Unrestricted satellite television lets the general Arab public 
participate in discussions about events across the region.  People anywhere in the Middle East 
can call in and challenge the authoritarian ruler.  When common citizens can ask questions on 
live television it forces governments to be more transparent and responsive to the public 
(Anderson 2003; Seib 2008).  Dictators have been put on the spot and forced to be open and 
honest, therefore changing their influence on their constituency.  The official version of news 
now comes from Al Jazeera and it is more objective than a state owned network and news 
source.   
 The response to this new process of open aired questioning was termed the Al Jazeera 
effect.  Al Jazeera has also liberalized Arab media by making the topics of discussion in its 
sphere of influence more diverse (El Oifi 2005).  Now the Arab media discusses women in 
society, religion, political power, the individual versus the state, and the meaning of modernity 
(Press and Williams 2010).  Topics are not limited to those that the regime wants to discuss.  
Issues of importance to the people can be debated.  Another contributor to liberalization of media 
is the use of multiple leaders of countries being questioned at once.  Not only does Al Jazeera air 
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debates between leaders and audiences but it has discussions between different Middle Eastern 
leaders.  Arab satellite television has “introduced viewers to the culture of public debate between 
various Arab figures” (El Oifi 2005, 75).  This helps to spread ideas from one state to the next by 
increasing communication among countries.   
 Even those who do not live in the region can watch the network and stay informed.  Al 
Jazeera has helped to form a McArabism sense of nationalism for Arabs in the Arab world and 
those “in diaspora and indigenous Arab minorities in other Middle Eastern countries” (Rinnawi 
2006, 7).  As well as being a satellite network, Al Jazeera has also launched a website to inform 
those who reside outside the Arab region.  The use of the Internet for Al Jazeera has helped to 
“strengthen national identity while also fostering a de-territorialized identity” (Seib 2008, 66).  
Not only do the Internet versions of the broadcasts make those within the Arab region feel akin 
to one another but it bonds those abroad.  The website makes it easier for people around the 
globe to stay informed with what is going on in the Middles East by those who reside in that 
area.  The website receives twelve million hits per day and is the first Arabic news site of its kind 
(Eickleman and Anderson 2003).  It enables the spread of information over a wider range of 
nations and people. 
 Al Jazeera has had a huge impact on the world, especially the Arab nations.  This 
influence cannot be overestimated because Al Jazeera has opened up the Arab world to new 
opportunities (Rushing 2007).  The programs are essential to Arab viewers because they provide 
“broadcasting in Arabic, by Arabs and for Arabs who, for decades, have been under the 
domination of foreign media broadcasters” (El Oifi 2005, 68).  Since the news outlets for people 
of the Middle East were either state news or foreign coverage, they did not receive the 
knowledge that they needed about the region.  In the past Arab nations did not know how they 
 19 
compared to other areas of the world.  They did not realize how fast they were falling behind not 
only the West but Eastern countries too (Rushing 2007).  The depictions on TV make citizens 
compare themselves to other regions.  The broadcasts allow citizens to make “comparisons 
between what they see on screen and what they have in almost all levels of life, particularly 
socially, politically, and materially” (Rinnawi 2006, 142).  The depictions of what is shown 
about Western life on Arab television have led analysts to expect political change.   
 The news station of Al Jazeera has opened up the region to potential political 
transformations.  The broadcasts are as much a political tool as anything else; it is “not only the 
biggest media phenomenon to hit the Arab world since the advent of television, it is the biggest 
political phenomenon” (Rushing 2007, 125).  This new form of political information through a 
non-state owned broadcasting station could bring “new dimensions to freedom of expression and 
political action” which could lead to democratization (Seib 2008, 48).  Arabs see the alternative 
government styles of other nations and envy some of the freedoms that they offer.  Even the 
director of Al Jazeera in 2005 commented that “democracy is coming to the Middle East because 
of the communication revolution.  You can no longer hide information and must now tell the 
people the truth.  If you don’t, the people won’t follow you, they won’t support you, they won’t 
obey you” (Seib 2008, 141).  This is a huge change from a decade ago when the media was 
controlled by leaders who could lie about their regimes.  It is for this reason that people believe 
that the political landscape of the Middle East is in transition.  It is all because of the opposition 
views and increase in availability of information that Al Jazeera has afforded the region (El Oifi 
2005 and Seib 2008).   
Social Media’s Impact in Politics 
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 When most people think of social media they think of the Internet, Facebook and Twitter, 
but it is much more than that.  Mobile phones and blogs are an important part of this new 
information sharing technology.  It is often debated when social media was created.  Some 
believe that in the 1980s the use of chat rooms and electronic note boards, which were the 
precursors to online networks and websites, were the start of social media.  However, modern 
social media and the expansion to the level of current usage began when Web 2.0 and social 
networking sites came into existence (Simon 2010).  Web 2.0 was introduced in 2002, when the 
average person could interact online with others around the world (Simon 2010).   
Besides debating its true origin, scholars also differ on what components actually make 
up social media.  All definitions of social media indicate that it has made information more 
available to the average person and at a quicker pace.  People can receive and upload new 
information no matter where their location.  Information is farther reaching and people can now 
know what is going on around the world pretty instantaneously; the population is more informed 
and connected to news.  Social media is more instantaneous than twenty-four hour television.  
People are updated about an event from the people at the site before, during and after the incident 
has happened.   
Yet scholars do differ in what they consider to be social media.  Blossom (2009, 29) 
defines social media as “any highly scalable and accessible communications technology or 
technique that enables any individual to influence groups of other individuals easily.”  Any 
social networking site, blog or mass texting device would qualify as social media under this 
definition.  When used for political reasons sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube qualify 
as influencing devices.  Simon (2010) considers social media to be only social networks and 
online networks.  This only encompasses a few select websites, and not even the entire Internet.  
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Included in this definition are Facebook and Twitter but excluded are any site where people 
cannot interact with one another, which could indicate that a blog is not a form of social media. 
Simon (2010) also leaves out key aspects of social media including mobile technology.  Lastly 
Press and Williams (2010) deem that social media is any new form of media, but limits it to 
specifically the Internet, cable and satellite television, digital recording, MP3 players and cell 
phones.  This definition is outdated because other scholars do not consider cable television to be 
a form of social media, and few would classify satellite television as a source of social media 
either.  For my thesis I will be using Blossom’s (2009) definition because the others are too 
narrow and specific.  Technology is changing so rapidly that the definition of social media needs 
to be variable instead of outlining only certain sites or types of appliances that can fall under the 
social media umbrella.  Blossom (2009) also includes the influential component of social media 
in his definition.  In this thesis it is important that people are influenced by the ideas of others.  
Without the ability to influence social media cannot be used as a tool to motivate people to join 
revolutions. 
 The types of social media outlets differ in usefulness and importance.  Some of the most 
popular social media types are mobile phones, SMS messaging (more commonly known as text 
messaging), blogs, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.  For most of the world’s population, it is 
cheaper to own a cell phone than a computer.  The technology for text messaging makes it easier 
to spread information than emailing or blogging (Rheingold 2002).  With a few taps of a finger, a 
message can be forwarded to ten friends or even an entire phonebook.  The cell phone has 
become an important facet of society and companies are trying to monopolize on this by making 
“it easy to receive alerts and news via SMS” (Goggin 2011, 101).  News organizations like CNN 
have capitalized on this.   
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 Through the use of cell phones and smart phones, citizens have become journalists and 
paved the way for future social media outlets such as YouTube and Twitter to allow for 
trustworthy news that is broadcasted by the average citizen.  When viewing old media sources 
today it appears that “much of the footage that was featured, capturing the latest events, was shot 
on mobile phone cameras, by individual protesters and witnesses … mobile and online media, 
[is] featured prominently in other ways in-how this news was created, listened to and watched, 
and circulated” (Goggin 2011, 99).  These forms of mass media are more centralized and even 
uploaded to social media sites as news (Hands 2011).  Citizen journalists communicate on-site to 
the world the occurrences that are going on around the globe.  All of these things allow for 
information to be spread easily and quickly among groups.   
 The phone is important but the Internet is a more recently publicized component of social 
media revolutions.  With this new tool, people have the ability to assemble their own sites and 
opinions on the Internet.  It is easier for people to freely post profiles on Internet sites when they 
feel anonymous; they do not fear the repercussions of the state.  They can create identities with 
more ease than face-to-face encounters (Press and Williams 2010).  With these identities they 
can meet like-minded individuals.  This anonymous feeling is important in electronically 
restrictive regimes in the Middle East.  It is easier to oppose the government when people cannot 
see you.
5
  These capabilities of the emerging media system will enrich cultural and political life 
by making communicating among people and nations easier (Press and Williams 2010).  Sharing 
of ideas outside of government control will occur more often and the ideas produced from these 
conversations will enrich the region. 
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 Within the Internet, social networking sites have led people to find one another.  Twitter 
has made huge advances for the social networking world.  It was created in 2006 with the idea 
that it would be “a brilliant network where friends were made effortlessly and without bias and a 
140-character limit ensured dialogue moved swiftly along, Twitter gave a voice to all those faces 
out there” (Simon 2010, 10).  It has turned into an area where groups of people can meet and 
interact, but also where news can easily flow and circulate quickly from one group to another.  
People conduct conversations by tweeting at friends, who they follow.  By using the same 
hashtag (#) people can easily find comments about the same issues.  Twitter enables an 
information-sharing environment.  Additionally with the process of retweeting, wide ranges of 
people can learn about current events, “The death of Michael Jackson, for example, travelled 
rapidly throughout the network, becoming a top trending topic and at high volume” (Crawford 
2011, 116).  The New York Times caught onto this circulation: “for many people their first 
contact with the news of Jackson’s death was on Twitter, before any coverage by newspapers, 
television or radio” (Crawford 2011, 116).  It is news stories like this that made Twitter change 
its motto.  From 2006 to 2009 the catchphrase read “what are you doing now” but the founders 
changed it to “what’s happening.”  This switch mirrors the change in Twitter’s role from purely 
social to a more journalistic media source (Crawford 2011).  There is an “increasing number of 
global news stories quoting Twitter or Twitter sources” because it is being used all across the 
world as more than a social network.  Twitter no longer is simply the status portion of Facebook, 
which tells about a person’s day, it is critical news, links and the witnessing of events (Crawford 
2011).  As a “platform that can lend itself to the speedy delivery of breaking news headlines” 
Twitter is a news source in itself now (Crawford 2011, 119).  The use of the social networking 
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site is being harnessed by some of the major networks, including the BBC, ABC and CNN, to 
spread breaking news to online members.  
 The use of social media has transformed the world of politics.  Across the world more 
people are using the Internet for political reasons.  In places such as the United States roughly 
three-fourths of people in the last month searched the Internet, including blogs, for political 
purposes.
6
  At the end of an article on a newspaper websites there is now the option to send the 
link to a friend, post on Facebook or Tweet about the article.  Politics and social media are 
meshing with ease: “If ever there were an activity that was perfectly tailored for social media, 
politics would certainly be it … social media enables masses of people to participate in political 
processes in personal ways that make all politics a local affair on a scale never before achieved 
in human history” (Blossom 2009, 164).  It makes each issue important to the recipient of the 
social media update.  People can also take these updates and then discuss with one another about 
what is going on in the political realm. 
 Social media allows for political issues to grow into movements.  This new 
communication form can cover a wider range of topics and for longer periods of time than other 
older news sources: “traditional media finds political causes that pay for a few commercial 
breaks and then moves on.  Social media finds causes that can grow into movements that carry 
personal endorsements into lasting influence” (Blossom 2009, 191).  People become passionate 
and involved with an issue and they continue conversations about the topics through social 
media.  Television and newspapers stop covering certain topics after a few days or if it will not 
support enough viewers.  Yet those who are inspired do not stop caring and can continue their 
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work through the use of social media.  These small issues can turn into larger ones that are 
pursued until corrected.   
 In the last decade there have been several occasions of smart mobs. Smart mobs are 
demonstrations and protests that are initiated by social media instruments.  Not all have been 
successful but in each instance the idea of revolution has begun to be spread through social 
media.  These attempts at smart mobs have not been reserved for those in the Western world.  On 
January 20, 2001 “President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines became the first head of state in 
history to lose power to a smart mob.  More than 1 million Manila residents, mobilized and 
coordinated by waves of text messages” to take down his regime (Rheingold 2002, 157).  
Through the actions taken during the movement the term Generation Txt was born (Rheingold 
2002).  In another example of a smart mob, the people of Myanmar used social media in a 
different manner than those in the Philippines.  Myanmar protesters in 2007 used social media to 
alert the world about what was occurring within the borders of the country.  The government-
controlled media was not accurately reporting on protests but “citizens equipped with text- and 
video-enabled mobile phones and concealed video cameras were able to capture many key 
moments of the protests and to find ways to transfer them from their phones to people outside of 
the country” (Blossom 2009, 189).  Uploading videos to the Internet heightened awareness of 
what was happening.  These posts enlightened outsiders because the images had circulated 
around the globe.  The outcome of the use of the Internet was that when television and 
newspapers stopped covering the issue, people online still rallied behind the cause.  It lasted 
longer through social media and more people were interested in the problems of Myanmar 
citizens (Blossom 2009). 
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 The Internet has been used to mobilize groups too.  The Obama campaign used “the 
Internet, text messaging and other forms of communication to build a now-legendary grassroots 
network of organizers and volunteers” (Hands 2011, 115).  This added people to the campaign 
and made individuals feel closer to the candidate.  Mobilization for a candidate could begin 
online and help to elect the individual.  People came together in support of Obama and began to 
pave his road to the White House.  
 Social networking sites can be utilized to organize people before protests.  A Facebook 
group known as No Mas FARC was arranged before protests in Columbia.  In 2008, after the 
country had been terrorized by the FARC guerilla movement for decades, over a million 
protesters stormed the streets and acted out against the FARC group (Morozov 2011).  The 
protests were unsuccessful because the FARC stopped the demonstrations.  However, the 
organization of the protest was successful because those who were repressed found each other 
online and strove to change the status quo.   Through grassroots organizations that begin online it 
is “thought that representative democracy and networked activism might combine to provide a 
radical tool to challenge the political system” (Hands 2011, 114).  Mobilization online led to the 
materialization of protests in the streets. 
 Even with this failure the No Mas FARC movement in Columbia impressed governments 
around the world.  Social networks and media had become a driving force and “American 
officials decided to embrace social networking sites as viable platforms for breeding and 
mobilizing dissent” (Morozov 2011, 182).  The United States even went as far as creating a five 
million dollar grant from the State Department for anyone in the Middle East to request funding 
“for projects that would ‘develop or leverage existing social networking platforms to emphasize 
priorities of civil engagement, youth outreach, political participation, or nonviolent conflict-
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resolution” (Morozov 2011, 183).  America wanted to help the people in the Middle East during 
2009.  The United States saw the value in social media and how it could affect politics 
worldwide.   
 The most talked about social media political movement prior to December of 2010 was in 
Iran.  During the 2009 protests in Iran, CNN failed to cover the story accurately (Crawford 
2011).  The average Twitter user who was being fed information agreed that CNN dropped the 
ball.  Therefore “the result was the emergence and widespread use of the tag #CNNFail, which 
then became a trending topic on Twitter” (Crawford 2011, 122).  CNN prides itself on being the 
number one source for political outbursts worldwide.  It quickly had to play catch up, as Twitter 
was the major source of news.  The reputation of CNN was damaged as people turned to social 
media for first hand accounts (Crawford 2011, 122).  This incident demonstrated the failure of 
“old media” and solidified the transition from television to newer media forms. 
 Social media started as an electronic note system in the 1980s with only a handful of 
users and has blown up into a global phenomenon.  It is expanding to more than just friend 
groups; it is influencing politics: “the explosion of social networking sites has succeeded in 
bringing people closer together as the restless masses stand on the mountaintop, waiting for the 
next revolution.  Where will it start?  Who knows?  But we’ll probably read about it on Twitter 
first” (Simon 2010, 10).  Social media will continue to impact those who look for political 
alternatives to their current system.  People who search for reform will meet and plan online 
before enacting these outbursts in the real world. 
Social Media in the Arab Region 
  As previously stated social media use to inspire political change is a global phenomenon.  
Prior to 2010 Iran was the biggest “success” story of social media in a protest.  Social media use 
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in politics has happened in the Middle East before, educating both citizens and leaders about the 
dangers of this new communication form.  While social media has been useful in political arenas 
around the globe, the number of users has specifically increased in the Middle East over the last 
few years.  The usage keeps growing at a rapid rate and since 2008 the increase in social media 
has been enormous.  One reason for the recent increased use in social media in the area can be 
that the majority of the population in the region is below the age of thirty (Eltahawy 2008).  The 
youth are tech savvy and want to be a part of these social networks.   
The increase in users has subsequently led to the increase in shared ideas and opposition 
to current political rule.  It is reported that in the last six years the access to Internet has increased 
by five hundred percent in the Middle East, and that almost universally in Arab countries it has 
mobilized political youth through their new access to social media (Lynch 2007).  Access to 
Internet is key for people to be able to access Web 2.0 and social media outlets that are based 
online.  Arab leaders have even deemed that “technology isn’t just a luxury of the developed 
world; it’s a crucial tool for the developing world.”7  Social media is everywhere and has 
impacted every facet of life.  Blogs have sprung up about sports, fashion and culture, as well as 
economics and politics.  Exploring social media use in the Arab world is important for 
understanding the unrest today. 
 As there was an increase in the use of blogs, the Internet, and social networking sites, 
there was an increase in the number of people who went online for political reasons.  The 
Internet became a forum for political debates and discussions for young activists, especially in 
Egypt (Eltahawy 2008).  It presented an opportunity for people who felt marginalized or 
oppressed to speak their mind about their grievances towards the government.  Women and 
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young adults are most often in the category of frustrated people who are seeking outlets to 
discuss their problems (Eltahawy 2008).  Sites such as Facebook allow those people to connect 
over common interests or frustrations.  People began to find one another and by 2010, just before 
recent protests, the number of Facebook users increased by 78 percent in the Arab world alone 
(Salem and Mourtada 2011).  Additionally one quarter of all Arab Facebook users are Egyptians 
(Salem and Mourtada 2011).   
 Facebook is not the only method of social networking that is popular among Middle 
Eastern people searching for those with similar frustrations and sentiments.  Twitter has a strong 
following in the area.  Arabs found Twitter to be a mix of blogging and social networking 
(Morozov 2009).  It is like a blog because discussions can be about whatever the person wants, 
whether it is personal feelings or current events.  Additionally people can link up with others 
who have common interests, which is the social network element.  They also found that it has a 
real ability to “challenge authoritarian Arab regimes by shattering their ability to control the flow 
of information, opinion, images and ideas” (Lynch 2011, 302).  As of 2009, there were 12,266 
people in the Arab world who had subscribed to Twitter and many more who visited without 
their own personal account.
8
  In 2009, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates had 
the highest Twitter population of all the Middle Eastern countries.
9
  Iran took advantage of this 
resource in 2009 and started using it for news.  With only one hundred and forty characters 
Twitter makes news quick and concise.
10
  It was used to depict to the outside world short updates 
of what was happening during the rallies. 
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 The potential for this technology to bring democracy to the region is being debated.  
Governments have tight control over the Internet and what gets put into cyberspace.  Yet, these 
restrictions are not stopping the youth of Middle Eastern nations from accessing Facebook and 
Twitter.  The tight control is backfiring and actually spawning “a generation adept at 
circumventing cyber road-blocks, making the country ripe for a technology-driven protest 
movement” (Morozov 2009, 10).  This generation is enthralled with blogging and social 
networking as a means of self-expression.  They are becoming more politically engaged and 
active (Lynch 2007).  The restrictions are not curbing this interest or diverting the youth from the 
Internet.  The Internet is being used across the region, from both individuals and organizations, 
to impact social platforms as well as politics and culture.
11
 
 Social media was used as a political tool within the Arab region prior to the Arab Spring 
in late 2010 and early 2011.  Media sources such as blogs were popular in politics in the early 
2000s: “bloggers have had a discernable impact in a wide range of Arab countries, including 
their role in the Kefaya movement in Egypt, political protests in Bahrain, the turbulent post-Al 
Hariri period in Lebanon, anti-corruption campaigns in Libya and the 2006 Kuwaiti elections” 
(Lynch 2007, 4).  In Egypt protests against President Mubarak were conducted in 2006.  The 
Kefaya movement wanted the president to transfer power to his son, Gamal.  Blogs and the 
Internet played key roles in mobilization of protesters.  The demonstrations did not accomplish 
their goals because Mubarak remained in power, but the protesters were successful because of 
their use of the Internet to mobilize people to the cause.  People learned of the protests through 
social media websites.  Blogs spread the word about the dates of the movement.  They also 
covered the protests before conventional news sources such as the Egyptian media and Al 
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Jazeera reported on them (Lynch 2007).  Bahrain also used blogs as a political tool.  The 
government imprisoned people for their political beliefs that were expressed online.  One such 
person, Abdulhadi Al Khawaja, who worked for the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, was 
arrested (Lynch 2007).  Protests broke out after this injustice.  In response to the protests, the 
government of Bahrain arrested more political activists and bloggers.  The blog was the first step 
in online political activism within the region (Lynch 2007). 
 Yet today social networks such as Twitter may be replacing blogs as the most important 
Internet tool when dealing with protests.  Twitter has had marginal success and some argue that 
especially in Iran in 2009, Twitter was a catalyst for the protests.  Social media was used to 
arrange and organize days of protest, including identifying where they would take place: “Iran’s 
youth effectively leveraged web-based social networking sites and messaging services to 
organize campaign rallies before the election, coordinate the protests that ensued, and document 
the police abuses at those protests” (Quirk 2009, 2).  This was the critical tool to instigate and 
organize protests in Iran (Morozov 2009).   
 Iran attempted to shut down Internet service to its citizens but failed.  Therefore, ordinary 
people used social messaging services such as Twitter and YouTube, “to document and 
disseminate to the world images of and information on repression in the wake of the recent 
election” (Quirk 2009, 2).  The use of the Internet to depict the protests changed how the election 
results were discussed.  News stations no longer focused on the political process that sparked the 
uprisings; the use of Twitter became the new story.  The whole world began to watch, blog, 
Tweet, Google, and YouTube about Iran.  With a few clicks of a mouse one could be 
“bombarded by links that seemed to shed more light on events in Iran” (Morozov 2011, 5).  The 
protests drew people’s interest because they were believed to be the first Twitter revolution.   
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 The number of people who were protesting the election results and wanted Ahmadinejad, 
the incumbent president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, out of office was a small portion of the 
population.  However, it was this group of pro-Western and technologically savvy individuals 
that the world was listening to (Morozov 2009).  They could manipulate the Internet and foreign 
countries into helping them because their side of the story was easily accessible.  What has 
become known as Generation Txt or Generation Facebook succeeded in mobilizing people for 
two main reasons.  The generation has taken to a bold blogging technique and then it transfers 
that blogging and social media use to street activism (Eltahawy 2008).   
 People in the West are quick to point to the Iranian revolution as a success story for 
social media.  The use of Twitter is being celebrated while opening doors for prodemocracy 
throughout the region.  However, before jumping to conclusions, a more critical view of Iran is 
necessary.  There was an overemphasis on the importance of social media in the revolutions in 
Iran.  A large portion of the population did not see the events of the election as being unfair; 
therefore, Ahmadinejad was not overthrown.  This may be why the West focused on the Twitter 
use more than what the majority of the people actually wanted.  Western journalists and bloggers 
stretched the scenario to make it a social media war (Morozov 2011).  Since Mousavi, the 
presidential candidate running against Ahmadinejad, never gained power, numerous critics 
believe that the Twitter revolution was “dreamed up and advanced by cyber-utopian Western 
commentators, who finally got a chance to prove that the billions of hours that humanity wastes 
on Twitter and Facebook are not spent in vain” (Morozov 2009, 11).  More than changing the 
political atmosphere of Iran, it proved that the West longs for a world in which social media and 
technology is so widespread and advanced that it can spread democracy (Morozov 2011).  
Looking back on the uprising, most individuals deem that the role of Twitter in the Green 
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Revolution of 2009, after the elections, was exaggerated.  The number of Iranian Tweeters 
during the revolution was over estimated since many tweets about the events actually came from 
outside of Iran (Kavanaugh et al. 2011).  Additionally people within the country did not 
necessarily receive their information from the social networking site.  Taxi cab drivers were a 
main source of information for whether protests were occurring on a specific day and where they 
were currently taking place (Kavanaugh et al. 2011).  The use of social media in Iran was similar 
to the Egyptian’s use of Facebook in 2006, because the small percentage of people who did use 
social media caught the authorities off guard.  This initial factor of surprise and temporary 
success made analysts search for a reason behind the excessive media coverage of Iran (Lynch 
2011). 
 Critics have concluded that it is highly unlikely that a social networking site could be the 
main contributor to the demise of a government regime.  Blogging will not broadly change the 
political landscape of the Middle East (Lynch 2007).  Some even went so far as to indicate that 
“if an authoritarian regime can crumble under the pressure of a Facebook group, whether its 
members are protesting online or in the streets, it’s not much of an authoritarian regime.  The 
real effects of digital activism would thus most likely be felt only in the long term rather than 
immediately” (Morozov 2011, 198).  It is now the objective of governments to see what role 
these new forms of communication will take for “understanding how the Internet fits a particular 
political and social environment” and it is a challenge that faces every country (Morozov 2009, 
14).  How social media impacts politics is a topic that has been widely debated in the last year 
since the Arab Spring began. 
The Impact of Social Media in the Arab Spring 
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The protests within North African and the Middle Eastern nations in 2010 and 2011 
called for changes to their political system. These protests bloomed over a society-wide 
mobilization to remove the leaders from office (Lynch 2011).  Social media was used in each of 
the six countries that make up the Arab uprising.  Each nation utilized social media but used it in 
a different manner; therefore, the range of success has varied.  What is common among them all 
is the use of one or multiple outlets including blogs, Facebook, Twitter, video sites such as 
YouTube, and text messaging during the Arab Spring.  However conventional methods of 
organizing people at mosques and through fliers were used too.  This allows for contradictions in 
examining the extent to which social media was used and the question of whether it made a 
difference in all of the revolutions is still being determined.    
The uprisings began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010.  When the day before a man 
committed self-immolation based off of the deprivations he felt while living in Tunisia, the 
country entered a state of chaos.  Many people began to protest.  Using Tunisia as a model, 
uprisings spread to Egypt and then quickly to Bahrain and Syria.  Protests began in Egypt on 
January 25, 2011.  Soon after the defeat of Mubarak the uprisings were launched in Bahrain on 
February 14, 2011. The last of the countries that I will analyze to engage in political activism 
was Syria, which didn’t begin rallies until March 16, 2011.12  During the rebellion, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were successful in removing their leaders.  In Yemen the leader was 
injured during an assassination attempt and temporarily left office but returned after three 
months and has subsequently resigned.
13
  The outcomes of both Syria and Bahrain are grimmer.  
The governments have brutally responded and no changes have come from the revolts.  
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 In 2010 by the time of the uprisings, the use of the Internet, especially social media, for 
political uses was commonplace in the Middle East.  By the time that mobilization occurred in 
Egypt the number of Facebook users had risen, and there were “21 million Arab users, more than 
the estimated total number of newspaper readers in the region … Egypt and Tunisia had 
particularly high levels of membership” (Lynch 2011, 303).  However, the political aspect of the 
protests was not what was covered most by outside news sources.  Numerous media outlets 
focused on the social media aspect of the demonstrations and what inspired the revolts just as 
much as the day-to-day struggles.  Since the Arab Spring has unfolded, there have been three 
schools of thought about the role that social media played within the countries that protested.  
Some scholars believe that social media was essential for the uprisings to occur, others thought 
that it played no role and was over emphasized by Western nations, and the last describes the use 
of social media as important to outside countries but not those within the Middle East.  Which of 
these, if any, provides the actual significance of social media in these situations will be 
determined in the months and years to come. 
 There are some scholars who attribute the Arab Spring largely to the use of social media.  
Prior to these outbursts social media had been growing as a political tool.
14
  More than simply 
organizing where to begin the protests, social media allowed for “like-minded members to find 
one another and to make their true beliefs known in a semi-public setting” (Lynch 2011, 304).  
Once dissatisfied people had found one another they could organize before taking their plans to 
the streets and general public.  Social media was the key to mobilization.  Facebook and Twitter 
have been cited as the most important aspects of the Internet to encourage the protests.  After 
witnessing the revolts, one reporter described that “much of the online organizing and 
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mobilization that went into the Arab revolutions happened on Facebook, usually in Arabic” 
(Hounshell 2011, 21).  This group believes that without social media no movement would have 
been initiated. 
 Others oppose this belief that social media inspired the Arab Spring.  These people 
believe that media cannot force change onto people, that new media has its limits (Seib 2008).   
They deem it impossible for only a website to create such a large mass movement and for that 
action to be successful.  These critics find it “surprisingly difficult to demonstrate rigorously that 
these new media directly caused any of the outcomes with which they have been associated” 
(Lynch 2011, 302).  To the individuals that advocate for this school of thought, the same 
outcome would have been produced whether social media was used or not because it did not add 
to the demonstrations, and could potentially have hindered the revolution.  Scholars purport that 
while social media may have been used it was not an important factor in gaining people as 
members of the movement for democracy.  People did not organize, mobilize, or produce a 
successful rebellion through the use of social media tools.  The protesters had grievances and 
took those to the streets.  People learned of these demonstrations through older forms of 
communication and joined; that is how mobilization of the population occurred and not through 
social media. 
 There is a third grouping of people who believe that social media played a role in 
informing the rest of the world about what was occurring in the Middle East.  In other words, 
social media did not impact the actual protests but the perception of them.  These individuals 
believe that the real purpose of networks like Twitter and Facebook was changing public opinion 
about the demonstrations in foreign countries.  It made people sympathize with those who were 
fighting for democracy, and it allowed them to better understand what was going on in the 
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country while it was happening.  Most Western countries thought favorably about the leaders 
before December of 2010 because they were United States allies.  After the use of social media 
to depict hardships, public opinion turned in the favor of the populations fighting for change.  
This had been a crucial factor in earlier Arab revolts and would be beneficial for countries during 
the Arab Spring.  Twitter and other social media, whether it was coming from within Iran or not, 
exposed the 2009 Iranian protests and shaped global opinion of those in the streets.  Since 
spreading information to outside countries had occurred before it is easy to see how it could 
shape public opinion again this time during the Arab Spring.  Social media was used to alter the 
mindset of those abroad rather than to mobilize protesters to request that leaders leave.   
 Whether the protests began because of social media, social media helped in spreading the 
visualization of on-the-ground fighting, or social media played no substantial role at all is to be 
determined.  What is known is that the desperation of one man in Tunisia led to protests, which 
quickly carried and spread to other Arab nations including Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Libya, and 
Yemen.  The uprisings in Egypt are essential for disturbances in other countries within the 
region.  Social change that happens within Egypt is often easily reverberated and duplicated in 
other Arab Middle Eastern politics (Eltahawy 2008).  Through the unification of the Arab region, 
the countries could recognize their deprivations and use technology to mobilize against their 
dictators.   
Looking at specific countries and analyzing how social media impacted Tunisia, Egypt, 
Bahrain, and Syria individually will help to conclude whether social media influenced the Arab 
Spring as a whole.  Whether social media led to the success of these protests and revolutions is 
what my thesis will explore.  It will discern if the use of social media led to the Arab Spring or if 
journalists and the media exaggerated the impact of this communication tool. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology for Case Studies 
 In order to decide if social media played any role in the collective Arab Spring, individual 
nations need to be analyzed.  Only six nations are considered to be a part of the Arab Spring; all 
of the other nations that experienced unrest were not organized enough and their protests are 
considered to be more clashes with the government than full on rebellions.
15
  The six countries 
that the media focused its attention on possessed the largest and most organized protests in the 
Arab region.
16
  There were other countries such as Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia that 
had some unrest and minor rallies.  Yet they did not reach the status of revolution because 
civilian life and the economy were not disrupted in the same manner as the Arab Spring 
nations.
17
  I will analyze the specific circumstances that surround the mobilization and protests 
within Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Bahrain during the Arab uprising.  Libya and Yemen have 
different circumstances that surround their uprisings; therefore, I will not focus on these nations 
within my thesis.  My thesis will look at how large a role social media did play in these protests 
and which, if any, of the three schools of thought regarding social media influence most 
accurately portrays the importance of social media within each nation. 
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Case Study Countries 
 My thesis will assess which of the three schools of thought apply to each country, and from 
those assertions I can determine the role that social media played overall.  The following 
chapters can attest to how important of a factor social media was in dethroning those in power 
and why protests failed in some states while succeeding in others. By using Tunisia, Egypt, 
Syria, and Bahrain, I will have two countries that were successful in dethroning their leaders and 
two that still live under their regimes (as of the time I am writing).  This will make it easier to 
look at what impact social media has on the protests.   
 Specific circumstances within Libya and Yemen make these countries dissimilar from the 
rest of those that are categorized in the Arab Spring.  Libya had an intervention by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  It was not a rebellion that was completely conducted by 
the citizens within the nation.  Without the help of NATO and other forces, the dictator 
Muammar Qaddafi may not have been overthrown or killed.  While the Bahrain revolution used 
outside forces as well, it did so at the idea of the king rather than other countries that do not have 
sovereignty over the nation.  Social media cannot be fairly evaluated in Libya since outside 
forces took over the rebellion to rid the nation of Qaddafi.  The success of the revolution cannot 
be linked with social media, because the protests within the nation are not the sole reasoning for 
the toppling of the government.  Without the help of foreign nations the end result may have 
been different and not deemed a success.  The impact of social media may or may not have 
helped to rally forces to push the president out of office but it cannot be confidently analyzed 
since NATO intervened.  Therefore, it is difficult to compare it to the other countries within the 
Arab Spring movement.   
 Yemen is also different than the other four nations.  The people of Yemen do not see 
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themselves in the same light that the protesters of the other five countries did.  Yemenis first 
wanted reform and not revolution.   A Yemeni journalist stated the following in an interview 
with The Guardian: "these were not spontaneous or popular protests like in Egypt, but rather 
mass-rallies organised by the opposition who are using events in Tunisia to test Saleh's regime. 
This is only the start of a fierce political battle in the run-up to Yemen’s parliamentary elections 
in April.”18 These protesters wanted to change their frustrations with the government through 
opposition parties and the electoral process.  Additionally another thing that sets Yemen apart 
from the other four countries that I have chosen is the president.  He was injured during an 
assassination attempt and left Yemen for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia.  He ruled from 
foreign soil for three months.  Who knows what decisions he would have made concerning the 
protests if he had remained within his own borders for the entirety of the rallies.
19
  He finally and 
officially stepped down on February 27, 2012.
20
  It is inconsistent with the other case studies that 
I have chosen to conduct; therefore, I will not compare it to the other countries within the Arab 
Spring.   
Sources 
 When looking for sources to evaluate the impact of social media on the four countries I 
examine, I initially tried to get first hand accounts provided by the people within the countries or 
those reacting to the protests.  Tweets, Facebook pages, or copies of texts that were used by 
protesters are the types of sources that would have been most useful.  In some places, such as 
Egypt, that was easy to procure, while in others the Internet was not used as widely to post 
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expressions and feelings about the revolution.  Some places posted videos of what was 
happening but they were not beneficial for indicating the impact of social media on those rallies.  
The videos themselves did not indicate how many people joined the rallies because of this use of 
social media.  I could better understand what the people of the nation and foreigners were 
viewing but could not see the impact that these videos had just by watching them.  Therefore, the 
sources that I did evaluate were mostly news articles from the time period of the revolutions as 
well as journal articles and scholarly papers that analyzed social media or the reason for success 
in the Arab Spring.  News articles from America, the United Kingdom, and the Arab region were 
used.  Only articles, tweets and other sources that were written in English could be analyzed for 
this thesis.  Additionally ongoing research from professors debating similar topics was also taken 
into account when addressing the influence of social media on the Arab Spring.   
 In all scenarios, I learned about the background and actual events that took place in the 
uprisings and then how social media was used to potentially influence these events and the 
mobilization of people.  A wide variety of information was needed to be able to analyze the 
impact of social media.  I also made sure to look at different types of social media for each 
nation; these types include social networking sites, video sites, mobile phones, and blogs.  
Different forms of social media targeted different groups; some nations used multiple media 
outlets while others focused directly on one or two to organize and mobilize.  What social media 
types were used also was based on the socioeconomic makeup of the nation.  In a poor country 
that is fighting for more political freedoms and changes to their economic system, the general 
population had the money to afford SMS messages but may not have had access to the Internet, 
which impacted social media usage.  
 The sources that I have chosen are necessary and essential to this research because they 
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provide extensive knowledge of the uprisings in each country.  Analysis of social media covered 
an expansive amount of time so that not just the beginning organizational posts and messages 
were chosen to distinguish the influence.  Social media was depicted from the start of the 
revolution to either the end or present rebellions.  Not only did I use sources from before and 
during the revolutions, but for those countries that have overthrown their dictators, I looked at 
articles afterwards analyzing how the overthrow happened.  These articles were not written until 
months later, after the countries had settled down, and academics could find reasons for the 
success of these protests versus previous attempts at democracy.  The research covered numerous 
topics and was objective.  The sources can accurately depict if social media was used in each 
country. 
Schools of Thought on the Impact of Social Media 
 There are three general schools of thought on how social media impacted the Arab Spring 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Bahrain.  These are: social media was necessary for the revolution 
to begin and the revolutions would not have happened or continued without the use of social 
media; social media was not essential to the success of the uprising and the use of social media 
was exaggerated by the media; and social media was used to change the opinions of outsiders 
about the regime and those protesting against it rather than to organize protesters within a nation.  
When looking at sources and evidence to determine which of these schools a country falls under 
it is important to determine: when social media was used, how it was used within the country or 
if it was used to target those who were abroad, what types of social media were used, and what 
happened if and when the government tried to limit access to social media.  Some countries had 
limited use of Internet, and others could not use broadband width or mobile phones at all because 
the government shut down these means of communication.  Any change in style of mobilization 
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or change in tactics of protests after government action will contribute to my conclusions in 
indicating how important social media was in each case study. 
 If I conclude that social media was used in a country and the nation falls under the first 
classification of schools, then certain things had to have taken place before or during the protests.  
Social media must have been used to organize and mobilize people to a protest.  Therefore, 
discussions and actions involving social media would have taken place before people moved to 
the streets.  A specific date and time must have been set and discussed using social media outlets.  
Grievances must have been talked about before the protests and the official start of the revolution 
began.  Social media would have been used to target key facts about the demonstrations 
including when, where and how the protests would take place.  In this school any type of social 
media can be used, and protests will be slightly altered by the government shut down of social 
media forms; however, protests will still continue. 
 The second classification does not mean that social media was not used at all in the 
country.  Scholars who believe that social media was over exaggerated do not think that such 
media sources were not utilized during the time of the uprising.  They just deem that social 
media could not have started the revolution.  Instead, built up anger caused people to protest, not 
a Facebook page or other form of social media.  What this school deems is that the news media 
greatly exaggerated the use of social media during the revolution.  Therefore, it did not play any 
role in starting the revolution and it was not essential for the revolution to continue.  In this 
school, protests started before online discussions.  These uprisings were spontaneous rather than 
preplanned and discussed online.  Social media was not necessarily a rallying technique.  People 
did not depend on social media to indicate what was happening within the protests.  Protests 
would have been unchanged by the government shut down of social media forms because they 
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were not essential to starting or maintaining the protests.  Digital media was an addition but not 
one that made the protests into a revolution or made the revolution successful. 
 The last category that social media impact can fall under is that it was necessary for 
altering the perceptions of foreign nations about what was happening within the country.  
Through outsiders viewing how protesters were treated by the current government, public 
opinion could change from a pro-government stance towards pro-democracy and demonstrators.  
This would cause foreign nations and leaders to put pressure on the Arab Spring governments to 
make concessions with their constituents or resign from office.  For this to have occurred within 
a nation, those within the country need to have targeted outside individuals.  In this school of 
thought the protesters’ use of social media increased once protests began because they had more 
videos and tweets from the demonstrations to depict how the government was mishandling the 
peaceful marches.  Foreigners paid more attention to the citizen based news that was coming out 
of revolutionary countries after protests had begun in each nation.  Online social media forms 
would have been used more often than mobile devices or other types of digital media because the 
Internet can more easily reach those within foreign nations.  Poor countries cannot use SMS 
messages to contact people in foreign nations; therefore, mobile phones would not be an 
important tool.  Depicting hardships and protests as a form of propaganda and creating sympathy 
for the protesters would have been a main purpose of uploading videos to the Internet.  
Additionally in this school of thought, the protests would have been completely altered by the 
shut down of social media sources.  People were willing to do anything to get back on the 
Internet and have access and contact to foreign nations. 
 These three schools differ in whether social media is deemed to make the protests a 
success.  The first school of influence indicates that social media is necessary for protests to 
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begin and for them to succeed, in the second school there is no real added benefit from social 
media and it is unnecessary for the success of demonstrations, and finally in the third school of 
thought social media is necessary for the success of the revolution because foreigners would aid 
and support those in the streets.  Of the countries that were analyzed, every school of thought 
was represented.  By using the criteria of what social media devices were used, when they were 
used, how they were used in protests, and what happened when the government tried to stop 
demonstrators from using them, I can determine which popularly declared school of thought on 
the impact of social media each of the countries of the Arab Spring fall into.  Through that 
knowledge a larger picture can be drawn on the influence of new media types in the Arab Spring, 
and this information will help future revolutionaries who wish for their protests to succeed. 
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Chapter 3: The Uprising in Tunisia 
 Tunisia was the first of the Arab uprisings to occur.  Citizens within the nations were 
tired of the corrupt regime and lack of economic mobility.  The protests began on December 18, 
2010, and lasted until January 14, 2011.  These rallies set an example for the rest of the Arab 
world, demonstrating that peaceful protests could accomplish the goals of their participants.  The 
president was forced to leave the country because the population was not willing to make 
concessions or have him in power for any longer than his current reign had permitted. 
Social media was prevalent during the Arab uprisings.  In Tunisia, mobile devices and 
uploaded videos on the Internet were the most important forms of social media.  However, these 
devices were used after December 17, 2010, when the revolution began and after December 18, 
2010, when the first protests broke out in Sidi Bouzid.  Social media was used more to depict the 
treatment of police towards those protesting in the streets, which reminded people why the 
protests began and how the protests began in the first place.  Social media was not used until 
after the beginning of the uprising.  In fact other forms of media and organizational tactics were 
used instead.  Unions, professional groups and satellite TV had large impacts in the beginning of 
the protest.
21
  People with common grievances stormed the streets in protests against the 
government.  Social media was not utilized to begin these protests, which is why social media 
use in the rebellion of Tunisia is categorized as over exaggerated and not important for the 
success of the demonstrations. 
 
 
  
                                                        
21
 Lewis, Aidan, “Tracking Down the Ben Ali and Trabelsi Fortune,” The BBC News, 30 January 2011, accessed: 12 
January 2012 < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12302659>. 
 47 
     Table 1: The important dates in the Tunisian Revolution. 
WikiLeaks article was posted online – December 7, 2010 
Bouazizi conducts the act of self-immolation –December 17, 2010 
First Protest—December 18, 2010 
Internet blackout begins – January 7, 2011 
Concessions between Ben Ali and the people begin – January 12, 2011 
President Ben Ali resigns –January 14, 2011 
 
Events in Tunisia 
 President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (usually referred to as President Ben Ali) had been the 
leader of Tunisia for twenty-three years, since he took over in a bloodless coup.  His family ruled 
the country in a mafia-esque manner because they had a stake in every major business in the 
economy.  Ben Ali, his wife and close family, controlled thirty to forty percent of the entire 
Tunisian economy.
22
  They were domineering and conducted business in fraudulent manners, 
which created the mafia nickname of “The Family” among Tunisian citizens (Dickinson 2011).  
The website WikiLeaks, which is devoted to bringing secure or innovative news and information 
to the world, helped to publicize some of the corruption present within the ruling family 
(Anderson 2011).  The website demonstrated the disparity between the people of Tunisia and 
“The Family” when it leaked videos and documents from government officials on December 7, 
2010 (Anderson 2011).  Table 1 indicates that on December 7, the WikiLeaks website uploaded 
videos of private jets taking Ben Ali’s wife shopping in Europe.  It also had accounts from the 
U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia describing the luxuries that President Ben Ali and his family had 
attained.  The report mentioned their spacious home, which was covered with ancient artifacts 
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from around the world, lovely multiple course meat filled dinners, a pet tiger, and a wait staff 
including a Bangladesh butler and South African nanny (Anderson 2011).  These items are all 
rare in Tunisia and to see so much wealth and flaunting of that wealth in one place angered the 
people of Tunisia.  The average everyday Tunisian was “struggling to build livelihoods, while 
the families of the president and those connected to him enriched themselves” at the expense of 
the general population (Angrist 2011, 1).  This had become an increasingly problematic situation 
in “the context of the financial and economic crisis of the last two years.”23  The citizens within 
the country could no longer ignore the problems and frustrations that they felt toward the 
government, including “high unemployment and regional inequities. As a consequence, the risks 
to the regime's long-term stability [were] increasing.”24  After WikiLeaks spread this 
information, the Tunisian government began to crackdown on social networks and the Internet 
because it did not want these images to become widespread (Anderson 2011). 
 While corruption was a huge part of why protesters wanted President Ben Ali gone, it 
was not the sole grievance that incited the revolution; inequalities and the lack of opportunities 
also inspired people to take action.  The official figure for the overall unemployment rate in 
Tunisia was fourteen percent before December 2010; yet, in reality it was much higher.
25
  More 
specifically for the age range of fifteen to twenty-nine year olds, the unemployment rate for those 
with educations was thirty percent.
26
  Fed up with the lack of economic opportunity and mobility 
as well as the rampant poverty within Tunisia, Mohamed Bouazizi decided to make a statement.   
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The revolution in Tunisia officially began on December 17, 2010 when Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a twenty-six year old college educated vegetable vendor, conducted the act of self-
immolation in front of a government building.
27
  Inequalities were the main motivator for 
Bouazizi.  He chose this spot as a sign of disrespect to the police and government of Tunisia.  
This was an act of desperation for he had tried to seek help regarding his food stand but was 
beaten every time he went to an authority figure to seek guidance.  Bouazizi went further and 
further into debt just to try and sell enough food everyday to earn money to feed himself, but 
“The Family” could fly to Europe for shopping or to Disney World for a vacation (Anderson 
2011).  It was hard for people with an education to find a job so they resorted to selling simple 
things like vegetables to make money.  Occupations such as this employed the poorest people 
within the country of Tunisia.  When Bouazizi lit himself on fire, “this set off protests about jobs 
in the town, which has an agriculture-based economy in one of the poorest regions of the 
country.”28  It began the revolution in Tunisia and then what became known as the Arab Spring. 
 His action was the spark necessary to inspire people first in Sidi Bouzid, where Bouazizi 
lived and worked, and then other provinces around Tunisia to protest against President Ben Ali’s 
rule.29  Bouazizi’s act was so dramatic and beyond normal social parameters that other Tunisians 
also decided the President’s reign had been unbearable for too long.  They flocked to the streets: 
“these were the first protestors, who rioted in the streets of Sidi Bouzid.  Their actions triggered 
bandwagoning by thousands more who joined the demonstrations, emboldened by the sight of 
their fellow citizens daring to confront the regime” (Angrist 2011, 1).  While protests began in 
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Sidi Bouzid, they quickly spread around the nation.  Clashes were contained to Sidi Bouzid for 
more than ten days but shortly before the New Year they spread to neighboring towns.30  These 
areas include Thala, Kasserine, and Regueb, which are closer to the capital Tunis than Sidi 
Bouzid is.  Protests moved from one town to another as more people were outraged at the 
reaction of authority figures to the peaceful demonstrators: “these demonstrations then spread 
elsewhere … the violent response of the authorities - with the police opening fire on 
demonstrators - appears to have exacerbated anger and ignited further protests.”31  Police 
violence was common in all towns, not just Sidi Bouzid.  Over the particularly bloody weekend 
of January 8 and January 9, 2011, five people were killed in Thala, three were declared dead in 
Kasserine, and three were killed in Regueb.32   
 The classes of people who tended to join the protests were students.  Unemployed 
students, graduates, and lawyers were the first wave of protesters because they were frustrated 
with the lack of opportunities and freedoms, “the excesses of the ruling class and anger at police 
brutality seem to have come together to spark an unstoppable wave of public anger.”33  Students 
were suffering the most because they were educated but could not make money; this is why they 
were the first groups of people to move to the streets in Sidi Bouzid (Howard and Hussain 2011). 
Soon others joined the demonstrations and protests within each town went morphed from a few 
hundred people to a little over a thousand.  It was not until after the death of Bouazizi on January 
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4, 2011, that the number of protests and demonstrators swelled in Tunis.34  Even with the swell in 
numbers, the demands of the protesters did not change much over the month long 
demonstrations.  Beginning as an outcry over the inequalities and corruption within Tunisia, the 
demands quickly moved from the call for reforms to the end of President Ben Ali’s rule as well. 
 President Ben Ali put up restrictions to stop the protests.  He encouraged the police to 
take action against those who were in the streets, saying that the brutality would be ok since it 
was considered “protecting public property against a small number of ‘terrorists.”35  Additionally 
to keep people off the streets, “all universities and schools were closed in a bid to keep young 
people at home.”36  In a final attempt to stop the spread of protests, the government shut down 
the Internet on January 7, 2011 (Anderson 2011).  Since the Internet had not been used as an 
organizational tool, face-to-face contact continued to spread the word about the revolution.  The 
blackout did not affect the protests or slowdown the rallies in the street because it did not impact 
personal contact.  Yet that effort at stopping mobilization to the rebellion didn’t work either, so 
President Ben Ali changed tactics and attempted to compromise with the now growing number 
of protesters.  To his dismay, bargaining was the only option that would allow him to remain in 
office. 
 Even though protests began to get ugly, with increased number of deaths, President Ben 
Ali was not willing to withdraw his power so quickly.  President Ben Ali fought for his position 
in office even as “the clashes became much more deadly on the weekend of 8-9 January, and 
then spread to the capital Tunis.  The government says 78 people have been killed in the 
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protests.”37  He did not initially want to give up his reign so he tried to bargain.  On January 12, 
2011, he fired his whole cabinet and interior minister and ordered the release of those who had 
been arrested during the protests (Anderson 2011).  He tried to curb anger by creating a 
government department that would investigate corruption.38  Citizens knew that most of the 
corruption came from within President Ben Ali’s office and no one would dare investigate him; 
therefore, this committee was a sham.  The protesters wanted real change and continued their 
demonstrations for his departure from the country.  He also tried to sweeten the deal by ordering 
his “security police to stop using live ammunition on protesters … cut the price of basic 
foodstuffs, and promised to allow a freer media and end Internet censorship” (Zuckerman 2011, 
1).  Ben Ali kept making concessions because none were working; he tried to meet the demands 
of the protesters but all they wanted was his removal and a new government system.   
Further concessions were made that targeted root causes of protests.  Another change that 
Ben Ali tried was to create an extra 300,000 jobs in the economy.  President Ali hoped that this 
would solve one of the demands that protesters had against the regime.  Lastly President Ben Ali 
stated that he would not run for reelection in 2014 when his term was supposedly going to end 
and that he would establish “new parliamentary elections within six months.”39  Yet all of these 
attempts to ameliorate the lives of Tunisians were not enough for the people of Tunisia.  Citizens 
did not believe that anything proposed by Ben Ali would actually illicit change.  On January 13, 
Ben Ali initiated a curfew for the Tunisian people.  This was the final straw for demonstrators.  
Those in the streets continued to rally, and protests exploded in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia.  
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People ignored the nighttime curfew that Ben Ali had set in place and stayed in the streets.  They 
did not want to leave until Ben Ali resigned from the government.40  President Ben Ali was 
forced from office and fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia, which was one of the only places that he 
was granted exile, on January 14, 2011. 
Uses of Social Media 
 Social media specifically mobile phones and sites such as DailyMotion, which hosts 
videos and is used like YouTube, were utilized during the Tunisian uprising.  Tunisia is unique 
among North African countries because a large percentage of its citizens actually used social 
networking websites before December 2010.  A little less than twenty percent of those with 
Internet access had their own Facebook accounts (Kavanaugh et al 2011).  However, the country 
ranks one hundred and sixty fourth out of one hundred and seventy eight nations in the world for 
press freedom; the government censors most of the Internet.
41
  With such strict censorship 
anything anti-government was forbidden and closely monitored.  A jail sentence was likely given 
to anyone who opposed the government through the Internet.  During the protests, the most 
popular forms of social media were video uploading websites (whether it was DailyMotion or 
Facebook) and SMS messaging.  Although text messages and videos that were uploaded to the 
Internet were important tools for educating people on the protests occurring in the country, they 
did not start until after the revolution had begun (Howard and Hussain 2011). Therefore, the 
Internet social media sites were not used for organization in Tunisia.  Tunisia mobilized and 
organized using ways of communicating that the state could not control.   
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 Social media only came into play for people in other cities of Tunisia who heard of 
Bouazizi and the uprisings in Sidi Bouzid that took place shortly after he set himself on fire.  
Some people learned about the rallies through word of mouth or witnessing one and felt 
encouraged to participate. To learn more information about what was going on within the 
country than could be discovered through face-to-face encounters, Tunisians could use social 
media.  Traditional media forms such as newspaper articles, were controlled by President Ben 
Ali, and could not be trusted.  Since national television was not covering the situation and 
foreign media was chalking it up to vandalism or terrorism within Tunisia, people who wanted 
the truth turned to their phones and the Internet (Zuckerman 2011).  The Tunisian public could 
not even look at outside news sources for help because news stories on sites such as the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC) and other foreign correspondents were blocked online during the 
protests.
42
  Online posts uploaded by natives, informed people of the reasons, actions and 
responses to the Tunisian protests.  While social media was used by some it was not enough 
people to warrant this communication type an intricate part of rallying people to the protests. 
 The sudden surge in Internet activity, after protests began when people were attempting 
to inform other Tunisians through videos about the ongoing protests, caught Al Jazeera’s 
attention and educated the station on the situation too.  These posts made Al Jazeera dispatch 
someone to cover the revolts (Howard and Hussain 2011).  It was the first news station to cover 
what was actually going on in Tunisia, and it had footage of the demonstrations.  Al Jazeera 
picked up the videos of citizens in the streets and played them on the air and online.  More 
people in Tunisia would have learned about protests through this television coverage rather than 
through the Internet.   
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Al Jazeera’s coverage allowed neighboring countries in the Arab region to see the 
protests that were occurring within the country.  It also allowed other regions of the world to see 
that the uprising was not an act of terrorism or vandalism, but instead peaceful gatherings to fight 
for more freedoms and a new government.  The videos also showed the abuse of the military and 
government, as they beat and shot at the peaceful protesters (Howard and Hussain 2011).  People 
saw treatment of protesters and went into the streets.  Al Jazeera, while important in the region, 
is merely satellite television and not social media; therefore, those who joined the cause after 
these broadcasts cannot be attributed to social media use.  The use of videos on the Internet 
corrected misunderstandings about the reasoning behind the protests.  Through Tunisians’ use of 
websites such as the DailyMotion, Al Jazeera picked up the news and made it easy for Arab 
nations to discount other reporters’ misinformed accounts of the Tunisian uprising (Zuckerman 
2011).  
Facebook and Twitter 
 The Internet was used to upload videos of people actually protesting.  More specifically, 
Facebook, DailyMotion, and Twitter were the social media sites that were used to upload videos 
or post about the demonstrations.  Yet, before celebrating the use of these Web 2.0 devices, there 
are some caveats.  Only thirty-four percent of the people within Tunisia prior to Ben Ali’s 
removal were online and of those a mere eighteen percent used Facebook.
43
  Of the thirty-four 
percent who have access to the Internet many were elite, and not disadvantaged students or 
unemployed citizens.  While this is higher than most Middle Eastern and North African 
countries, the Tunisian government restricted most aspects of the Internet.  Therefore these sites 
were used to inform the people of the nation about what had already happened in the 
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demonstrations rather than incite protests by organizing people to a new rally.  This is why the 
people of Tunisia did not conspire to have large days of unified protest.  Social media was not 
used to organize and anything posted on the Internet was about prior demonstrations not 
upcoming unrest. 
 Scholars have searched for a way to link Bouazizi and social media.  Yet he was “not the 
linked-in, internet whizz, you may have read about, who wrote online about his intentions and 
frustrations.”44  Bouazizi did not update a post, status, or tweet to indicate to the world his 
actions, for with such strict Internet censorship that may have stopped him from being able to 
accomplish them.  In fact, social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter were not used for 
political reasons until after the start of protests on December 18, 2010, since the videos posted 
were mostly of rallies.  Once people moved to the streets “a steady flow of protest videos, tweets, 
and political manifestos … continued to make its way onto the web in a variety of languages: 
Arabic, the Darija Tunisian dialect, French and English.”45  People posted regular videos to 
DailyMotion and updated their Facebook pages to demonstrate what was happening in Tunisia.  
After these videos and subsequent posts about them were put online, people learned more about 
each other’s grievances.  However, no organization of protests occurred online.   
The use of social media allowed for Al Jazeera to use the content to broadcast the protests 
to the rest of the world (Howard and Hussain 2011).  The videos that were used were of how 
people were protesting and how the authority figures were reacting.  Knowledge of this police 
brutality rallied people in other cities besides Sidi Bouzid and made them take to the streets in 
protest of the behavior of the government.  The videos themselves were not used to mobilize 
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people.  Unintended social media use, through Al Jazeera picking up some footage from either 
DailyMotion or other social media posts, could have inspired other people, but social media was 
not intentionally used to mobilize the population of Tunisia. 
 Twitter feeds of Tunisians were not used to encourage people to start protesting either.  
When analyzing Twitter feeds about the Tunisian revolution, it was found that the most frequent 
tweeters were not even based in Tunisia.  It was others outside the country who tweeted and 
posted about the events and were commenting on the circumstances that were occurring in 
Tunisia (Kavanaugh et al 2011, 5).  This adds to the case that those within the country were not 
using social media to perpetuate the revolution.  Twitter was a luxury of the elite.  While most 
people do have mobile phones, they are not advanced enough to have the Internet on them; most 
tweeters were already in the street versus those waiting for a reason to join the cause.  Not only 
were the biggest Twitter proponents not updating from the country where protests were taking 
place, but also tweets and hashtags including the words Tunisia drastically spiked after President 
Ben Ali left office.  Furthermore, this conclusion that Tunisian citizens were inactive on Twitter 
had nothing to do with the Internet blackout.  The tweets that were analyzed occurred between 
January 1, 2011, and February 1, 2011, which is both well before and after the government shut 
down access to the Internet (Tsotsis 2011).  On January 13, 2011 the largest number of tweets at 
one time was 5,000 but on January 14, 2011 after Ben Ali’s plane left for Saudi Arabia, the 
number spiked to about 18,000 (Tsotsis 2011).   
 The Tunisian government attempted to censor the use of social media sites on the Internet 
in early December.  Before shutting down the Internet, the government tried to erase blog 
websites and subversive pages on social networking sites.  To do this a new JavaScript, which is 
the language that is used for computer programming of websites, was written and added into the 
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login page of Facebook, Gmail and similar sites.  The Tunisian Internet Agency embedded this 
JavaScript into sham Facebook URLs (the web-addresses) and began “harvesting passwords and 
usernames of bloggers, reporters, political activists and protesters” while bringing them to a 
nonexistent webpage (Anderson 2011, 2).  This brought the user to an error page with the 
number 404 and text saying that the website had not been found.  While this fake site loaded, the 
government received all of the individual’s personal information.  Police around the country used 
this new knowledge to apprehend those who wrote threatening things about the government on 
these sites (Anderson 2011).  At least five opposition bloggers and a rap artist were arrested in 
the following days.   
 The government shut down the Internet on January 7, 2011.  No longer were Internet 
sites labeled as “not found” because the government deleted and censored them; instead the 
Internet was not accessible to the population at all.  The lack of Internet did not stop the protests 
because people could still contact one another through cell phones and when face-to-face in the 
streets during protests.  The news media over exaggerated the use of Facebook and Twitter as 
sources of social media.  These sites were not needed for the revolution in Tunisia to begin nor 
were they used to organize any of the protests during the rebellion against the government.  
Videos on the Internet did not change the opinion of others; they educated and informed people.  
Mobile Phones 
 Pictures that were sent through SMS messages serve more of a purpose than the sources 
of Facebook, Twitter and other Internet sites.  The percentage of the Tunisian population that had 
cell phones in 2009 was ninety-five percent (Kavanaugh et al, 2).  A small percentage of people 
within the country have access to Facebook, but almost everyone has a mobile phone.  Citizens 
described the month of upheaval as a time when people ran into the streets to protest carrying 
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only two things, a rock and a cell phone (Kavanaugh et al 2011).  Since mobile phones are so 
prevalent, they are better to use than Internet postings when a message needs to circulate among 
a large portion of the public.  Thus, SMS messages were the most popularly used social media 
form during the protests (Howard and Hussain 2011).  The SMS messages that were sent during 
the protests were geared toward people within the country of Tunisia (Howard and Hussain 
2011).  Messages received on a phone were used to continue to motivate people rather than spur 
anger in those who had been complacent.  It was not until early January, after the death of 
Bouazizi, that mobile phones began to be used.  At this point there were already a plethora of 
people in the street and social media was not needed to inspire the revolution (Howard and 
Hussain 2011).  
Phones continued to provide the motivation needed for people to continue storming the 
streets in protest after weeks had gone by with no concessions.  When Bouazizi lit himself on 
fire, it did not go unnoticed or undocumented.  People within Sidi Bouzid captured this action on 
mobile video and pictures.  The government may not have made a big deal about the self-
immolation, but citizens were cognizant of this intentional censoring.  Scholars have classified 
this as the ignition phase of the protests, because it involved an “incident that the state-run media 
ignored, but which came to wide notice online and enraged the public” (Howard and Hussain 
2011, 42).  Pictures of Bouazizi’s courageous act and later of his dead body kept the enraged 
public angry (Howard and Hussain 2011).  These pictures continued to motivate protests.  After 
the New Year, SMS messages reminded Tunisians that Bouazizi gave his life to fight against the 
economic inequalities within the nation that would allow its people to live in a perpetual state of 
poverty, while elite family members lived like lavish kings.  
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Bouazizi did not die from his self-immolation until January 4, 2011.  His actual death 
encouraged more people and gave a renewed sense to the protest.  Graphic pictures of a burned 
or dead Bouazizi were used to inspire people who were rallying for a new regime.  After his 
death, a new surge of critics of the president and his rule went from the virtual world to public 
places to finish what Bouazizi had started (Howard and Hussain 2011).  After weeks of protests 
with no noticeable gains, these pictures served as a reminder of injustices towards the citizens of 
Tunisia.  It kept people in the streets demanding change rather than admitting defeat and going 
back to their regular lives.  The pictures of Bouazizi’s body may have encouraged people at the 
end of the rebellion, but at this point in the revolution any added people in the street were just 
icing on the cake.  Tunisians were protesting and dragging friends and family into the streets 
each day because they sensed the weakness of President Ben Ali’s rule (Anderson 2011).  The 
protests in Tunisia began without the use of phones and would have continued to succeed 
without the advent of messages from mobile devices. 
 The Internet blackout did not strongly alter the use of phones.  Mobile phones were the 
most popular social media form in Tunisia, and continued to be used at a similar rate both before 
and after January 7, 2011.  Social media was used only to sustain the already occurring anger at 
the ruling government through text messages and videos of the treatment of protesters.  It was 
not until early January, when protests were well underway, that “mobile-phone videos of police 
repression were streaming across North Africa” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 37).  The videos 
were used to continue motivating those who were already fighting for the removal of President 
Ben Ali.  They continued to motivate but did not start the protests and were not necessary for 
them to happen.  
Impact of Social Media 
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 It is debated how important social media was to the dethroning of President Ben Ali.  
Was this the first social media revolution victory?  After looking at the evidence of Tunisia 
different scholars have diverse opinions, although they generally fall into the latter two 
categories: over exaggerated when coming to the revolution, or important for changing the 
opinions of outsiders about those who were fighting. 
 There are numerous people who believe that the use of social media was over 
exaggerated throughout the Tunisian revolt.  Those who support this theory deem that Tunisians 
took action because of “decades of frustration, not in reaction to a WikiLeaks cable, a denial-of-
service attack, or a Facebook update” (Zuckerman 2011, 3).  There were numerous problems 
with the government of Tunisia and people finally got tired of the corruption.  These individuals 
would argue that the citizens knew of the extravagances that “The Family” had and they did not 
need a WikiLeaks report to become educated.  It is unknown if this WikiLeaks page was even 
looked at by those in the country, and “it remains unclear if Mohamed Bouazizi … had even 
heard of WikiLeaks” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 38).  Protesters did not need social media to 
ensure that Ben Ali resigned from office. 
In Tunisia, the people who used the social media websites were generally college 
educated.  The majority of social media users and protesters were young adults, but because of 
life expectancy that is also the largest population of people within Tunisia (Kavanaugh et al 
2011).  Social media was not used until protests in the streets were underway.  Therefore the first 
grouping of revolutionaries felt the same deprivations as Bouazizi, lived in Sidi Bouzid and after 
seeing his actions wanted to protest too.  People assembled because they found that “in their 
shared sympathy for the dying man, networks of family and friends came to realize that they 
shared common grievances too” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 36).  Within Tunisia digital media 
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was not used to organize people so citizens went into the streets before going online.  When 
people were together they realized their collective goals of ridding the country of President Ben 
Ali because of the actions he took against his own citizens (Howard and Hussain 2011).  
Demands based off of past grievances were set and people hoped to change the political 
atmosphere of Tunisia.  
 How the protests were covered by journalists lead some scholars to believe social media 
inspired other countries and informed foreigners on what was happening.  Before the Internet 
postings to Facebook, Twitter and DailyMotion by the people within Tunisia, it was unknown 
what was happening there.  The Tunisian government would not let reporters into the country.  
There was little to no coverage by domestic news, let alone foreign correspondents, of the 
protests in Sidi Bouzid and other regions.
46
  Once outside reports began, foreign and domestic 
broadcasts deemed the protests to be vandalism, terrorism or just protests about unemployment, 
all of which were wrong.
47
  The government wanted to keep the disruptions quiet so, “reporters 
were prevented from traveling to cover protests in Sidi Bouzid” (Zuckerman 2011, 2).  The New 
York Times did not even begin to report about this topic until January 10, 2011, which is only 
four days before Ben Ali left office.
48
  Therefore The New York Times and foreign journalists 
could not get the full correct story since they arrived so late to the revolution; people within the 
country were the only form of news for the people on this topic.  News outlets were way behind 
the game, and if it weren’t for citizen journalists this could have been a huge missed opportunity 
for the Arab world and the rest of the Arab uprisings. 
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Tunisia is not a Social Media Success 
 Tunisia was the revolution that led to all of the others.  Without this uprising the Arab 
Spring might not have happened.  Social media played a small role once protests were under 
way.  Yet the role of social media within this country that is purported by the news media was 
greatly exaggerated.  Headlines such as “Tweeting Tyrants Out of Tunisia: Global Internet at Its 
Best” and “The First WikiLeaks Revolution?” demonstrate the media’s ploy to attribute the 
revolution to social media.  Social media was not used to coordinate the first protests, nor was it 
used to organize later mobilizations.  It was used to keep people motivated but rarely spurred 
emotions that would lead them to the streets.  Social media could not be used to mobilize or 
organize because the demonstrations in Tunisia were unintended and spontaneous outbursts 
calling for a new government.  The revolution was leaderless.  There were no formal protests; 
people stormed the street in response to Bouazizi’s action and then subsequently to how those 
who sympathized with him were treated by police.  There was no social media organization of 
when, where or how to protest that was posted online.  
 Tunisia has been compared to Iran in 2009, the most successful social media revolution 
until the Arab Spring.  Critics and authors have concluded that when it comes to the aspect of 
social media use during rallies “had the Tunisian protests hit during a slow news month, it’s still 
unlikely they would have been followed as closely as events in Iran” (Zuckerman 2011).  Nor 
should it have been because the protests did not begin because of social media.  They were 
inspired by a grievance of a man not the WikiLeaks page, a blog post, or a social networking 
group.  The use of social media forms was over exaggerated; this was not the first successful 
Twitter revolution or the first WikiLeaks revolution.  It was simply long overdue protests against 
a controlling and corrupt government.  The revolution was inevitable.  The policewoman Hamdi, 
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who is claimed to have slapped Bouazizi sending him into a frenzy that ended with his self-
immolation stated: “today, tomorrow, or after tomorrow, it was going to happen, because of the 
accumulation of frustration. We don't know when exactly, but we knew it was going to happen. 
He was just the first spark. It was like a full glass of water, and he was the drop that made it 
overflow.”49  With or without social media, the Tunisians were going to revolt and succeed in 
dethroning Ben Ali.  
 Tunisia falls into the second category of scholars’ depiction of social media use in the 
Arab Spring; social media use was over exaggerated.  Social media was used but it was not 
necessary for the revolution to take place, and it did not change foreigners’ opinions from pro-
dictatorship to pro-protesters.  Foreign countries, once they learned the truth about the reasoning 
of the protests mere days before they ended, fully supported those in the streets.  Tunisia as a 
democracy is not as much of a threat as other Middle Eastern countries, so there was no need to 
convince outsiders that the people deserved more rights.  People did not need social media to 
indicate that the rule of President Ben Ali needed to end.  Social media usage was not important 
to the rallies and the protests would have succeeded without the videos and SMS messages.  The 
media should have focused on the rallies for a new government rather than the false statement of 
how social media or a WikiLeaks post of a document from 2009 was used to create those rallies. 
Epilogue: What is Happening in Tunisia Since Ben Ali Left 
Tunisia has rid the country of Ben Ali.  Even with this supposed new freedom of 
democracy and elections, citizens feel that little has changed since the ousting of the regime.  
Economic restrictions within the nation still exist.  People feel helpless since they fought to 
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achieve more rights and have seen little to no change.
50
  They do not know where to go from this 
point because they deem that protests got them where they are today and would not work to 
accomplish goals if they have not succeeded yet.  The people of Tunisia do not know how to 
alter their state to achieve the original goals of the 2011 revolution.  More freedoms were the 
demands of the people in 2011, but when looking at the results of the election this does not seem 
to be the future of the nation.  Surprisingly, Tunisia has put its faith into a religious political 
party to lead the country to a democratic future.  It is too soon to see how this will impact the 
goal of democracy and modernization. 
 The economy, job market, and lives of people have not improved vastly since Ben Ali 
left Tunisia.  In the six months that immediately followed Bouazizi’s death and then the end of 
the successful revolution, over one hundred people in Tunisia conducted the act of self-
immolation.
51
  People are frustrated with the lack of opportunities and increasingly upset about 
no apparent change in their lifestyles since ridding themselves of the corrupt regime of Ben Ali.  
The number of people who believe that there is no future prosperity in Tunisia and ultimately 
chose self-immolation has increased five-fold since the end of the revolution.
52
  This does not 
depict progress in the country and indicates that the people and nation are more unstable now 
than before the uprising.  Those who are most willing to make such a statement are type-casted 
and fit a profile: they are “unemployed and (perhaps unrealistically) disillusioned that the 
revolution had not yet delivered real economic reform.”53  Tunisia was the first successful 
country to overthrow its dictator in the Arab Spring, the first to hold elections, and the first to 
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demonstrate to the world that just because a country expels its leader does not mean that all of its 
problems will be solved.  It takes more than one election to rid a country of years of corruption 
and governmental abuses, but people are unwilling to wait that long before seeing any change to 
their country and lives.
54
 
Elections in Tunisia were initially supposed to occur over the summer of 2011 but were 
delayed until October of 2011 because of improper ways to register voters.  There were 400,000 
Tunisians with outdated forms of identification cards; therefore, they could not register to vote, 
and the switch was made to hold elections in October.
55
  After this mix-up was corrected, only 
“around 55% of the total number of Tunisians eligible to vote - were registered.”56  By the time 
October emerged and all of the problems with registration in the underdeveloped country were 
resolved, ninety percent of Tunisians actively participated in the election for a new Constituent 
Assembly.
57
  People were lined up for hours waiting to cast their votes, and the elections went 
smoothly.  The citizens of Tunisia were simply proud to have the ability to vote for their own 
government and hoped their vote would make a difference in their lives. 
While elections give the promise of hope, there will be a slow change in the lives of those 
within Tunisia.  Within the elections the people of Tunisia had a few political parties that they 
could chose to elect from.  The main contenders in the Tunisian elections were the Ennahdha, 
which is the most popular political party in Tunisia and it is also an Islamist based party; the 
Progressive Democratic Party, which is the most well-established secular party and unlike most 
parties was legal under President Ben Ali; and the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties, 
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which is a social democratic party.
58
  In October voters were electing people to the “new 
Constituent Assembly which will draw up a new constitution and appoint a new transitional 
government until further elections return a permanent government.”59  The Constituent Assembly 
will be comprised of two hundred and seventeen seats, and it will have one year to create and 
write a new constitution for the country.
60
  Of the two hundred and seventeen positions that were 
elected, “199 seats [were] contested in 27 constituencies in Tunisia and 18 seats [were] marked 
for Tunisians abroad voting in six overseas constituencies.”61  The Ennahdha party won about 
half of the seats in the assembly and the other half was taken by various secular parties.
62
  A 
coalition will be formed to create the new country, and the Ennahdha will have the most 
representation.
63
   
Since the Ennahdha won and plan to use Islamic law as a part of their platform to rule, 
some people are concerned.  Yet the religious party declared that the results of the election were 
“not necessarily an embrace of religious rule.  But they also cautioned that voters had been 
looking to punish those secular parties that appeared to pick a fight with religion.”64  
Spokespeople stated that the Ennahdha party did not attract voters just because of their religious 
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aspects but more for the credibility of their call for change.
65
  The people of the country were 
tired of the abuses of the Ben Ali government and when a political party preached the long 
awaited call for change the Tunisian population jumped on its bandwagon.  People are desperate 
for change and want it to come quickly.  Therefore, since little modifications have occurred in 
the year since the removal of Ben Ali, people are discouraged and do not know how to 
ameliorate their lives any more.  They are putting their faith into the new Ennahdha coalition, in 
hopes that its campaign promises will come true. 
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Chapter 4: The Egyptian Revolution 
 Tunisia’s revolution helped to spark the ideas of uprising in Egypt.  Egyptians began 
protests shortly after the Tunisian President Ben Ali vacated the country for Saudi Arabia.  The 
citizens of Egypt saw the potential that peaceful well-organized protests could accomplish and 
took cues from the Tunisians when deciding how to approach demands for a new government.  
Tunisia’s success was a great recruitment tool for activists in Egypt.  When the president of 
Tunisia was exiled it became official that some Egyptians wanted to emulate the 
demonstrations.
66
  It made the idea of rebellion and democracy easier to execute since they had 
an example in the Tunisian people. 
Protests in Egypt officially began on January 25, 2011, and President Mubarak left office 
on February 11, 2011.  This makes the Egyptian Revolution the quickest of the rebellions during 
the Arab Spring.  There had been rallies and disturbances for more freedoms in Egypt since 2000 
(Anderson 2011).  However, during the 2011 demonstrations, social media was used in more 
ways than previous protests.  Numerous social media outlets were utilized to rally support for 
protests from those within Egypt, to gain more support, and those abroad, who could help 
exercise pressure on the government to resign and put a democracy in place.  Videos, Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube or DailyMotion, and cell phones were used during the eighteen days of 
protests.  This makes me conclude that not only was social media necessary for the protests to 
start and continue but it was necessary to get other countries on board with the pro-democracy 
demonstrations.  
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  Table 2: Important dates in the Egyptian revolution. 
Protests Begin – January 25, 2011 
Day of Rage – January 28, 2011 
Internet Blackout –January 28 – February 2, 2011 
Wael Ghonim tortured – January 28 – February 8, 2011 
Minor Concessions Begin –January 28, 2011 
Million Man March/Day of Departure – February 4, 2011 
Mubarak resigns from office – February 11, 2011 
  
The Egyptian Revolution 
 Talk of protests in Egypt began on January 18, but did not move to the streets until later. 
Table 2 demonstrates the major events in the revolution and that protests officially began on 
January 25, 2011.  The government of Egypt was a military dictatorship.  Since 1952, there had 
only been three leaders of Egypt: Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak.
67
  
President Mubarak had been ruling for the past thirty years.  The people of the nation had few 
freedoms, the government was repressive, and Mubarak utilized a secret police within the state to 
enforce his restrictions on citizens.
68
  On January 25, 2011, people rallied in the street because 
they felt common grievances against the government.  Changes to levels of poverty, corruption, 
and unemployment needed to be made, and the people of Egypt were ready to protest until the 
government stopped abusing its power and instead helped the citizenry.
69
  Pouring into the 
streets on the first day of protests, demonstrators called “for an end to the 30-year reign of 
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President Hosni Mubarak with complaints of corruption, unemployment and lack of democracy” 
(Kavanaugh et al 2011, 5).  The regime had abused its people for too long, and citizens wanted 
President Mubarak out of office.   
 Protests were scheduled by online activists to begin on January 25, 2011.  Twenty 
locations were decided upon for the first protests.  These places were strategically picked, 
usually near mosques and in lower or working class neighborhoods.  These areas were densely 
populated.  By having so many spots the thought was that demonstrations would “draw larger 
numbers and increase the likelihood that some protesters would be able to break out and link up 
in Tahrir Square.”70  Tahrir Square is located in the downtown portion of the capital city of 
Cairo.  The Egyptian Museum, National Democratic Party headquarters, Headquarters of the 
Arab League, and downtown campus of the American University in Cairo all surround the 
square, making it a historic place for protests during Mubarak’s reign.  The strategy of having 
multiple rallies end at Tahrir Square worked.  To the police, the protests seemed like a 
spontaneous mass movement in the slums of Bulaq al-Dakrour, which is located on the edge of 
Cairo.
71
  Previous protests in Egypt had not been this successful, and that encouraged more 
people to join the next rally during this revolution.  After the first day of protests, there were 
about 10,000 people occupying Tahrir Square (Nunns and Idle 2011).  However, thousands more 
had participated in the protests during the day.  Protests were the largest in Cairo but took place 
in multiple cities.  Additionally the demands of protesters on January 25, 2011, were the same as 
those on February 11, 2011, when Mubarak stepped down: protesters were “fed up with high 
                                                        
70
 Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, “The Secret Rally That Sparked an Uprising,” The Wall Street Journal, 11 
February 2011, accessed 22 September 2011 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704132204576135882356532702.htm>. 
71
 Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, “The Secret Rally That Sparked an Uprising,” The Wall Street Journal, 11 
February 2011, accessed 22 September 2011 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704132204576135882356532702.htm>. 
 72 
levels of poverty, corruption and unemployment. Some protesters say they will not give up until 
President Mubarak steps down.”72 
While protests began on January 25, 2011, another larger gathering was scheduled for 
that Friday January 28, 2011.  The success of the first demonstrations was the spark that led to 
tens of thousands of people storming the streets on January 28, 2011, which was the next big 
protest day known as the “Day of Rage.”73  They headed towards Tahrir Square, where the 
protesters seized what is now referred to as Liberation Square and did not give it back until the 
end of the revolution.
74
  After seeing the number of people who had participated in protests on 
that day, a curfew was instilled by President Mubarak to prevent people from staying in Tahrir 
Square and plotting more protests.  As soon as President Mubarak initiated the curfew, protesters 
ignored it and rallied more in the streets.
75
  Not only did people storm into Tahrir Square in 
Cairo, but protests occurred in Alexandria, Suez, and Ismalia.
76
 
January 28 was an influential day in the Egyptian protests.  It was a large protest day, as 
well as the day that the government decided to shut off access to the Internet and mobile phones.  
These actions transformed some people’s views from pro-Mubarak to pro-protesters.  Business 
owners and middle-class individuals were outraged by Mubarak’s decision because it negatively 
impacted the economy (Howard and Hussain 2011).  The blackout also indicated to foreign 
investors that Egypt was not a place that they would enjoy doing business safely; support from 
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international companies was altered and relationships were soured by this approach to the 
protests (Howard and Hussain 2011).  Eventually President Mubarak lost the support of the 
middle class, since he angered them when he shut off the use of Internet and phones during the 
first few days of the protests. The disruption in Internet access altered the pro-regime citizens’ 
opinions toward governmental change.  The middle class who relies on the Internet to conduct 
business was denied access and “took to the streets in larger numbers than ever, many driven by 
an urge simply to find out what was going on” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 39).  It was more of a 
recruiting tool for the protesters than Mubarak intended.  It backfired on him and sent more of 
his allies into the streets because they were angered at the actions of the government.  
President Mubarak had some supporters during the beginning of the protests.  The middle 
class as well as elites within the army supported his rule.  These citizens related more to 
President Mubarak because the elites and military were the ones to fight alongside him when he 
gained power thirty years before.  They lived comfortable lifestyles because President Mubarak 
took care of them.  What the president asked in return for this favor was for his supporters to take 
back Tahrir Square from the protesters.  To do this President Mubarak bussed loyalists into the 
square during the first few days of the protests before the blackout, but the demonstrators showed 
great vigor and fought back.
77
  People began to get hurt doing the dirty work of the president.  
Combining this fact with the government blackouts, the middle class citizens no longer 
supported Mubarak’s rule and joined the cause of the protesters. 
The largest protest up until this date occurred on February 4, 2011.  It was deemed the 
“Day of Departure,” for Egyptians believed that by the end of the day President Mubarak would 
be ousted from office.  They truly believed that after their eleven days of protest, democracy 
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would finally be theirs.  Unfortunately it took another week before Mubarak would step down as 
President, but millions of citizens stormed the streets for this march.  While these protests were 
proving to the government that the people within Egypt were unhappy with their current 
lifestyle, nothing was changing.  Protests were not affecting the government in the manner that 
the people who organized the uprising had hoped.  Just when people were beginning to loose 
faith, Wael Ghonim, the Google executive who was seen as the leader of the movement, was 
released from capture.  Wael is depicted as the organizer and leader of the movement because he 
created a safe haven for people to discuss the protests before and during the rebellion.  Through a 
pseudonym he instigated the revolution and protests.  To the people of Egypt, he is seen as the 
sole leader of the movement. 
Wael Ghonim was taken into police custody and tortured for eleven days.  He was 
reported missing on January 28, 2011.  Ghonim was a symbol of the country’s move towards 
democracy.  He was seen as the voice of the revolution, because he linked the voices of Egyptian 
revolutionaries with well wishers who resided overseas (Howard and Hussain 2011).  He enabled 
a way for people within the country to collaborate over their frustrations and then take action.  
Once he was released from custody on February 8, 2011 he made the most impactful statement 
to rally people to the cause for democracy in Egypt.  During an interview with Dream TV station 
in Egypt immediately after his release, he gave what is deemed to be a very emotional interview 
and one that will prove to be a historical interview.
78
  His interviewers showed Ghonim pictures 
of the hundreds of people who had died in the streets during the past eleven days, and this led to 
his emotional breakdown into tears.  When he was released he wept at the destruction and human 
devastation that had occurred:  
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  This emotional display was utterly alien to the Mubarak regime—and proof to many wavering 
  Egyptians that the revolutionaries were humans, and the government was a heartless bureaucracy 
  easily capable of every brutality of which it had been accused.  Popular fear dissolved and Tahrir 
  Square became a protest site for ordinary Egyptians, not just for Facebook friends and a crowd of 
  tweeting revolutionaries (Wood 2011, 48).    
 
His actions rallied more people into the streets than any other motivational tactic.  It could even 
be determined that this was the turning point in the revolution for Egypt.   
After his release, people around the nation were calling his speech the inspiration 
remaining Egyptians needed to mobilize.  Others indicated their fear that the revolution would 
fade and fizzle had been unnecessary because of their leader Wael Ghonim (Nunns and Idle 
2011).  Ghonim was so genuine when he cried for those who had died during his imprisonment.  
He explained that he did not want blood to be shed but that the current government was 
unacceptable and it was their abuse of power that caused those deaths.  His sincere emotions for 
those who were martyrs for democracy made people question whether “Mubarak has ever shed a 
tear for a single life he’s taken” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 174).  It brought Egyptians together more 
than any other mobilization effort thus far in the revolution.  Thousands more people came out to 
Tahrir Square the next day than had been there for any other portion of the protests. 
President Mubarak attempted to make some concessions during the eighteen days of 
protests.  His first move was to fire his cabinet on January 28, 2011.
79
  When this did not deter 
people from calling him corrupt and wanting him to leave office, he created a Vice President 
position.  It was the first time in thirty years that he was willing to share power.  His Vice 
President, Omar Suleiman, would take over more responsibilities, but Mubarak conveniently left 
out what those would be and was vague when questioned about this transfer of power.
80
  
Mubarak also told his country that he would not run for president again in the September 2012 
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elections.  He made this announcement on February 1, 2011.
81
  Still none of these concessions 
were appeasing the protesters.  After just over a week of rallies and these attempts at bargaining 
made by President Mubarak, more than one hundred people had died at the hands of military 
violence.  Many more would lose their lives at the hands of riot police before the revolution 
ended.  While President Mubarak was claiming to understand the grievances of the protesters 
and telling his countrymen that he would make changes, he was instructing the army to use force 
against those in Tahrir Square.  His actions were contradictory and the protesters were unwilling 
to compromise because they wanted him to leave office. 
On February 11, Mubarak finally stepped down after eighteen days of protests.  He lost 
the support of his people, the military and foreign allies such as the United States.  Mubarak’s 
decision to leave office in February, rather than before the September elections, was brought on 
by both the military and American influence.  Younger military men found cracks in the system 
and wanted to side with the demonstrators; therefore, they wanted a change in government too 
and if necessary would have resorted to a forceful removal of Mubarak.
82
  The day before the 
million person strong march in Egypt on February 4, the military deemed that they would not use 
force against any person with a legitimate demand for democratic reform in government.
83
  This 
turn of events was detrimental to the regime of President Mubarak.  Additionally, after looking at 
the protests from afar, America “finally summoned up all their power and influence to force the 
Egyptian military to get rid of Mr Mubarak.”84  These were added contributions to the already 
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powerful protests that drove Mubarak from power.  On February 11, 2011 Mubarak ended his 
thirty yearlong reign as president and the military took over the country.
85
  
How Social Media was Used in Egypt 
While some forms of older media were used to help inspire people to take action, social 
media was a much faster and more efficient method of getting people to join the bandwagon. 
Leaflets were distributed and meetings at mosques were held to try and mobilize the population 
but social media was “far faster than leaflets, with the added benefit that those receiving the 
messages were already interested and trusted the source” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 20).  Egypt is 
one of the leading countries in the number of Internet users that reside within its borders 
(Howard and Hussain 2011).  Egyptians used the Internet for YouTube, Facebook and Twitter 
during the revolution.  Through the use of these sites to mobilize people and the added 
excitement after the resignation of President Ben Ali in Tunisia, people were prepared to protest.  
Circumstances surrounding the Tunisian president were powerful recruiting tools for the people 
of Egypt.  It is easier to entice people to join a cause when they have seen a successful one in a 
neighboring country; therefore, they know that their efforts could pay off and provide a change 
in their government system instead of just a jail sentence.  
 Tech-savvy youth discussed how to organize protests in a different way than the 
previously failed protests attempting to gain more freedoms.  When the Egyptian government felt 
threatened by the organizational tactics being conducted online during the January protests, 
Mubarak chose to shut down Internet access to citizens.  It was an unprecedented action in Egypt 
that included a complete shutdown not only of the Internet but mobile phone networks too 
(Lynch 2011).  January 28, 2011, was when Mubarak chose to cut the public’s access to the 
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Internet.  He blocked the Internet and phone services on the third day of protests; people could 
not contact each other within Tahrir Square (Kavanaugh et al 2011).  The shutdown happened 
early on in the protests; while it took weeks for the government of Tunisia to impose this 
restriction, it took the government of Egypt mere days (Howard and Hussain 2011).   
After the Egyptian government shut off Internet access to its residents, the country went 
from using as much as 2,700 Mega Bites per second (MBps) three hours before the government 
intervention to about 25 MBps after it.  At 5:30 EST traffic to and from Egypt was almost all but 
terminated (Schafer 2011).  In Egypt, unlike Tunisia, all social media forms were cut off.  
However, the Internet was the most dramatically affected, “the government shut down Internet 
access, although briefly, in an attempt to squelch communication among citizens with each other 
and with the outside world.  [On January 28] close to 97% of Egyptian Internet traffic was 
reported lost” (Kavanaugh et al 2011, 9).  Mubarak’s attempt to isolate Egyptians from outside 
countries was only partially successful.  People within the country had expected his maneuver 
since the Tunisian president had taken this tactic too; therefore, “tech-savvy students and civil 
society leaders had put in place backup satellite phones and dial-up connections to Israel and 
Europe” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 39).  Even though mobile phone lines were down, satellite 
phones could still be used as forms of communication to foreign nations.  Protests did not slow 
down during the Internet blackout because at that point “there was no need to organize events 
online because people were spending every day face to face on the streets” (Nunns and Idle 
2011, 21).  Activists continued to rally because they were already mobilized. 
Initially the organization and mobilization for these protest was online.  However once 
thousands of people were in the streets it was easier to just conduct business face to face.  This is 
why when the government turned off access to the Internet and mobile phones on January 28, 
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2011, the lack of electronic communication systems did not stop people from continuing to 
protest or talk amongst themselves.  Social media was not utilized in the same vein because the 
thousands of people on the street, instead of a select few people through social media, decided on 
the next step of the revolution; through face-to-face interactions the majority were now 
demanding how the protests proceeded.  Those in the streets “realized they could not call for less 
than [what all of] the demonstrators wanted.  So the demands of the Revolution were set by the 
spontaneous chants of the People” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 32). 
 The blackout only lasted for five days because it was inefficient and rather than stopping 
the protests it was rallying more people to the cause.  When the blackout did not stop the 
protests, Mubarak changed his tactics for dealing with the demonstrations.  His first strategy was 
to make citizens turn on one another because they were inconvenienced by the interruptions in 
their daily lives, but instead of targeting fellow citizens the people’s anger at the government 
grew.  He had shut down the Internet as well as banking systems in hopes that people would get 
frustrated and blame those in the streets for their inconveniences: “now for the first time banks 
reopened and people resumed their jobs.  This was a change in strategy and a threat to the 
protestors” (Nunns and Idle 23011, 159).  President Mubarak returned Egyptian life to normal by 
restoring social media channels in hopes that no more people would join the cause for 
democracy.  Instead of restricting communication, his second plan to stop the protests was to 
resort to violence.  On February 2, 2011, the blackout ended and attacks by security forces 
against peaceful protesters intensified (Barany 2011).  Security police targeted innocent 
protesters but turned on the government on February 4, 2011 and joined the protesters.
86
 
Facebook 
                                                        
86 Black, Ian, Jack Shenker, and Chris McGreal, “Egypt Set for Mass Protest as Army Rules Out Force,” The 
Guardian, 31 January 2011, accessed: 20 January 2012 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/egyptian-
army-pledges-no-force>. 
 80 
The total number of Facebook members skyrocketed both in Egypt and the Arab region 
during 2010.  There were 21,361,863 Facebook users in the Arab world in December of 2010, as 
opposed to the 11,978,300 users in January of that year (Salem and Mourtada 2011).  In Egypt 
the number of Facebook users in 2010 was 4,634,600, which is only about 5.5% of the total 
population.  Yet that was all that was needed to organize the initial January 25 revolution.  While 
Egypt has the second largest number of Internet users, it has the largest number of Facebook 
members in the region: “Facebook has been the social networking tool of choice for human 
rights activists in Egypt. There are five million Facebook users in Egypt, the highest number in 
any Middle Eastern or North African country.”87  The best site to manage and organize the influx 
of demands for a protest was Facebook.  It was where people chose to plan the protests and 
discuss the mobilization of different groups to the January 25 demonstrations (Nunns and Idle 
2011). 
When deciding to begin rallies on January 25, a holiday usually set aside for the military, 
the Egyptian Facebook sites asked “What do you think we should give as a gift to the brutal 
Egyptian police on their day?” and the answer was Tunisia.88  These organizational talks 
happened on Facebook, and more specifically on the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook group.  
Khaled Said was a twenty-eight year old Egyptian.  His name is remembered because he was 
beaten to death by the Egyptian police in June 2010.  He was known to have had a cell phone 
video that demonstrated the corruption of the justice system and police authorities.  That is why 
he was targeted, dragged out of a coffeehouse, and killed.  There were other people within Egypt 
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who were killed by the police over the summer of 2010.  This caused some unrest within society 
and a few minor protests.  
Two Facebook pages were devoted to Said’s memory, one in English and one in Arabic.  
Both pages educated the public about his brutal death, and they soon became the sites for angry 
Egyptians to discuss ways to overthrow their oppressive regime.  Said’s death and subsequent 
Facebook page sparked a huge explosion from activists.
89
  The Facebook page was set up in his 
honor but soon allowed for people to form a common bond over their anger at the government.
90
  
It was a natural place for those who felt grievances to express them and find others who were 
equally as upset with the government; therefore, the site diverted from discussing Said himself to 
a collective dissent and commiseration towards the government (Howard and Hussain 2011).  
Said died in June of 2010 and successful protests that we now deem a part of the Arab Spring 
began in January of the following year.  When the Tunisian government fell, websites like “We 
Are All Khaled Said” and “April 6 Youth Movement,” which was an Egyptian Facebook page in 
2008 that attempted to gain supporters for a worker’s strike, were used as organizational sites for 
Egypt’s own protest.91 After the Tunisian success activists used the page to organize the first 
protest and came up with the idea of choosing multiple sites for protests.  Their hope was that the 
riot police would have to separate, making them too strained to do any real harm.  This could 
ensure success.  
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At first the creator of the Khaled Said webpage was anonymous, but word leaked out that 
it was initiated and run by Wael Ghonim.
92
 Said became the figurehead and symbol of the 
revolution but Wael Ghonim was the leader: “a revolution organized by Facebook, spread by 
twitter and organized by a guy working for Google. #jan25 #ILOVEOURREVOLUTION” 
(Nunns and Idle 2011, 173).  To the people participating in the Egyptian revolution, Ghonim was 
seen as the creator, organizer and instigator of the protests (Nunns and Idle 2011).  Not only did 
he create the Facebook page but he was the one who encouraged participation from other 
Egyptians.  Instead of making people feel that he was the sole leader he “polled the page’s users 
and sought ideas from others, like how best to publicize a rally — through printed fliers and 
mass text messaging, it turned out.”93  Whether he will admit it or not, Ghonim inspired the 
revolution and others to discuss organization tactics.  There were two Facebook pages, one in 
English and one in Arabic.
94
  Had Ghonim not started the English version, then no Arabic one 
would have been created and it would not have relayed the information that Ghonim and his 
allies decided upon. 
Ghonim, who created the English version of “We are all Khaled Said,” was taken into 
police custody on January 28, 2011.  After members of the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook 
group organized the first of the Egyptian protests, the Internet was shut off to deter more people 
from coming into Tahrir Square (Wood 2011).  The government was shocked that the revolt and 
protests occurring throughout the nation could have been started by just some kids on social 
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networking sites such as Facebook (Wood 2011).  By the “Day of Rage” protests on January 28, 
2011, 90,000 people had pledged online that they would join the protests against President 
Mubarak.
95
  The number of people who were being mobilized by Facebook and social media 
scared the Mubarak regime (Nunns and Idle 2011). 
Middle class Egyptians joined the fight, in part, because they were angered by the loss of 
Internet access in their own homes and the detriment to the economy that taking away the 
Internet caused.  Mubarak’s decision to shut down and ban “access to social-media websites, 
powering down cell towers, or disconnecting Internet switching points in major cities were 
among the desperate tactics to which authoritarian regimes resorted as they strove to maintain 
control… Egypt lost at least US$90 million to Mubarak” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 44).  The 
shut down of these communication forms made businesses lose contact with foreign partners.  
Everything but the stock market was shut down and could not be accessed by those within the 
nation or outside of it: “this episode harmed the country’s reputation among technology firms as 
a safe place to invest,” and conduct business (Howard and Hussain 2011, 44).   Therefore, 
through the government’s actions to quell the protests more harm was done and millions of 
dollars were lost for the country.  People poured into the streets after the Internet was shut down.  
The government blackout of the Internet did the opposite of what the government wanted or 
expected.  In general, “if a government were to shut down Internet access or ban cell phones, it 
would risk radicalizing otherwise pro-regime citizens or harming the economy” (Shirky 2011, 6).  
People who were pro-government or neutral in Egypt turned against the regime because their 
freedoms were being taken away.  Mubarak’s actions rallied them to the pro-democracy cause. 
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 Facebook was used for organization and mobilization of people in the beginning of the 
protests.  Therefore, when the government shut down the access to Internet, it was problematic 
for keeping people updated on the progress of the protests, but not detrimental to the cause.  
Since thousands of people were already in Tahrir Square and hundred more were protesting in 
different cities around Egypt, they could determine the next step in their movements based on 
conversations that they had face-to-face instead of over the computer.  People were not leaving 
Tahrir Square for fear that the government and military would take back control.  Thus people 
were sleeping in the city center and were constantly together talking about what direction the 
protests should take. 
Twitter 
 Twitter was used as a news source as well as an organizational tool.  Unlike Tunisia, the 
people who were tweeting about the Egyptian uprisings were within Egypt.  The frequency of 
tweets was 63,255 for the week that Mubarak left Egypt (February 7, 2011 to February 14, 
2011).  The next largest number of tweets came from London, and that frequency was much less 
at only 5,921 tweets (Kavanaugh et al 2011, 8).  Egyptians deemed this site as an alternative to 
traditional news sites.  Before protests started people used Twitter to decide on common hashtags 
so that anyone wanting information about the protests knew exactly where to go.  One Egyptian 
posted asking “What time should we be in the streets tomorrow #jan25?” and was answered by 
another saying “For when and where the revolution will be and what other important info, go 
here http://bit.ly/Jan25egypt” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 29).  This social media site was used to 
spread information about the first day of protests and then was utilized to inform outsiders of the 
events of the protests. 
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Twitter was a way to become informed by those in the streets rather than a second hand 
news update (Nunns and Idle 2011).  Tweets were filled with the emotions of the people who 
were in Tahrir Square, “so emotional and exciting that anyone following them felt an intense 
personal connection to what was happening in Tahrir” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 13).  Twitter 
provides a way for people to become informed instantaneously.  Tweets such as “we have news 
of rubber bullets being fired in tahrir sq. And people are not budging” were common (Nunns and 
Idle 2011, 41).  The posts served as informational tools.  Protesters provided lots of tweets about 
where to meet, how to get there, including what roads were accessible and what areas were filled 
with riot police, as well as when to come in groups versus individually to Tahrir Square because 
of the military.  There were a plethora of Twitter feeds about the treatment and actual events of 
protesters.  Twitter was also used to debunk myths and false statements made by the national 
media.  Posts on Twitter were trying to down play the demonstrations and discredit those in the 
streets as being thugs.  The national media, which was run by Mubarak regime, did not want 
more people to join the rallies for democracy.  He wanted the remaining loyalists to side with 
him and join the fight against the protesters (Nunns and Idle 2011). 
 It was not only a way for protesters to communicate with themselves and foreigners, but 
it was a way to communicate directly between President Mubarak and the people in Tahrir 
Square.  President Mubarak sent out tweets that said, “Habib just sent me a bbm.  He says I 
should prepare a farewell speech for my citizens.  Where are you guys going? #jan25” (Nunns 
and Idle 2011, 52).  He also used Twitter to indicate his actions.  He blocked Facebook and 
Twitter, in hopes that it would stop communication between protesters and slow down the rallies, 
yet he told his citizens that “I blocked Twitter and Facebook so you could focus on your work, 
not run around the streets shouting. #jan25” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 49).   Twitter was essential 
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for those within the country to communicate, Egyptians to talk with those who were outside the 
country, and people to send personal messages to President Mubarak and read his responses.  It 
was a recruiting tool.   
When President Mubarak chose to shut down access to the Internet as well as mobile 
phones, it affected the use of Twitter as a social media tool.  The Internet and SMS messages 
were blocked from January 28, 2011, to February 2, 2011.  During this time frame there were 
absolutely no tweets on January 28, but as people found ways around the system there was more 
access to Twitter (Nunns and Idle 2011).  To get tweets posted online, people talked with foreign 
media officials who were in the country covering the protests.  By trading interviews for access 
to satellite phones, activists could call a new service provided by Google and Twitter, which 
translated voice mail messages to tweets.
96
  The new service network was named speak2tweet.
97
  
Egyptians were desperate to find ways to post and get information out to foreigners.  They 
wanted to be heard and influence the opinion of anyone, whether Western or Egyptian, to rally 
behind those in the streets.  Once access to Twitter was restored after the five-day blackout tweet 
frequencies went back to normal. 
Mobile Phones 
 Just as in Tunisia, the potential for an Egyptian to have a cell phone is greater than his or 
her access to the Internet.  Only about six percent of the people within the country use Facebook 
as a social network.  The number of people who had a cell phone increased in the few years 
before the Arab Spring: “mobile phone use has grown exponentially in the past few years, 
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reaching around 80% of the population according to recent figures.”98  Thus photos through SMS 
messages were used as well as the Internet to gain supporters.  Photos of Said’s brutally beaten 
up body and pictures of his body at the morgue were “passed from one mobile-phone camera to 
thousands” during the protests in January (Howard and Hussain 2011, 38).  Protesters also used 
their mobile phone to call people within their social networks, whether that was their online 
networking friends or people within their community, to come and join the protests (Howard and 
Hussain 2011).  When people had the ability to use their phones, the social media device was an 
intricate part of the protests within Egypt.   
Satellite phones were helpful during the social media blackout.  The government could 
block the cell phone waves for domestic phones but could not stop the use of satellite phones.  
Therefore, most foreign correspondents and non-Egyptians had access, even if it was limited, to 
foreign people who could tweet and outside sources such as speak2tweet, which converted 
voicemails to tweets.  Those who had not planned ahead soon found ways around the blackout.   
These citizens got around the government intervention “by telephoning friends abroad to upload 
their tweets, pooling their resources to get on to the one remaining internet service provider in 
Egypt, or offering interviews to news organizations in return for access to their satellite internet 
connections” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 20-21).  The government blocked all Internet services 
except the national stock exchange server, in hopes that the economy would not be affected by 
the protests.   
During protesters’ time in Tahrir Square, they found the cell phone to be the most 
important form of social media.  Tweets indicated that the interruption of the use of phones, 
either from the government blackout or spending too much time in Tahrir without access to 
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electricity to charge a phone, was causing problems.  People were actually routing power from 
streetlights so that they could charge their cell phones without leaving the protests (Nunns and 
Idle 2011).  On February 9 one person even stated, “I say we take over parliament, not to 
increase pressure, but to have access to plugs so I can charge phone” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 188).  
Phones were essential, before and after the brief blackout, in keeping people around Tahrir 
updated on the happenings of the revolution, as well as informing foreigners of the recent events 
in the revolution. 
Impact of Social Media in Egypt 
 Most scholars are quick to say that Twitter and Facebook played a huge role in the 
uprisings in Egypt.  They deem that there were different levels of involvement of social media in 
each state, but in Egypt “Facebook was crucial for coordinating Egyptian protestors to emulate 
Tunisia starting January 25” (Lynch 2011, 303).  This enabled the January 25 protests to succeed 
when previous attempts had failed (Lynch 2011).  I agree with the statement that the Egyptian 
uprisings depended on social media to succeed.  However, some are skeptical about this 
approach and question the links between social media and the resignation of President Mubarak. 
This school of thought thinks social media is exaggerated and would deem that 
revolutions can never be attributed to just one element.  It is unfair to say that social media is the 
only thing that inspired people.  Revolutions do not come out of thin air, or even cyberspace 
(Nunns and Idle 2011).  While this is true, Facebook and Twitter allowed people to express their 
frustrations about their repression.  Facebook combined with other older concerns, such as 
political anger over corruption in elections and the horrible economic situations in the country, to 
lead to action within Egypt (Lynch 2011).  These external factors of corruption and high 
unemployment can be linked to the governing tactics of President Mubarak.  Additionally, the 
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leader was becoming older and “President Mubarak appeared in public less frequently, and soon 
it seemed as if every month brought a new disaster or crisis” (Eltahawy 2008, 70).  His 
governing style was not conducive to the happiness and productiveness of Egyptians anymore.  
For these reasons activists began looking for ways to organize and mobilize people into the 
streets to provoke a rebellion.   
The same school of thought indicates that the Egyptian revolution cannot solely be a 
Facebook Revolution because only about six percent of people use Facebook.  More than just the 
elites with access to Facebook were needed for the revolution to succeed but it would not have 
begun without the Khaled Said Facebook page to organize it.  The majority of the population 
lives on less than two dollars a day, and the prospect of having a personal computer with the 
ability to use Facebook is not even on their radar.  Yet it was these people who would be 
essential in overthrowing the government.  Those who thought up the initial plans for the protests 
on January 25, 2011, knew “that the demonstrations’ success would depend on the participation 
of ordinary Egyptians in working-class districts … where the Internet and Facebook aren’t as 
widely used.”99  The urban poor are the main group in this category, and while Internet based 
social media outlets were the last thing on their minds, hundreds still “literally placed their 
bodies between tyranny and freedom on the front line” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 22).  Tweeters 
agreed that “I doubt that people in Tahrir … have revolted cuz of facebook but for why&how 
KhaledSaid was killed in the first place” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 174).  Those who organized 
knew that Facebook would not be the only organizational tool, which is why fliers were 
distributed to inform the less wealthy about the rallies.  Posters and leaflets were a source of 
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spreading the word for the January 25 protests, not just Facebook or Twitter.
100
  The rallies were 
staged around mosques so that people would have an easy access point and could hear about the 
protests before they began.  Numerous types of organizational tactics were used, not just social 
media.
101
  All of these ranges of media helped to get the point across and spread the word about 
January 25.   
Social Media Made a Huge Difference in Egypt 
 Social media was necessary for Egypt’s revolution.  It was essential for initially 
organizing the protests.  Egypt falls under the category of the first school of thought, that social 
media was necessary to start the rebellion, as well as the third school of thought, social media 
was used to change the opinions of foreigners from pro-Mubarak to pro-democracy seeking.  
Social media websites were used to organize big rallies such as the “Day of Rage” and the 
“Million Man March/Day of Departure” protests.  These happened both before and after the 
blackout and continued to sustain the revolution by mobilizing more people to the cause.  It has 
been stated that without social media “the way in which the Revolution is seen in the West, in 
the Arab world, and even within Egypt would be very different if we had not been able to hear 
from protestors and see the action so directly” (Nunns and Idle 2011, 22).  The accessibility that 
foreigners had to first hand accounts of protesters made them angry at the treatment by Mubarak, 
his regime, and the military. 
Social media was essential for getting the revolution organized and started.  Without it 
people would not have been able to communicate across the country with a set day, time and 
place to meet to rally people towards Tahrir Square.  Along with these essential details, coming 
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up with a clear list of consistent demands across the population was also a use of social media.  
In a diverse population it could have been easy for protesters in Cairo to call for different 
changes than those who were demonstrating in Alexandria.  Facebook and Twitter unified the 
call for Mubarak to resign.  Organization for the initial protest of January 25, 2011, was 
formulated online.  The sites of the protests were announced as well as the time.  Since most sites 
were placed around mosques, rallies would begin at 2 P.M. after prayers had just ended.
102
  By 
using Internet social media sites such as Facebook people could comment on how previous 
protests, even if they were organized online, did not work (Anderson 2011).  They could discuss 
and pinpoint problems that needed to be solved before January 25, 2011.  The activists online 
came up with a way to ensure that the police could not prevent “demonstrations from growing or 
moving through the streets, and at keeping ordinary Egyptians away” from joining the 
movement.
103
  They used this knowledge to form twenty different protests that would converge 
in Tahrir Square.  Social media was used to organize, mobilize, and sustain the protests, which is 
why Egypt falls under the first school of thought on social media’s impact on the revolution. 
 Egypt was the real model for how to organize a protest.  It was a quicker process than 
Tunisia, and it had real leaders during the fight.  People around the Arab region could emulate 
the Egyptian protest in hopes of getting the same outcome and changing governmental systems.  
When Mubarak shutdown the Internet for five days, people still fought for ways to Tweet and 
put videos on the web.  Who were they sending these messages to?  Others within Egypt had no 
way of checking for new posts online.  They were blacked out too and would have had to trade 
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interviews for online usage.  Protesters would not have wasted time searching for updates since it 
was unnecessary because no one else was posting information frequently enough that it was dire 
to check.  This indicates that those who did continue to post during the blackout found outside 
nations and people their target audience.  They were either inspiring other Arab nations to follow 
in the footsteps of Egypt, or letting others know what was happening on the ground.  Changing 
the perceptions of Americans and other Western allies of Egypt away from pro-Mubarak and 
stability towards freedom and democracy was another motive.  If the third school of thought, 
influencing foreigners to change their opinions of the regime, was not an aim of protesters then 
protesters would not have gone to such lengths to gain access to Twitter in the five-day blackout 
(Nunns and Idle 2011). 
Some foreign nations were ecstatic when Tunisia began protesting and removed President 
Ben Ali, yet once Egypt tried to do the same thing Western political figures and administrations 
were cautious and purported that protests should remain peaceful.  There was not the same 
excitement because Egypt had been such a longtime ally of the United States and Western 
societies.  The instability that came with a new government, free elections, and the possibility of 
an Islamic regime, scared governments.  Jon Stewart even joked on his show, that the underlying 
force behind the American government’s hesitation to support the protests was stability.104  After 
the United States government reacted to the protests in Egypt, Stewart mocked that “we want 
Egyptian people to have freedom just as soon as we’re sure they will use that freedom for 
hugging not hurting.  See Tunisia's reputation is as a more secular, moderate nation where as 
Egypt sits atop one of the regions largest reserves of untapped Islamist rage.”105  In Tunisia there 
was no threat from a new democratic government but in Egypt a democracy could indicate a 
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Muslim Brotherhood victory.  This belief was confirmed by Hillary Clinton in a speech after the 
first day of protests.  She indicated that “what we don't want … are radical ideologies to take 
control of a very large and important country in the Middle East.”106  Therefore, during the first 
few days of protests in Egypt, “US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said her administration 
supported ‘the fundamental right of expression and assembly’ and urged all parties ‘to exercise 
restraint.’”107  This is not what the Egyptians were hoping for.   
The protesters needed to prove that their grievances were just as legitimate as those from 
citizens of other autocratic rulers in the Middle East.  To do this, videos of protests were 
uploaded to sites such as Facebook and YouTube, and people tweeted about violence on the 
ground in Tahrir Square.  The use of social media worked.  Outsiders became sympathetic to the 
cause of protesters and wanted to ensure their victory.  Through interactions on Twitter and 
Facebook, foreigners became invested in the livelihoods of the protesters.  The posts of those in 
Tahrir Square were so moving that people could envision being along side those who were 
shedding blood for democracy (Nunns and Idle 2011).  Additionally seeing videos that were 
posted and pictures that were taken of peaceful protesters having to run for cover because the 
military and loyalists were attacking them, added to the sympathy that outsiders felt towards 
those in the streets.  After these depictions, foreign governments could not ignore the human 
rights violations.  By the end of demonstrations on February 11, America had changed its views.  
President Obama was encouraging the Egyptian army to take control of the country and 
overthrow President Mubarak.  Egyptians welcomed the aid of foreign people on their side to 
ensure that Mubarak would vacate his seat as president.  However, foreign governments never 
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would have changed their opinion about Mubarak if they had not witnessed the atrocities of his 
government through social media outlets. 
Egypt falls into the first and third schools of thought on social media’s impact in the Arab 
Spring.  The protests would not have started if they were not organized online and the 
demonstrations would not have received the large number in turnouts if social media did not 
continue to entice people to join the demonstrations.  Additionally, it made countries that had 
backed the Mubarak regime for thirty years turn on this alliance in favor of the citizenry who 
wanted more rights.  The United States eventually placed pressure on President Mubarak to leave 
and the military to take over.  Without social media the revolution in Egypt would not be 
considered a success. 
Epilogue: What is Happening in Egypt Since Mubarak Left 
Egyptians have rid their country of President Mubarak and instilled a new government.  
In the last year the nation has held free elections for a government, but citizens feel that little has 
changed since the ousting of their leader.  The unemployment rate has not decreased 
significantly; people are still having problems making ends meet.
108
  The people of Egypt do not 
know how to alter their current state to achieve the original goals of the 2011 revolutions.  With 
their newfound freedom the people of Egypt have elected the Muslim Brotherhood into the 
majority of the new parliament seats.  As other nations feared, Egyptians have put their faith into 
the religious political party.  It is too soon to see how this will impact the goal of democracy and 
modernization. 
Just as in Tunisia, the people of Egypt feel that little has been accomplished since the end 
of the revolution in February of 2011.  Some residents of Egypt even feel that their lives have 
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gotten worse since Mubarak was exiled.
109
  Instead of creating a new democracy with political 
freedoms, the military government has kept the same ruling system in place that was present 
under the old Mubarak regime.
110
  All of the optimism that was present when Mubarak left the 
country has evaporated.  The one-year anniversary of the end of the 2011 revolution sparked new 
protests.
111
  These were warranted because Egypt is still unstable and people have used their new 
freedoms for criminal purposes and corruption rather than uniting the country.  Illegal acts were 
more common in the latter portion of 2011 and early 2012 than they were in 2010 and early 2011 
when protests began.  The police and authority figures do not stop these crimes because “they 
want [Egyptians] to feel that Mubarak may have been corrupt, but people were safer in his 
time.”112  In order to combat the amount of corruption, the military would have to put a new 
governing structure into place, but authority figures do not want to put the energy into altering 
the current system.  Leadership is absent in the country and there is no direction or clear path for 
the future of the nation.
113
  Not only is there no rule or job opportunities for people within Egypt, 
whether they are educated or not, but inflation has soared and raising the salaries of those who 
are fortunate enough to have a job is not solving the problem.
114
  Elections hoped to help the 
country but the population was not positive that it would change the lives of the common man 
who was protesting in the streets.  
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The elections in Egypt were a months-long process.  People within Egypt were so 
discouraged by the government that many did not even want to vote at all.  People felt that the 
revolution did not accomplish the goals that it set out to, and that elections were not the answer 
because they too would not result in change.  Therefore “the Egyptian authorities suggested that 
they might fine people about $80 if they failed to vote.”115  This would force everyone to get 
involved, and hopefully make voting and the elections create a real change.  The first portion of 
the voting process was for the lower house and elections began in major cities.  After this two 
other rounds of voting for the upper house and the presidential election were scheduled.  The last 
round was in January and election results will officially be completed by March.
116
  Even though 
some results are known, the “final results remain uncertain, in part because Egypt’s military 
rulers have yet to spell out the formula that will be used to allocate seats among parties according 
to their share of the vote.”117  Preliminary actions can be taken to create a new government but 
the real results of the elections from all parts of Egypt, not just the biggest cities, will be 
calculated in March.
118
  
Multiple political parties and individuals placed themselves on the ballot for elections.  
Some of these included the Muslim Brotherhood, which wants to rule through Islamic law, and 
former members of the Mubarak regime also ran for political office.  Mubarak’s cronies are 
“hoping past patronage and name recognition will overcome anger at their association with the 
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old government.”119  While there was a wide range of candidates, the results of the election so far 
have been a huge victory for the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, which is known as the 
Freedom and Justice Party.  As of the current knowledge on election results: the Brotherhood 
won approximately half of the legislative seats in the new democratic government.
120
  During the 
three rounds of elections for different houses of the new parliament, the Freedom and Justice 
Party won “50 percent of the seats awarded in the first two rounds of the vote.  It won roughly 40 
percent of the seats allocated by party voting, and a higher percentage of the seats contested by 
individual candidates.”121  The Muslim Brotherhood party, which was banned under the Mubarak 
regime because it was seen as a threat, now holds the largest number of seats in parliament.
122
   
For now the future of Egypt is uncertain.  The nation is temporarily operating on a 
Muslim Brotherhood parliament.  The election results do not indicate that the Brotherhood will 
be asked to form a coalition government.
123
  Final results and decisions will be made in later 
months of 2012.  If the Freedom and Justice Party does win and does not chose to form a 
coalition government then it will “diminish the power of the partners in any alliance as well as 
any other parties.”124  The Brotherhood would have all of the power and would not need to rule 
in favor of the entire Egyptian population because it would control the majority of the 
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government anyway.  The transition from dictatorship and authoritarian rule to a democracy will 
be a long process.  To ensure that the goals of the revolution are met, the party must lift the state 
of emergency.  Egypt can only call itself a real and deep democracy if it rids the nation of the 
state of emergency law.  Without the transfer of rule from the military to the people, reform and 
changes cannot be made.
125
  One can only hope that the Brotherhood will rule in favor of the 
majority, ameliorate the lives of the citizenry and lift the state of emergency.  However, since 
this political party has a majority of the representatives in parliament, even if it does not alter the 
state of emergency law a challenge by other political figures would result in the favor of the 
Brotherhood.  With the end to the state of emergency, the people will no longer be disheartened 
about the failures that have occurred since Mubarak has left and they will begin to see that 
change is not just an illusion but can be achieved. 
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Chapter 5: Bahrain Protests 
 The Bahraini people were inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and the ability 
of their citizens to rid the country of longtime dictators.  Bahrain is a monarchy that has been run 
by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and his family for over two hundred years.  They are Sunni 
Muslims but the majority of the people within the country are Shia.  Therefore, the majority of 
the people are being ruled by a minority power who suppress them and take away economic 
opportunities.  In early 2011 the Shias of Bahrain used websites such as Google Earth to see the 
disparities between the ethnic groups in Bahrain; “the Shias of Bahrain—many of whom live in 
one-room houses with large families—could map and aggregate photographs of the ruling Sunni 
minority’s opulent palaces” (Howard and Hussain 2011, 40).  The need for more political rights 
and economic opportunities was what started the protests but soon more than just Shias were in 
the streets.  At some points of the revolution, which only lasted for one month, protesters could 
be heard yelling slogans such as No Shia, No Sunni, Just Bahraini.  Numerous groups wanted 
reforms to the government.  Yet, after the military crackdown the ethnic divisions grew larger 
and the two groups could not compromise on reforms because they wanted different changes to 
the government.   
 The revolution was short lived in Bahrain.  In an article in The New York Times, it was 
written “in all the revolts that roiled the Arab world in 2011, Bahrain’s government was the only 
one to manage a tactical, perhaps ephemeral victory through force.”126  It is the only revolution 
where the government stopped major protesting.  Even though Bahrain is one of the few Arab 
Spring countries that journalists were allowed to report from for the majority of the rebellion, the 
articles that were written on the uprising focus more on what happened once protests started 
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rather than how they were organized and began.  Demonstrators went out into the streets on 
February 14, 2011, and stayed there until they were crushed on March 16, 2011.  After the 
crackdown, the revolution ended and the government declared itself victorious against the 
protesters. 
Table 3: Important Events in the Bahrain Revolution. 
Revolution Begins – February 14, 2011 
Destruction of Pearl Roundabout – February 19, 2011 
Government Clampdown and State of Emergency Enacted – March 16, 2011 
Outside Forces Enter Bahrain and End Rebellion – March 16, 2011 
State of Emergency Lifted – June 1, 2011 
National Unity Talks Begin – July 1, 2011 
New Elections – September 2011 
 
Revolution in Bahrain 
 Protests for more equality among the Shiite ethnicity in Bahrain had been occurring since 
2009.  Most protests were small, but after witnessing the events in Tunisia and Egypt the people 
of Bahrain were inspired.  The people of Bahrain wanted democratic reforms.  A new 
constitution and more political power was promised to the people ten years earlier but no 
changes had been made to the government system.  People had previously been complacent 
about the lack of change, but after seeing other Middle Eastern and North African countries 
peacefully protest to get reforms, the people of Bahrain decided to call for change too.  As shown 
in Table 3, protests began with a “Day of Rage” in Bahrain on February 14, 2011.  The first 
protests were in the villages of Karzakan and Nuweidrat, which are located on the main island of 
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Bahrain not too far from the capital.
127
  Protests also took place in Manama, which is the capital 
of Bahrain. 
The first day of protest was largely made up of Shia citizens of Bahrain but in the 
following days of demonstrations those on the street would become more diverse.  Sunni and 
Shia people were protesting side by side for reforms to the government.
128
  Some protesters even 
were calling for the downfall of the king as early as the February 14, 2011, demonstrations.
129
  
On that first day of protests, demonstrators marched through Manama and took over the Pearl 
Roundabout in the center of the city.  Police wanted to stop those who were protesting from 
gaining a central rallying place but when those in the streets would not budge authority figures 
pulled out and left the demonstrators.  The crowd “waved flags and carried banners into the 
square in a show of defiance to the authorities.”130  Force and violence were not immediately 
used.  It was assumed that since Bahrain has close ties to the West, King Hamad showed restraint 
at the request of the United States’ President Obama.131  This act of restraint against those 
protesting the current regime would not last past the first day. 
Demands of demonstrators evolved over the course of the month of rebellion.  They 
began with a desire for compromise over a new genuine democratic parliament.  Neither the 
government nor the people could be the sole decider on the new system of rule; the two parties 
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would have to come together to form the new regime.
132
  However, it only took four days from 
the official start of the protests for those on the street to change their views from “we used to 
demand for the prime minister to step down, but now our demand is for the ruling family to get 
out."
133
  The use of violence helped create this transformation.  The government was waiting for 
the people in the streets to get tired or frustrated and go home, but the people who were 
protesting were doing the same thing with the government.  They were waiting for the 
government to give up and leave.  Both groups were using a battle of wills, and each side was 
hoping that the other would give up first.
 134
 
 The Bahrain rebellion had a centralized meeting point, similar to Tahrir Square in Egypt.  
In Manama, the capital of Bahrain, the protesters took over a roundabout called Pearl Square.  
There were thousands of protesters camped out in the roundabout, “pledging to stay until their 
demands [were] met. Protests began with a Day of Rage on Monday.”135  From this position the 
people could control the stretch of road from the Bahrain Mall to Pearl Square.  This area 
became a sea of national flags as people gathered for a pro-democracy rally on February 14, 
2011, and then again later in the week.
 136
  The protesters wanted their voices heard and the best 
way to do that was to camp out and indicate that they would not leave until the demands of the 
public had been met by the monarchy.
137
  They deemed that their voices be heard and listened to.  
By staying in one spot people could coordinate the next action of the protests and discuss in real-
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time how to deal with the demonstrations.  By taking control of the square early, it lessened the 
need for organization through social media. 
The government tried numerous tactics to get the people of Bahrain out of the Pearl 
Square Roundabout and Manama.  At first King Hamad ordered the use of military forces to 
move people away from their central meeting point, but this did not work.  On February 16, 
2011, people were scared when police used live ammunition but the demonstrators did not give 
up or retreat.  Four people died but anti-government demonstrations continued within the 
roundabout.
138
  Since people did not show fear and kept meeting at the Pearl Roundabout, the 
government withdrew from the area.  On February 20, the people set up extra tents to allow more 
people to live in the protest camp.
139
  The attempt to clear the camps had failed.   
Unfortunately for the protesters, the next tactic that the government tried in order to get 
people out of the Pearl Roundabout was to destroy the site.  Demonstrators left the capital to 
attend the funerals of the four people who died during the first attempt to clear Pearl Square.  
Military forces took this opportunity to raid the area.  Up to five hundred officers showed up at 
Pearl Roundabout to destroy the site.
140
  Not only did they wreck havoc on the property of the 
protesters, but they took down a giant white monument that was in the middle of the roundabout.  
By breaking this over the area it made it harder for the protesters to recreate their old living 
arrangements.  The mound of grass that the protesters had been living on was now a pile of dirt 
littered with debris.
141
  The raid left the tent city in ruins and rallied more people into the streets.  
The treatment of the base camp of the protesters led other people who had not yet been 
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prominent in the protests to join the cause.  The destruction to the tent city was so rampant that it 
initially destroyed all hopes of peaceful change.
142
 
By the time that word had gotten to protesters who were attending funerals outside of 
Manama, it was too late.  Few protesters could make it back to the roundabout in time to see its 
destruction.  Additionally King Hamad put into place a curfew, which stopped people from 
returning to the site after it had been demolished.
143
  The people of Bahrain, unlike protesters in 
other countries, listened to the curfew.  Demonstrators obeyed the law because they had no place 
to meet and protest the unfair government actions, since the military had just destroyed their 
center of operations. 
 After the Pearl Roundabout was destroyed, people began congregating at the Salmaniya 
medical center in Manama.  It was the site where many people who were injured during the 
previous protests had gone for medical treatment.  It was now the new home to the revolution; “a 
hospital forecourt was an unlikely spot to start a revolution. But the thousands of people who 
surged into the grounds of Salmaniya hospital in the capital Manama clearly believe a revolt 
[had] been born that [would] lead them into a showdown with police.”144  People were angered at 
the reaction of the government to the peaceful protests.  Demonstrators organized at the hospital 
and took action with newly invigorated protests.   
The government found the new protest headquarters to be problematic too.  The 
monarchy thought that the hospital was now operating as a base to plot the overthrow of the 
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regime and governing family.
145
  Any medical professional who helped to treat those who were 
injured during protests was seen as supporting the cause of anti-government rallies.  They too 
were traders to the regime and were even put on trial for their crimes against the monarchy.  The 
defense that during the unrest “they were under professional duty to treat all casualties and 
strongly rejected claims by authorities that helping anti-government protesters was akin to 
supporting their cause” was heard by deaf ears.146  King Hamad did not accept this justification 
and sentenced forty-seven health professionals to between five years in jail and a life sentence.
147
  
Military forces took control of the hospital on March 15, when martial law was implemented in 
Bahrain.
 148
  King Hamad wanted an end to the protests and crushed the rebellions through the 
use of military forces and martial law.  The military was not treating those who came in with 
wounds from police brutality during the protests.  In fact it was reported that troops were using 
live ammunition in the hospital to shoot people and threaten doctors not to give medical attention 
to certain individuals.
 149
  This was the first action in the government crackdown.  The Salmaniya 
medical center no longer was a central point in the protests. 
These actions against the people of Bahrain led to more changes in the demands of those 
in the streets.  Now protesters were requesting that the government release people from custody.  
Those who opposed the rule of King Hamad as well as citizens who were just doing their jobs, 
such as doctors, were detained.  Demands in the streets changed to “prisoner release, they want 
the government to resign, the deaths of protesters to be investigated, and political reforms that 
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will lead to a constitutional monarchy.”150  Additionally the demonstrators believed that the 
curfew should be disbanded and peaceful protests should be allowed to happen without the result 
of violence from military and police officials.
151
 
 After just over a month of protests, the government of Bahrain cracked down on those 
who were calling for more reforms and a change of government.  The day before the crackdown, 
Bahrain kicked out all foreign media correspondents.
152
  In an attempt to crush the protests, 
martial law was declared on March 15 and was enforced by troops.  On March 16, 2011, the 
Bahraini government instituted troops from around the Gulf, including Bahraini, Saudi Arabian, 
and United Arab Emirates forces, to put the country into a state of emergency.  The use of so 
many types of security forces was to ensure that protests and disruptions in the streets stopped.
153
  
The Sunni monarchy snapped; the government’s patience with protesters and their roadblocks 
ended and the king wanted to make sure the protests ended too.
154
  The police took control of the 
streets.  With this control came, “police checkpoints … tanks stationed in the centre of the capital 
Manama, a curfew from midnight until early morning and more than 1,000 troops and police 
from neighbouring Arab Gulf states helping to guard vital installations.”155  There was no longer 
any accountability of troops, which meant that violence against those who opposed King Hamad 
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increased.
156
  The police and military could do whatever they wanted and get away with these 
actions because no one was going to report them or reprimand them. 
Not all people within Bahrain believed that there was a need for change within the 
government.  While other dictators in Arab Spring countries had supporters who they called 
upon at times to help aid their cause, none held rallies on their own to indicate the successes of 
the regime.
157
  But in Bahrain, demonstrations by anti-government protesters were met by even 
bigger pro-government events, especially at the end of February (Dalacoura 2012).  Numerous 
Sunni communities benefit from the rule of King Hamad.  The Sunni population is the minority 
but rules over the majority Shiite ethnicity.  While the Shia people feel that they have been taken 
advantage of and disenfranchised by the Hamad regime, the Sunnis benefit economically from 
being in power.
158
  Bahrain is a relatively wealthy country because they have a large quantity of 
oil.  The Sunni minority profits from the oil money more than the Shia population.  Therefore, 
they do not want to have a constitutional monarchy or a democracy because it would hurt their 
lifestyles.  At a Sunni mosque numerous people were quoted as saying that they were supportive 
of the crackdown against protesters.  To this group the protesters had gone too far in their 
demands and were hurting the economy of Bahrain.  For this they deserved to be repressed and 
have their protests ended by both foreign and domestic troops.
159
  This increased tension between 
Shia and Sunni led more Shia into the streets because they felt the need for quicker change.  This 
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does not mean that both sects were not rallying for some changes to take place in the government 
but the majority of those who opposed the government were Shia.
160
 
Within the Shia population there were influential individuals and groups that were 
fighting for more equality and a change in government structure.  One of the key activists was 
Abdulhadi al-Khawaja.  He is considered by King Hamad and his government to be a dangerous 
republican because he called for the end of the regime.
161
  King Hamad’s government has 
charged al-Khawaja with inciting unrest among the Sunni and Shia communities and pitting one 
sect of Muslim against the other to inspire the revolution.
162
  He has been taken from his home 
and detained by the government because he spoke out against the abuses of the Hamad regime.  
The government has detained hundreds of other people, who like al-Khawaja have opposed the 
rule of the monarchy.  Anyone who appears to be harmful to the government is taken, even if 
they are not purposely acting out against King Hamad’s regime.  These individuals have not been 
heard from for weeks or even months.
 163
 
Besides outspoken activists such as al-Khawaja, the opposition party Al-Wifaq has been 
instrumental in the protests.  This political party, which represents the Shia majority, used to hold 
seats in parliament.  However, the eighteen members of parliament resigned after they saw the 
treatment of the government during the crackdown on protesters in March.
164
  This was a bold 
statement against the government, but it may not have been the smartest move on the part of the 
Al-Wifaq party.  In September the government held a special election to fill the seats of those 
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who had resigned months beforehand.
165 
 The people who support Al-Wifaq “make up about 
70% of Bahrain's native population, and is boycotting the polls on the grounds that the ‘election 
is not aimed at achieving serious results.’”166  In these special elections that occurred only certain 
people were allowed to vote or run for office.  The people involved were “either pro-government 
or nominally independent, given the opposition boycott. Four of the seats have already been 
filled, as single candidates were left when all competitors withdrew ahead of the polls.”167  These 
classifications ensured that people who were pro-government won the empty seats.  The majority 
of the population who are Shia and those who were protesting in the streets would not be 
represented in the government.  Therefore, King Hamad might not be forced to change his 
behavior or his rule of the land.  More laws that crackdown and repress the population could be 
passed.  This could be one of the contributing factors to King Hamad’s continued reign of power 
instead of him being forced from the country like other Arab Spring leaders. 
 Unlike most other Arab Spring leaders, the government of Bahrain gave few concessions 
to its people.  Few reforms were granted during the uprising in February and March.  King 
Hamad made one announcement about his government.  He promised to reshuffle his cabinet to 
allow for a more diverse group of people to help him rule.  During this announcement the king 
stated that he would change his cabinet but not replace his prime minister, Sheikh Khalifah ibn 
Salman al-Khalifah, who has been governing with him for forty years.
168
  King Hamad hoped 
                                                        
165
 “Q&A: Bahrain’s By-Elections,” The BBC, 23 September 2011, accessed: 8 February 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15016365>. 
166
 “Q&A: Bahrain’s By-Elections,” The BBC, 23 September 2011, accessed: 8 February 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15016365>. 
167
 “Q&A: Bahrain’s By-Elections,” The BBC, 23 September 2011, accessed: 8 February 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15016365>. 
168
 “Bahrain Crackdown on Protests in Manama’s Pearl Square,” The BBC, 16 March 2011, accessed: 7 February 
2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12755852>. 
 110 
that this announcement would curb dissent in the streets, but it did not.
169
  Most talks with 
opposition groups happened after the end of emergency law, which was lifted on June 1, 2011.  It 
was deemed that after this time the country had returned to normal because protests were no 
longer regularly occurring.  Therefore, the government could rationally talk about making some 
changes.  
 On June 1, 2011, King Hamad ordered an end to the state of emergency rule that he had 
put in place in March.  This decision was staged as an attempt for Bahrain to reassure foreign 
financial markets that the country was ready to conduct business again.
170
  It was a way to show 
outside countries that Bahrain had returned to normal.
 171
  The government wanted to entice 
foreign investors and tourists to come back to Bahrain because it was safe to conduct business 
with and visit again.  Officials hoped that by discontinuing this eleven-week law it would 
indicate that the country was no longer a threat since it did not need emergency rule.
172
  
However, those in power were depicting a contradictory response to outside sources and to the 
protests within the nation.  King Hamad was telling the world that the unrest had stopped and 
people were content with the government again but “the joint Gulf security force, which rolled 
into Bahrain when the emergency was declared on 15 March, will stay in place until the 
government thinks it is no longer needed.”  This Gulf security force was comprised of Saudi and 
UAE forces.
173
  By keeping outside mercenaries in the country, it does not give off the 
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appearance of safety and security. Additionally mere hours after Hamad lifted the law, “security 
forces attacked peaceful protesters in more than 20 villages with rubber bullets, stun grenades, 
shotguns and tear gas.”174  King Hamad has stated that the law has been lifted but in reality 
nothing has changed because violence and troops are still present in the country. 
 On July 1, 2011, King Hamad began a national dialogue with opposition groups to 
ameliorate the country.
175
  Opposition leaders and members of the government met on July 2, 
2011, but the first day of discussion was “mostly ceremonial, with a recital from the Koran, a 
speech and presentations. The talks [were] to last until the end of July, with delegates meeting 
three times a week.”176  The talks included the Al-Wifaq party, which represents seventy-percent 
of the country.
177
  While this Shia opposition party was allowed into the discussions about 
reforms, they only received a small portion of the spots in the national dialogue.  For the number 
of people that the opposition party represents they should have received more than thirty-five 
seats out of the three hundred available spots.  If any reform was put to a vote the Al-Wifaq party 
could easily be overturned and overruled by parliament, which is comprised of all pro-
government supporters.
178
  
The Al-Wifaq party removed itself from the talks during the national dialogue because 
the discussions were not accomplishing any goals; the talks began on July 2, 2011, and the Al-
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Wifaq party pulled out after only two weeks of participation.
179
  The talks were not serious and 
nothing was being changed because too few seats were given to represent those who were 
protesting.  The King had announced that all topics and options could be put on the table but 
refused the release of detained protesters when it came up.  King Hamad knows that anything put 
on the table that is not beneficial to the ruling party and those who associate with them can be 
stopped by a vote, which will result in the ruling party’s favor.  Until this point the government 
has not made any concessions on the “demands to free all detainees and clear other convicted of 
protest-related charges, including eight Shia opposition leaders sentenced to life in prison [in 
June].”180   
In November an independent report from the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry came out in Bahrain saying that the government used excessive force when dealing with 
protesters during the February and March uprising.  After this declaration questioned the 
leadership of King Hamad, he made a committee to look into the human rights abuses during the 
protests.
181
  Few activists and opposition parties are hopeful about the new committee.  They find 
it to be a political ploy and indicate that the government has no intention of looking into the 
deaths of protesters.
182
  The government has made promises before that it has not followed 
through on and the people of Bahrain do not see how this committee could be any different from 
those previous actions.  This committee will not resolve any grievances in the country or conduct 
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any reforms that are beneficial to those who wanted a regime change.
183
  If anything does come 
of this investigation, it will not be in favor of those who were in the streets.  King Hamad would 
more likely use this opportunity to exonerate Bahrain’s rulers who were involved in the 
government crackdown of demonstrators.
 184
 
 After the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report was released, the 
government has looked into making other small changes besides the new commission.  King 
Hamad has replaced his head of security by moving him to a different government job and 
appointing someone new to his old post.  This change comes after the report stated that the 
crackdown was too harsh and violated human rights of those within Bahrain.  Being a Western 
ally that depends on foreign investment, the country cannot afford to ignore a report claiming it 
is unsuitable for outsiders to do business there.  Therefore, on the surface it appears that King 
Hamad is taking measures to deter such crackdowns from happening in the future, but in reality 
this is just a show.
185
  He has successfully stopped the protests once already and would likely do 
it again.  It does not matter who the head of security is.  If protests threaten his position of power 
King Hamad will crackdown on the rallies.  Other recent changes that the king has made include 
“constitutional reforms that are intended to lead to greater accountability, ordered the rebuilding 
of mosques knocked down by the government, and appointed two distinguished British lawyers 
to overhaul Bahrain's judicial system.”186  Lastly the government has stated that it will give jobs 
back to those who lost them during the protests.  Some people were fired for rallying on the 
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streets while others lost employment simply because they were Shia and could potentially be 
against the reign of King Hamad.
187
  Either way people were given their jobs back and could 
work again.  Hamad is making it appear that all is back to pre-protest conditions and norms. 
 As of this writing, King Hamad is still in power in Bahrain.  The one-year anniversary of 
the start of protests has passed, but protests are rare now.  Over the last year, the government has 
detained hundreds of people.  Protesters, opposition leaders, human rights advocates, athletes in 
the country as well as doctors and lawyers and Shia professionals are just some groups of people 
who have been rounded up and put into Bahraini custody.
188
  It is approximated that the Bahrain 
government has detained 1,600 people.
 189
  Those who have been held by the Bahrain 
government have experienced mental and physical torture.  These people have confessed to 
committing crimes against the government that they had no part in because they were tortured or 
threatened until they would admit to these acts.
 190
  Of the people in custody a few have even 
been sentenced to death for protesting against the government and disrupting the way of life in 
Bahrain.
191
  More than four hundred people have lost their jobs because of the protests and the 
ethnic divisions that have widened since the protests began.
192
  During the two months of 
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protests and the small squabbles with authority figures since, over forty people have been killed 
in the Bahrain revolution.
193
 
 King Hamad is still in power for multiple reasons, including the lack of calls for his 
resignation from outside forces, the effective use of domestic and foreign militaries to crackdown 
on the protesters, the change in seasons that made it harder to revolt and the sectarian division 
among those living in Bahrain.  America and other outside countries are allies with Bahrain.  To 
them, King Hamad was not threatening and did not need to be removed in the same manner as 
President Mubarak.  Obama called for reform but never indicated that King Hamad should leave 
his post; “in the case of Bahrain, where the US Fifth Fleet is stationed and there is fear of Iranian 
meddling, Obama called for ‘reform’ but failed to publicly condemn the regime’s repression” 
(Dalacoura 2012, 78).  Stability was even more important in Bahrain than in Egypt.  The 
American government did not want to anger the monarchy of Bahrain and risk conflict that 
would result in the US government having to move its military base from the nation.  Bahrain is 
located in a key area of the Gulf region because it is so close to Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Therefore, President Obama chose to call for restraint rather than back the protesters (Dalacoura 
2012).   
Having troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates come in to help crush the 
rebellion marked an end to the revolution.
194
  Scholars and those within the country of Bahrain 
indicate that the uprising in this country lasted from February to March.  Even though other 
small demonstrations occurred, once the emergency law and use of foreign troops occurred the 
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rebellion ended.  Subsequent protests were infrequent and did not accomplish any goals.
195
  Even 
the climate of Bahrain added to the unsuccessfulness of the protests.  Once emergency rule was 
lifted and people had the potential to begin protests again, it was “blazing summer across the 
Middle East. In most places it's too hot to demonstrate, or to fight, in the middle of the day. And 
it is clear that the process of change that has come to the Arab world is not neat, quick or 
easy.”196  It was too much effort to protest in the streets under the hot Middle Eastern sun, so 
people gave up on fighting for reforms when the emergency law was lifted. 
 The division between the Sunni and Shiite Muslim sects did not enable the people of 
Bahrain to come up with a unified force against the government.  The problem between the two 
groups stems from and is “fuelled by minority regimes for whom majority rule is especially 
threatening.”197 Religion and different sects play a role in the inability to overthrow the dictator.  
Protests bring groups together but when deciding upon how changes should be made and what 
changes should occur, differing religions can come up with diverse answers.  At the beginning of 
the rallies, the majority of people in the streets were Shia.  They were calling for a change to 
“economic hardship, the lack of political freedom and employment discrimination in favour of 
the ruling Sunni Muslim minority.”198  The Sunni population did not feel the same grievances as 
the Shia citizens.  The Sunnis benefit much more from being the political party in power.  They 
did not necessarily want a change to these political issues and therefore were protesting for 
different government reforms.  With the addition of foreign troops in the country, the divide 
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between the two Muslim sects that were protesting grew.
199
  Different groups blamed others for 
the harsh crackdown, injuries and deaths that the Bahrain government imposed on its citizenry.  
A large sectarian dimension reappeared within the nation.
200
  King Hamad could use this divide 
to remain in power.  If the citizenry was not united on what reforms they wanted enacted, it was 
easier for the king not to make any changes. 
Social Media Use in Bahrain 
When looking at the statistics of Internet accessibility, number of Facebook users, wealth 
of the country and literacy within Bahrain, it is hard to understand how little social media 
impacted the uprisings in 2011.  By June of 2011, when the state of emergency was lifted 
649,300 people out of a population of about 800,000 were Internet users.
201
 That’s eighty-one 
percent of people in the country who had the ability to use the Internet.  Of the people who 
utilized the Internet in June of 2011, roughly twenty-four percent of people in Bahrain used 
Facebook (Salem and Mourtada 2011).  However another study stated that before the crackdown 
most people used Facebook for social networking and not political or organizational dialogue.  
Additionally during the months of the Arab Spring in early 2011, Bahrain was named one of the 
“top five Arab countries in terms of usage of social networking sites Facebook and Twitter.  The 
word ‘Bahrain’ was also among the top 'hashtags' posted by Twitter users in the Arab world in a 
series of regional trends focusing on the events of political unrest across the region in the first 
quarter [of the] year.”202  This does not mean that the tweets were coming from within the 
                                                        
199
 Hardy, Roger, “What Happened to the Arab Spring?”, The BBC, 15 Arpil 2011, accessed: 8 February 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13091091>. 
200
 Chulov, Martin, “Bahrain Declares Martial Law as Protesters Clash With Troops,” The Guardian, 15 March 
2011, accessed: 7 February 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/15/bahrain-martial-law-protesters-
troops>. 
201
 “Bahrain Profile,” The BBC, 4 January 2012, accessed: 8 February 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-14541053>. 
202
 “Bahrain Social Media Users on Rise,” TradeArabia, 9 June 2011, accessed: 10 February 2012 
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/871119169/134D94653335110661E/8?accountid=14637>. 
 118 
country though.  The country is ripe with wealth from oil production, and uses that money for 
education, which means that roughly ninety-one percent of the population is literate.
203
  This 
adds to the number of people who could have read about the protests online and mobilized to the 
cause.  With all of these factors, it is puzzling that when looking at the Arab Spring nations 
journalists talk least about social media in Bahrain.  Why did journalists, who were freely 
allowed to roam the nation until the day before the crackdown on March 16, 2011, not comment 
on the use of social media to start or sustain the protests? 
 Access to specific tweets or posts were not available for me to analyze.  However, stories 
have been told to reporters about social media use gone awry.  Messages were misleading and 
directed people towards harmful rather than helpful situations.  Such messages include 
government groups that used anonymous names to create organizational posts and round up 
activists and detain them.  The government also arrested people for posting opposition arguments 
on the Internet when in fact the government had hacked into their account and created those 
updates.  Hackers from the monarchy went online and posted opinions that were anti-government 
under the name of known opposition activists.
204
  These acts quickly turned people off of social 
media.  Protesters in the streets did not use social media, so both foreign and domestic viewers of 
digital media stopped paying attention to the false posts.
205
 
 Since social media was not essential for the uprisings, the two attempted government 
blackouts of social media did not affect the protests.  The government altered social media 
services twice in the month that protests occurred in the nation.  Even though the majority of the 
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people within the nation did not utilize social media, the government took precautionary 
measures against the spread of information on rallies, during the first blackout, and the spread of 
human rights violations videos, during the second blackout.  The interruptions to social media 
use were both at key points in the demonstrations.  On February 15, 2011, the day after protests 
began, people found that their connections were not working up to par: “Bahrainis complained at 
the slowness of internet connections, fuelling speculation that the government had forced service 
providers to throttle speeds to slow the dissemination of information.”206  Even if people wanted 
to use social media, they could not.  Not only were Internet connections altered for the people in 
the nation but other social media outlets were monitored too; “mobile phones [had] been 
disrupted. Social networking outlets [were] being monitored. Activists with contacts to outside 
journalists [were] being arrested.”207  The second blackout administered by the government was 
when the crackdown began on protesters.  On March 16, 2011, as foreign troops were helping to 
remove demonstrators from the streets, social media was not working within the country.  People 
could not indicate to one another what was happening or how to avoid it even if they wanted to 
or trusted the posts that would be put on the Internet through social media.  Both times the 
government blacked out social media usage, the disturbances did not last for long periods of 
time.  
Facebook and Twitter 
Facebook and Twitter were not used as organizational tools before the protests began.  
When people within the country were interviewed, they could not indicate if social media had led 
to the start of the protests.  People responded with statements such as I think social media was 
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utilized, but no definitive webpage could be recalled where organization took place.
208
  In fact a 
Facebook page was created called 14 February Revolution Youth Coalition.  However, it only 
briefly talked about a protest that should end at the Pearl Roundabout.  No details were decided 
upon through the use of the webpage.  The page did not have many updates between the first 
demonstration and the special elections in September, when it was utilized again.
209
  It was not 
used to organize the first protest or attempt to mobilize people to the cause.  The social media 
blackout did not alter the use of Facebook or Twitter because people who were going to rally in 
the streets for regime change were not monitoring the sites.  The lack of use of this Facebook 
page cannot be attributed to the first government black out of social media.  The first blackout 
began on February 15, 2011, after the protests began.  The rare protester who did check these 
social media sites reported that they could no longer access sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter.
210
  By the time that Twitter was back people had taken up residency in Pearl Square and 
did not need social media to organize.  Instead organization happened through older forms of 
communication.  Meetings at mosques and coffee houses were used to establish dates, times and 
ways of protesting.  Fliers along with word of mouth informed people about the demonstrations 
and when they would begin.  Social media was not needed to spread the word about the 
revolution. 
Twitter was used mostly by elites, and very few elites were also Shia protesters.  Those 
who posted on Twitter that were anti-government were not the same protesters who ran into the 
streets to demonstrate against the government.  Since those who opposed the regime in the open 
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were more likely to be picked up by authority figures and tortured, these elites aired their 
disagreements with government policies through social media outlets while congregating at local 
coffee shops.
 211
  By meeting at a local business, tweeters hoped that the government would not 
track their Internet Protocol (IP) address (which indicates the location of the social media device 
that is uploading or updating information on the Internet) back to their houses.  Twitter was used 
to depict the harsh realities of the government security forces and anger in the different ethnic 
communities, according to the British Broadcasting Company.
 212
  However, the depictions that 
were tweeted were from those watching the protests rather than those who were participating in 
them and felt first hand what it was like to be struck by teargas.  Since Twitter was quickly found 
to be unreliable, these tweets were not impacting those within or outside of the nation. 
Social media is discredited in Bahrain because it was unreliable for indicating what was 
happening on the ground.  Individuals within the country and abroad felt that what was shown 
through social media could have been fabricated and the source was often untraceable.  
Government intervention, and use of Internet based social media by elites rather than actual 
activists led the general public to find social media untrustworthy.  The Bahraini government had 
seen the impact of social media in other countries, and tried a new tactic of infiltrating the system 
to stop the use of this communication type as a mobilization tool.  Government officials even 
used social media to trick protesters and detain them.  Bahraini individuals did not use social 
media to organize or mobilize because they did not trust those whose identity they could not 
verify.  The addition of people who were not directly involved or camped out in Pearl 
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Roundabout but were commenting as if they were revolutionaries, adds to the theory that social 
media could not be trusted to give an accurate picture of the uprising in Bahrain. 
YouTube 
 YouTube was used to capture the protests on camera.  The few killings that happened as 
well as violent demonstrations were caught on tape for the world to see.  The videos, especially 
one in Sitra, which is close to the capital Manama, revealed what the Bahraini government 
preferred its Western allies not see.
 213
  The police and military fired on civilians, threw teargas 
canisters, and used other means to silence the protests.  People within the nation and some that 
were outside of it viewed these videos.  They circulated around different social media websites 
such as YouTube and Facebook.
214
  Few people abroad were shocked or appalled at these videos 
in the same manner that they had been when videos of Egypt were posted online.  Since other 
social media sites had been fabrications of the truth, viewers were skeptical of the material in the 
videos.  Another reason that these images did not invoke a reaction could be that most of the 
videos that were uploaded were of the crackdown.  These depictions wanted to show the 
hardships of the protesters during the violent crushing of the rebellion, but the Bahraini 
crackdown coincides with the first day of protests and “Day of Rage” in Syria.  Abuses were 
much more dramatic in Syria; therefore, Syria received more media attention than the crackdown 
in Bahrain. 
While Bahrain is an ally of the United States and even houses one of its military fleets, 
Americans were unconcerned with protests in this Gulf state.  People often do not know much 
about the nation and in comparison to all of the other unrest going on in the Middle East, Bahrain 
                                                        
213
 Black, Ian, “Bahrain Protests: ‘The Repression is Getting Worse,’” The Guardian, 8 August 2011, accessed: 7 
February 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/08/bahrain-protests-repression-getting-worse>. 
214
 Booth, Robert, “Bahrain: Four Protesters Sentenced to Death by Firing Squad,” The Guardian, 28 April 2011, 
accessed: 7 February 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/28/bahrain-four-protesters-sentenced-
death>. 
 123 
was not a major concern.  Other countries attracted more media attention.  Since the videos in 
Bahrain could not be authenticated and viewers did not know if the images were real or 
contrived, people in other nations did not feel strongly about King Hamad’s use of force.215  
Outsiders did not call for his resignation.  People did not watch the videos from Bahrain with as 
much passion as they did the other revolutions in the region.  They were caught up in more 
violent and pressing uprisings.  The demonstrations in Bahrain were coming to an end as a result 
of the government crackdown, while rebellions were flaring up in other countries. 
Impact of Social Media in Bahrain 
Social media should have been extremely important in fostering the protests in Bahrain 
and organizing grievances against the regime, but older forms of media were used instead. With 
a high rate of Internet use, Facebook members, and cell phone users, Bahraini protesters should 
have organized online before moving to the streets, yet the people of Bahrain did not use social 
media in the same vein as other nations.  Multiple scenarios could explain the absence of a 
mobilization technique that made more sense in this Arab nation than any of the others that did 
utilize it.  Shia Muslims, who comprise the largest population of protesters, are poor.  They do 
not have the luxuries of owning a personal computer with access to the Internet or Facebook.  
The available data on Internet and Facebook users is from June 2011, not February when the 
protests began.  Nothing helps to encourage the use of technology more than uprisings and 
confrontation.  It is unknown if Shia Muslims had the ability to use Facebook as a massive 
organizational tool before the protests began.  People could have developed the skill of social 
media usage during the revolutions, since Shia Muslims were out of work, protesting, and 
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looking for ways to gain supporters for the rallies.  If protests were to start again, the possibility 
of social media use could be higher.  
The government of Bahrain was quicker to shut down protests than any other 
government.  It was the only regime that succeeded in stopping demonstrations all together 
without mass killings.  Very early in the rebellion, the government began rounding up anyone 
who was capable of using social media to inspire those who were not already in the streets.  
Through government filters they could “[target] political, human rights, religious material and 
content deemed obscene. Bloggers and other netizens were among those detained during protests 
in 2011.”216  Protesters were being arrested for speaking out against the government.  The 
protesters that were being detained were “doctors, bloggers and opposition activists - some of 
whom have simply ‘disappeared’, according to reports from family, friends and rights 
groups.”217  The Bahrain monarchy has tried them for organizing a terrorist group against the 
government.  Police forces picked up twenty-three people and detained them without access to a 
lawyer for weeks.  Finally they were pardoned by King Hamad but days after this decree the 
police began picking up the protesters again.  People were “dragged out of bed by armed men in 
ski masks and their houses smashed up. The Mukhabarat [secret police] set up a Twitter account 
and named people as traitors so that when they tried to leave the country they were picked up. 
Hundreds remain in prison.”218 One protester even died at the hands of government officials.219  
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By capturing leading bloggers and people with access to the Internet, people were deterred from 
using social media to plan a protest. 
 The protests of Bahrain occurred from February 14, 2011, to March 16, 2011.  During 
that time period the people of Bahrain used social media minimally.  When it was used it did not 
aid in bringing people out into the streets to protest against the Sunni monarchy that had been 
ruling for two hundred years.  The protesters in Bahrain did not use social media to organize or 
mobilize because they did not trust the sources that posts and updates were coming from.  While 
some scholars found the Arab Spring to be determined and defined by social media, that was not 
the case in Bahrain.  For this revolution the e-activist had not replaced a pamphleteer.
 220
  
Bahrain reverted back to older forms of communication.  The common meeting ground of Pearl 
Roundabout was akin to a town square.  To get information people would converse face-to-face 
at the rallies in the roundabout.  One writer even indicated that the Bahraini rebellion 
demonstrates that “the tweet will never replace the street.”221  For the Bahraini people to 
mobilize and figure out what direction the protest should take, it was easier to communicate 
when together than virtually discuss goals and motives.  Social media did not impact or have any 
influence over the Bahrain uprising.  Instead of using social media, the people in Bahrain stuck 
with older and more traditional forms of communication.  These tactics were successful before 
the intense and violent crackdown by the government.  Had the government not used foreign and 
domestic forces to crush the rebellion and detain those who had any relation to it, older forms of 
communication may have led to more reforms and even a change of government.   
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Social Media did not Impact the Revolution 
 Social media did not play an important role in the revolution of Bahrain.  Older forms of 
communication were utilized rather than social media.  When police vehicles or military tanks 
rolled through one town and headed towards another, people would throw paint on the vehicle.  
When the authority figure reached the next destination those in the area could tell where the 
vehicle had just been.  This process was used for “alerting fellow protesters to where the force 
has just come from.”222  Demonstrators within Bahrain deemed this a better tactic for 
communicating with one another than blogging, texting or updating a post saying what type of 
vehicle or license plate numbers had been through their own town recently.  People within the 
nation did not trust social media because information on the sites was often wrong or 
defamatory.
223
  The government was also apprehending anyone who spoke out against the 
government or helped the protesters achieve their goals.  An easy way for the regime to find 
opposition parties was to target those who posted on the Internet about revolutionary actions. 
 The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry created a report on the February and 
March uprisings in Bahrain and released the report in November.  In the report it was noted that 
“the commission found numerous examples of exaggeration and misinformation, some highly 
inflammatory, that were disseminated through social media.”224  This furthers the thought that 
people did not trust social media during the uprising.  Social media outlets were untraceable and 
unaccountable during this time period.  Posts incited violence between protesters and the 
government and protesters of different ethnic divisions.  People were unsure where these social 
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media postings were coming from but they were detrimental to the progress and goals of the 
revolution in Bahrain because they caused disagreements among the demonstrators.
225
 
 Protesters did not use social media to organize rallies, and these tools were not used to 
mobilize or sustain people during the revolution.  Bahrain falls under the second school of 
thought when it comes to the impact of social media in the Arab Spring.  Social media tools were 
not necessary for the rebellion to begin.  Social media impacted the country negatively rather 
than positively.  Bahraini protesters were not successful in achieving any of their goals of reform 
or riding the nation of King Hamad.  However, the use of social media would not have allowed 
this country to succeed against the regime.  Citizens within the nation did not trust each other or 
social media outlets because they could not validate the source or indicate if the person behind 
the message wanted to help or hinder the cause for a constitutional monarchy.  For multiple 
reasons, social media was not an important factor in the revolution in Bahrain.  It was not 
utilized and not necessary.  Social media was more of a detractor from the protests, so people 
quickly learned to stay away from what posts were saying.  Therefore, social media did not 
contribute in any way to the uprising. 
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Chapter 6: Syrian Revolution 
The Syrian revolution is different than the previous Arab Spring revolutions.  The 
movement and protests have lasted much longer than the rebellions in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Bahrain.  The government did not allow foreign media into the country and even domestic news 
sources have been censored.  Additionally military and police brutality have been excessive for 
those who have protested against the government.  For these reasons, the knowledge that outside 
countries have gained about the uprising cannot be completely verified.  People who do come 
forth with information on what is happening on the ground must do so under pseudonyms for 
fear if their real identity is revealed they will be captured, tortured, and killed.  In this chapter 
quotations and information come from sources known as Katherine Marsh, Nour Ali, or Nidaa 
Hassan.  They are all protesters within Syria, but they are not always the same person.  People 
use the same name to disguise their true identity.  These people have helped further the 
understanding of the protests and enabled people to see the use of social media during the 
rebellion. 
Protests officially began in Syria on March 15, 2011 and the revolution is credited to 
have begun the next day.  Syria is still in a state of revolution today and President Assad 
maintains power over the country.  Protesters have been fighting for more freedoms and a change 
in government for almost a year with little change to the status quo.  During these uprisings 
social media outlets such as Facebook and YouTube have been used to organize and mobilize 
more people to the cause for democracy.  Therefore, Syria falls under the first school of thought 
on social media’s impact on the Arab Spring.  Social media was necessary to start the revolution 
and needed to continue the protests during the uprising. 
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Table 4: Timeline of important dates that have happened so far throughout the                                 
Syrian uprising. 
Protests Officially Begin –March 15, 2011 
“Day of Rage” protest –March 18, 2011 
President Assad begins concessions –March 27, 2011 
“Day of Martyrs” protest –April 1, 2011 
Hamza’s dead body is returned to his family—May 27, 2011 
Government Blackout –First week in June 2011 
“Day of Not Kneeling” – August 12, 2011 
Arab League Suspends Syria – November 12, 2011 
UN votes on Peacekeeping Mission – February 2012 
Hussameddin, a governmental official, resigns – March 8, 2012 
 
Revolution in Syria 
 Syria’s leader President Bashar Al-Assad has only been in power since 2000.  However, 
his family has ruled the country for the last forty years.  Assad was naive enough to state that his 
country was not at risk to the wave of democracy that was sweeping the Arab region in 2011.  He 
told sources that “his country is immune to the demands for change that have already toppled 
leaders in Egypt and Tunisia.”226  This could not have been farther from the truth.  Some minor 
protests occurred in February and early March but they were small with no more than thirty 
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people at each demonstration.
227
  These rallies were over the government’s torture of students.  
Students in a small southern city of Syria drew anti-government graffiti on walls of buildings.  
The fifteen students wrote the “well-known slogan of the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt: 
‘The people want the downfall of the regime,’” on walls in Daraa.228  The government did not 
respond well to this outburst of dissent.  Authority figures rounded up the perpetrators, and 
tortured those who were responsible.  Some of the teenagers who were involved were killed by 
police forces.  These students just wanted freedom and the government crushed those dreams.
229
  
These brutal actions led others in the town to protest the abuses of the state.
230
  Once these 
protests started in early March, they spread to other cities and towns around the south of Syria.  
This was the initial spark that led people to organize mass movements all over the nation.  Young 
people did not want to stand by as others of their age were ruthlessly murdered while attempting 
to depict their need for more rights; the “young are determined and fearless, prepared to pay the 
bloody price for change.”231  
As Table 4 demonstrates, the official beginning to the revolution was March 16, 2011.  
After this date thousands of people stormed into the streets.  Marwan Kabalan, a political science 
professor at the University of Damascus, noted that thousands of ordinary people were protesting 
because they wanted more freedoms in their daily lives.
232
  He even found the initial protests to 
be unorganized because they were spontaneous actions of frustrated people.  Later mobilizations, 
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which were organized and unified the North and South of Syria, would be thought through and 
more calculated.  Since the revolution is still going on, and the government has chosen to use 
violence and detainment as a way to discourage people from participating, those who organize 
protests cannot use their real names.  This would be detrimental to their safety, so it is unknown 
who within Syria is behind the mobilization.  However, there are some spokespeople who talk 
for protesters. Omar Idlibi, is a spokesman for a network of activists in a suburb of Damascus, 
which did not have large protests until later in the revolution.
233
  Some outside Swedish and 
French individuals have helped to inspire protests and opposition groups though.  Burhan 
Ghalioun, who is from Paris, had worked with opposition groups that directed protests later in 
the rebellion. 
The demands of protesters changed over the almost yearlong rebellion.  The demands 
began simply as a need for reform and change.  Some laws and policies were outdated and 
needed to be altered to ameliorate the lives of Syrians.  The people of the country wanted an end 
to the state of emergency that had been in place since the Assad family had been in charge, and 
they wanted an end to the secret police, which kept the citizens in a state of repression.
234
  The 
people wanted President Assad to lift the emergency rule, because “Syria has been under 
emergency law since the Ba'ath party took power in a 1963, banning any opposition and ushering 
in decades of economic retreat characterised by nationalisation.”235  Initially people did not want 
to overthrow President Assad, they wanted to change some of his family’s policies. 
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After the initial protest of March 16, 2011, the next scheduled uprising was set for Friday 
March 18, 2011.  These rallies were scheduled to take place in five cities within Syria.  They 
included Damascus, the capital, Homs, which is in the north, Daraa, which is located in the 
south, Banias, which is on the western coast of Syria, and Deir el-Zour, which is in the east of 
Syria.
236
  Protests were not successful in all of the cities.  In Damascus, the revolutionaries never 
got out of the mosque that they gathered at before the protest; police entered the Ummayad 
Mosque and beat demonstrators there.
237
  Police brutality began the same day that the protests 
started.  On March 18, 2011, in other cities protesters were beaten, tear gassed, and put into 
detention centers.  Shots from military forces were fired into the air.
238
  Even from the beginning 
of the rebellion it was clear that the road to democracy would be much more violent for Syria 
than it had been for either Tunisia or Egypt.  Both the largest and bloodiest protest of the day 
occurred in Daraa.
239
  In Daraa the government took control of the city.  For eleven days the 
people of Daraa were trapped inside their town, and families ran out essentials including 
water.
240
  Over these eleven days three hundred people were killed and hundreds more were 
detained.
241
  This city received the bulk of force from the government during those first protests. 
Even though Damascus is the capital, the protests within this city were light.  For the first 
few weeks of the rebellion, rallies were not large within Damascus.  This is because the city is 
the home to intelligence and security services, as well as the military headquarters.  It is harder to 
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successfully protest (Abouzeid 2011).  In general “protesters appeared to consolidate their 
positions in Daraa in the deep south and in the northern port city of Latakia, which are the two 
main fronts in the challenge to the Syrian regime.”242  Those who were demonstrating for change 
kept moving protests from smaller cities closer towards the capital of Damascus.  At the end of 
April, protests officially reached Damascus, but demonstrations did not take full force there until 
July.  Then it became the third largest city to hold protests.
243
 
 After the first nationwide demonstration on Friday March 18, protests within Syria 
occurred weekly on Fridays.  Uprisings would begin after the 2 P.M. prayers.  People would 
begin in mosques and then take to the streets together after praying. These types of 
demonstrations have become weekly events.
244
  After seeing the brutality of how President 
Assad’s forces treated unarmed protesters, the population of Syria was angered.  The violence 
was a large recruiting tool, and made tens of thousands of Syrians angered to the point of 
protesting against the authoritarian rule of Assad.
245
  Every time people were killed within a 
town, more citizens decide to join the protest for the next Friday.   
 Whenever protests flared up on a Friday in parts of the country “security forces launched 
a harsh crackdown on [those calling for freedoms]. But only in Daraa did they turn deadly,” 
during the first month of protests.
246
  Daraa was the first city to have a casualty from the protests 
for governmental change.  More fatalities began to occur at the hands of authority figures and 
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President Assad loyalists.  It was more than live ammunition that was used against peaceful 
protesters.  Teargas and sound bombs were utilized to stop those demonstrating in the streets.  
Roads and access points to hospitals were closed off.  This made those who were injured harder 
to save and increased the death toll.
247
   
Authority figures were not the only ones to use violence, loyalists shot those who 
opposed the government too.  Mass graves containing up to four hundred and twenty bodies have 
been found in public parks close to protest sites.
248
  Gangs, known as Shabiha, that have close 
relations with the ruling Assad family have been seen terrorizing neighborhoods of protesters 
even when the demonstrations were not going on.
249
  President Assad inspired the idea of 
demonstrating and fighting against those who opposed the regime, but after initiating the cause 
loyalists took it farther than Assad dreamed.  They were brutal towards those in the streets.  Even 
if these loyalists did not agree with the violence against protesters, they would not dare disobey 
the president.  Military and police figures are more than willing to defend President Assad and 
his rule.  They live comfortable lives with him as a leader and would not want to alter the status 
quo.  Syria is unique because it is comprised of a Sunni majority but is ruled by a minority 
group.  Therefore, letting other ethnicities have the opportunity to win political offices is 
problematic for those who are close to Assad.
250
  It would be detrimental to their lifestyle if they 
no longer had the luxuries they currently possess because Sunni leaders were in power. 
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Even if individuals chose to defy President Assad, in his eyes they would turn into 
demonstrators and be treated that way.  Once violence started to increase, some soldiers did not 
want to shoot live ammunition at demonstrators anymore.  When they refused to fire on the 
peaceful protesters, the soldiers were shot themselves.  There is footage of a soldier being shot in 
the back for refusing to fire on defenseless demonstrators.251  Numerous soldiers were injured this 
way.  If they still refused to defend President Assad’s regime by firing at those who were 
opposing the government then they were killed.  Death tolls went down for a few weeks at the 
beginning of April, as military officials tried to oppose the rule to shoot at protesters.  The 
number of demonstrators increased, until authority figures used force again: “casualty figures … 
were down on previous weeks but the numbers of demonstrators appeared to be some of the 
largest yet seen.”252  People returned to the streets when violence increased because they were 
reacting to the abuses against citizens.253 
At the beginning of the revolution, Assad’s government had numerous individuals who 
were loyal to his regime and rule.  As the protests went on the number of Assad supporters 
waned.  The president treated those who were his companions but had a change of heart as if 
they were enemies.  Assad tortured and killed hundreds of his own citizens.  This treatment 
changed the opinion of people within his regime from pro-Assad to wanting a change in 
government.  Government officials began to question fighting against the protesters.  One 
official named Bakkour resigned in September of 2011 after remaining loyal even during the 
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rising domestic and international pressure for President Assad to step down.
254
  Bakkour, the 
former attorney general, soon went missing after his resignation from government duty.  It is 
speculated that Assad took him into custody and is torturing him, as he has done to other military 
and government officials who have betrayed him during these uprisings.
255
  The highest-ranking 
government official to step down from the Assad government was Abdo Hussameddin.  He was 
the Deputy Oil Minister and vacated his seat on March 8, 2012.
 256
 
 One of the last rallying techniques besides the initial unhappiness with government 
actions, and brutality of authority figures towards protesters, happened at the very end of May.  
Up until this point, the majority of the violence had been restricted to actions taken against 
adults.  While men and women were targeted by the military, it was rare that a child was killed.  
If this did occur, it never seemed to be an intentional fatality in cold blood as this death had been.  
On April 29, 2011, Hamza al-Khatib who was a thirteen-year-old boy from al-Jizah, which is a 
village in the south near Daraa, was captured by security forces.  On May 27, 2011, “his badly 
mutilated corpse was released to his horrified family, who were warned to keep silent.”257  He 
was the first child, that is widely known of, to be taken and tortured by Assad’s government.  To 
many people around the country this was the final straw.  The government had gone too far to 
capture and torture a small boy.  Pictures of the brutality were sent around the nation.  One could 
see that his “tortured and his swollen body showed bullet wounds on his arms, black eyes, cuts, 
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marks consistent with electric shock devices, bruises and whip marks. His neck had been 
broken,” and other appendages had been cut off.258  The death of an innocent boy rallied people 
to the cause of democracy and demand for the resignation of President Assad.  Hamza became 
Syria’s version of Bouazizi and Said for the respectively Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.  He 
was an innocent person who had been killed at the hands of the corrupt and abusive government. 
Assad blames the unrest in Syria on armed gangs who were disturbing the population.
259
  
By categorizing these protesters as outlaws, who were dangerous to the citizenry, he could justify 
crushing those who were opposing the government.  To Assad, foreigners were also implanting 
ideas of reform into these thugs who were hurting the people of Syria.  Assad even took this 
view so far as to publicize it on his state run television networks.  On television people could see 
the destruction that these gangsters were imposing on innocent civilians; “state-run Syrian TV 
has run lingering, gruesome close-ups of dead soldiers, their eyes blown out and parts of their 
limbs missing, to back up their claims that they are under attack.”260  With these videos, 
President Assad hoped to maintain the loyalty of some citizens and halt the recruitment of other 
Syrians to the protests. 
 President Assad began talking with protesters to make concessions almost immediately 
after protests began.  Yet these discussions provided empty hopes for demonstrators.  On April 1, 
2011, the “Friday of Martyrs” was organized as a giant day for demonstrations against the 
government.  Demonstrators over the country wanted to protest President Assad not following 
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through on his pledges to change his rule to better the lives of the average Syrian.
261
  People 
began to distrust the government even more than they had before the start of the uprising in 
Syria.  During the almost year of protests in Syria, President Assad has made some concessions 
to his people.  The first of these peace offerings happened a mere eleven days after the revolution 
began.  Assad chose to fire his cabinet.  He hoped that this gesture would reflect his willingness 
to make changes to the government.
262
  Yet, his actions were indicating that he would not allow 
for any changes to his rule.  With only eleven days of protests, “more than 150 people have been 
killed in 11 days of unrest, which have seen protesters calling for increased freedoms.”263   Assad 
was not willing to give up power to the demands of his people.  His next big plea to persuade 
protesters not to call for him to leave office was “granting Syrian nationality to thousands of 
Kurds, a long-ostracised minority. But the gestures have failed to satisfy protesters, who demand 
political freedoms and an end to the decades-old emergency laws that allow the regime to arrest 
people without charge.”264  Protesters would not settle for small changes to the government.  
They wanted more freedoms and the repealing of unnecessary laws that restrict the abilities of 
citizens in Syria.   
In the middle of April, one of the protesters’ demands was achieved.  The decades old 
emergency law was abolished.  However, instead of being a cause for victory Assad put into 
place other equally as restrictive crackdowns.  When the emergency law was lifted, Assad’s 
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troops fired on demonstrators.
265
  In 2008 the government of Syria created a law that made 
security forces of the country immune to prosecution.
266
  This made the enforcement of new laws 
restricting protests even more debilitating for people.  Security forces chased protesters from 
central locations, tracked them down, beat them and then detained the revolutionaries.
267
  There 
were no consequences for authority figures because they could attack protesters without 
repercussions.  Assad also sent military tanks into cities that were known for widespread and 
large protests against his regime.  President Assad had finally lifted the state of emergency ban 
but his security forces killed people the next day.
268
  The tanks opened fire on those who were 
peacefully demonstrating.
269
  These concessions should have been the most important to date but 
President Assad did not change anything.  He lifted one law but put into place almost the same 
rule but under a different form.  He also increased violence and subsequently casualties from the 
ongoing protests.
270
 
The previous concessions had not quelled the protests that were still spreading to new 
cities every Friday.  Assad decided that more aggressive concessions needed to be made.  His 
next form of action was to abolish another long-standing law.  The state security court, which 
was responsible for the trials of any political prisoners, would be abolished.  President Assad 
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also created a new law that legalized peaceful protests.271  These responses to the demands of the 
people came in the middle of April, which was about one month after the start of the protests.  
Still these were not deemed to be sufficient freedoms for those who were participating in the 
uprising.   
People were no longer angered merely because they did not have enough freedoms within 
their own society.  After the initial protests, more people rallied to the cause based on the 
treatment by the government towards those who were peacefully demanding more rights.  The 
abuses of the government against those who were unarmed in the streets made more Syrian 
citizens mobilize to the cause.  Chants of “He who kills his people is a traitor,” could be heard 
after especially violent protests.272  Demands of revolutionaries changed from wanting more 
freedom to wanting a new government and leader.  They could no longer accept someone who 
would be so brutal to his own citizens.  Thousands of people on May 6, 2011, chanted in sixty-
five towns across the country, “the people want to topple the regime.”273  Nothing short of the 
resignation of President Assad would make people stop protesting every Friday. 
President Assad continued to bargain and even tried to hold a meeting of opposition 
groups to find an end to the protests. In June of 2011, “more than 150 Syrian intellectuals and 
activists including prominent opposition figures [met] in Damascus … to discuss the current 
crisis and propose a way out of the violence.”274  Assad did not invite all of those who were 
involved with the uprising to meet at the table and discuss ways to ameliorate the lives of Syrians 
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and end the violence.  The talks are supposed to be between independent figures.  Neither Assad 
nor anyone who has had a previous affiliation with a political party was allowed to join the peace 
talks.275  The groups are hoping to come up with an inclusive response to the fighting before 
suggesting concessions to the government and demonstrators.  However, a compromise will not 
be accepted by the Syrian protesters if Assad will remain in office. 
According to a Syrian Human Rights group, at this point in the protests approximately, 
“1,419 civilians and 352 members of the security forces [had] been killed since 15 March, while 
more than 1,300 people [had] been arrested.”276  While President Assad had been telling 
opposition forces that he wanted to make concessions and end the violence over the first four 
months of protests, in reality he had been killing and torturing thousands of citizens who 
challenged his reign.  Protesters did not want to make deals with Assad or other government 
officials because they did not trust that Assad would follow through; “opposition figures have 
emphasised that there can be no dialogue or trust in the regime's reform programme until the 
security crackdown stops.”277  His actions and words had been contradictory up until this point in 
the revolution, and instead of bargaining demonstrators just wanted him gone. 
It was reported on July 25, 2011, that as one of his final major concessions President 
Assad would draft a new election law.  This legislation stated that rival political parties were 
allowed to run for political office against the ruling Ba'ath party.  President Assad is a part of the 
Ba’ath party; therefore, this legislation states that if someone were to run against his party and 
win, they could hold office.  Even though this was a large step towards freedoms, the move was 
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“largely dismissed by opposition groups as an empty gesture.”278  All previous attempts at 
meeting the demands of the protesters had not transpired, and the citizens of Syria had no faith 
that this would provide a real change either.  The lifting of the emergency law, which was one of 
the roots of the rebellion, resulted in no change; therefore, the people had no reason to believe 
that the change in election policy would produce any alterations to the current system. 
Since this last concession the people of Syria have still been fighting for Assad to leave 
office and depart from the country.  Thousands more people are being killed through the fighting 
and military force that is used against the revolutionaries.  On August 12, the country staged a 
protest known as the “Day of Not Kneeling.”  This protest symbolized that the people of Syria 
would not treat President Assad like a god and kneel for him.279  Demonstrators wanted him gone 
and would no longer show him any respect because he did not deserve it.280  The human rights 
violations have become so intense that the United Nations has begun to get involved. The Arab 
League, which kicked Syria out of its establishment in November of 2011, and United Nations 
are trying to come up with a peacekeeping mission to help keep the country from falling into a 
civil war.281  This peacekeeping mission hopes to produce a ceasefire.  By getting both sides to 
agree to a ceasefire, no more innocent civilians will die at the hands of President Assad.  Most 
Western nations feel that President Assad must be stopped, but there are nations that side with 
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the Syrian regime.282  The only countries that oppose the call for Assad to step down are China 
and Russia, who see Syria as a trading partner and have no concerns about the human rights 
abuses that are occurring within the nation.283  The demonstrators are still in the streets after 
almost a year, fighting for more freedoms, the removal of President Assad, and the creation of a 
democratic government.  They are determined to rebel until their demands are met. 
As of March 2012, President Assad still has power over Syria.  The most recent studies 
indicate that over 3,500 people have been killed by Syrian forces.
284
  Yet not all of the violence 
can be accounted for and realistically the number of fatalities is higher.  Of those that have died 
during this uprising over eighty-eight were killed while in police custody.
285
  Lastly while 
thousands have been killed, thousands are also still detained in police custody.  About 12,000 
people have been detained since mid-March of 2011 and remain in the hands of the Syrian 
government.
286
  Foreign nations are calling for the resignation of President Assad, and telling 
him that change is inevitable.  Over the summer of 2011, the Obama administration finally 
“turned against Mr. Assad but stopped short of demanding that he step down.”287  During the fall 
months, as Assad used more violence against his constituents and the Arab League dismissed the 
membership of Syria, the United States also called for President Assad to step down from office.  
However, Assad has not accepted the fact that his time left in office is limited.  He continues to 
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kill his citizens because he is unwilling to give up power, especially if the majority ethnicity 
group will take over after his reign. 
Assad is still in power for numerous reasons including: his use of the military to stop 
protests by force, and that protests occurred mostly on Fridays, which did not send the economy 
into an upheaval.  The military forces listened to the government’s demand for violence against 
demonstrators, and brutally crushed protests and killed hundreds of people.  President Assad 
wanted to stop the rebellion, and he thought violence would accomplish that.  Since the military 
is of the same sect of Islam as the President and his government, they benefit from his rule.  The 
relationship between the government and authority figures is a good one, and those in the 
military would not risk their position in society by siding with the protesters.  Therefore, they 
willing used tanks, teargas, and guns on large protests and cities known for opposing the 
government.  The violence that Assad has applied to the demonstrations has allowed him to stay 
in office because forces and brutality have broken up multiple rallies. 
Most protests occurred on Friday afternoons in Syria.  All major demonstrations that 
were organized online were set for Friday at 2 P.M. after prayers.  This was not the best tactic for 
those in the street.  Protests were predictable and the security forces knew exactly when rallies 
would take place, which made them easier to crush.  The violence that was used against 
revolutionaries ensured that the protests could not make as big of an impact on the government 
as those participating wanted.  Additionally, unlike other nations, where demonstrators have 
continuously protested, the people of Syria chose only one day per week.  The economy of Syria 
has not been as interrupted as those from other Arab Spring nations.  If the economy went into an 
upheaval then the government would be forced to make changes or it would lose support from 
foreign trading partners like China and Russia.  Analysts think that “Syria's paralysed economy 
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could be the key factor … Its collapse could well precipitate the regime's demise.”288  The 
number and frequency of protests should increase so that the message of those within Syria is 
heard and dealt with by the government. 
Social Media Use in Syria 
 In order to try and curb the likelihood that the Arab Spring uprisings reached Syria, 
President Assad loosened his restrictions on social media before the March protests.
289
  Assad 
hoped that by granting this minor freedom, the people of Syria would not feel repressed under 
his rule.  He did not want to seem like other dictators who were shutting down Internet access to 
maintain control.  By giving the people more freedom, Assad’s actions were trying to prevent 
protests and unrest in the nation.  This was unsuccessful for his regime but did open the doors for 
ordinary people to use outlets such as Facebook and YouTube for political organization.  The 
Syrian government placed restrictions on media once the uprisings actually began.   
No foreign media outlets were allowed into the country and no media sources were 
allowed near the especially troubled spots that were protesting.
290
  Even the United Nations was 
not granted access to the country.  This lack of communication makes “it almost impossible to 
verify the dramatic events shaking one of the most authoritarian regimes in the Arab world.”291  
Even when communicating with those within the country, foreign outlets found it hard to 
initially find out what was going on.  Since “Syria places tight restrictions on the movements of 
journalists in the country when it comes to security issues and state-run media, officials rarely 
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comment on such sensitive matters.”292  It was hard for those in the country and those abroad to 
learn the truth about the protests.  President Assad, just as other Arab leaders before him, was 
playing the demonstrations off as gangs stirring up trouble within the country rather than 
uprisings against the government.  This made the YouTube videos that citizen journalists posted 
key for the uprising. 
 Through the Internet people discussed ways to mobilize.  For the first few weeks of the 
protests, “Mosques have so far been the focus of Friday protests, but activists say they are 
rapidly developing online and offline networks to mobilise people elsewhere.”293  The Internet 
has been utilized to decide on times, dates and crucial information for the major protests of the 
revolution.  The revolution has been a combination of using digital media and face-to-face 
interactions to decide upon how protests should continue to operate.294  Social media has 
organized large protests and brought large numbers of people to the streets. 
 Syria did not have as intense of a social media blackout as Tunisia and Egypt did.  The 
government tried to curb social media during only one week of the months long protests; the first 
week in June was defined as the blackout since there were problems accessing social media sites.  
Yet, the government did not succeed in quieting the population because “live streaming and 
better-quality pictures have been emerging from Syria this week despite the government's 
attempts to curb social media and temporarily block access to email services and Twitter.”295  
People found ways around not being able to use the Internet to upload videos by “pass[ing] 
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memory cards through an assembly line of activists who would get them across the border to 
Jordan, where relatives and activists would upload the photos and videos of attacks on protesters 
to the Internet.”296  People needed to know about the brutalities of the Syrian government and 
citizens were not going to stop informing others of these atrocities.  Since the tactic of disruption 
with social media was not working because people were still getting news out about protests, the 
blackout ended and a new strategy was created to stop images of the protests from being leaked 
to online viewers.  When authority figures saw devices that could record images of the military’s 
use of force and violence, they seized the item to “decrease the risk of further incriminating 
images being transferred on the internet.”297  The Syrian government used a different tactic than a 
blackout to curb the way information was spread. 
Facebook 
The number of Facebook users in Syria is 241,859 out of a population of 22,505,091 
people.  This equates to only 1.07 percent of people within Syria that use Facebook (Salem and 
Mourtada 2011).  That is a small portion of the citizenry.  Therefore, while Facebook was used to 
instigate the first March 18, 2011, protest and some subsequent mobilizations, it was not relied 
on for the massive mobilization of people.  Facebook users tried to incite a demonstration in 
February but could not organize it.  A Syrian living outside of the country, “called for multiple 
protests across Syria in a Feb. 5 ‘Day of Rage.’”298  Facebook users were unsure of who the 
source behind the call to action was and they ignored the desire for protests.  Multiple Facebook 
pages were being used to decide on a date for the first real protest too.  This was causing too 
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much confusion since “at least a dozen Facebook pages urging protests in Syria were created 
between Feb. 5 and March 15, according to activists.  Organizers eventually coalesced around 
the Syrian Revolution 2011 page, whose early founder, a young, religious Muslim in Sweden, 
hails from a family of exiled Muslim Brotherhood members.”299  He too was a Syrian who was 
not living in the country but organizing the protests to start the revolution.  Another attempt for 
protesting was made and the date of March 15 was set up for the first real protest.
300
  This is why 
the revolution in Syria is considered to have begun on March 16, 2011. 
In order to communicate without having a person’s true identity revealed, people used 
pseudonyms on Facebook.  Not all of the people who used these fake identities were from within 
Syria; “young professionals and students used online pseudonyms to connect with other activists 
on Facebook. The first calls for protests came from abroad, from young Syrians—many of them 
living in exile with their parents—watching protests unfold in Egypt. They excitedly planned 
their own revolt.”301  Not much is known about the identities of the Syrians who called for 
revolution from foreign nations.  Yet, without their vote of confidence and encouragement from 
outsiders, Syrians may not have been able to organize the first successful protests.  Facebook 
was important for getting people around Syria to communicate in one spot, and then pass on this 
information to those in their communities who were not subject to Internet access.  Even if a 
non-native orchestrated this, it does not diminish the usefulness of the social media tool in the 
uprising.  One Facebook page was eventually allocated to discussions of protest.  This page was 
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used for the March 15, 2011, “Day of Rage,” April 1, 2011, “Day of Martyrs,” and August 12, 
2011, “Day of Not Kneeling” protests, among other demonstrations. 
Discussion of the protests began online before heading to the streets.  After its initial use, 
Facebook was not as essential because each town and village came up with its own method to 
succeed when rallying.  Local committees dictated how protests would go and where they would 
be each Friday; “after a while, partly through the work of online activists who linked them to 
each other, a number of ‘local committees’ were set up in cities around Syria.”302  Organization 
happened face-to-face after enough people got into the rhythm of protesting every Friday at 2 
P.M.  Larger protests that happened, such as the “Day of Not Kneeling” that happened in August, 
were organized online.  The “Day of Not Kneeling” organizers used Facebook because they 
wanted to convey a larger message than the regular anti-government Friday demonstrations.  
This Friday was going to represent that the people of Syria would not bow to anyone but God, 
and that they would no longer deem President Assad worthy of his high position.  The Facebook 
group, “the Syrian Revolution 2011,” was used to put this protest together by communicating the 
details of the rally to those with Facebook access.
303
 
Facebook was also utilized to remember Hamza, who was the thirteen-year-old boy who 
was tortured and killed at the end of May 2011.  The people of Syria hoped that by making a 
“We are all Hamza al-Khatib” Facebook page it would be akin to the “We are all Khaled Said” 
page that had sparked the Egyptian revolution.  While more than 61,000 people followed the 
Facebook page, not enough people in Syria are members of Facebook for it to play as large of a 
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role in Syria as it did in Egypt.
304
  This page was less successful than mobilization online 
because people needed to see the images of Hamza al- Khatib for the message to be understood, 
whereas if someone passed along the information that was on the “Syrian Revolution 2011” page 
it would be as if they had read the information too; the message was received even if someone 
did not use the “Syrian Revolution 2011” page themselves. 
Facebook was important for the first stage of protests.  It allowed for a single place for 
people in the North and South to discuss protest ideas.  Protests were discussed online before 
they were enacted in the real world.  Grievances, goals and demands were decided upon before 
people began demonstrating in the streets in March.  Facebook gave Syrians a place to discuss 
these topics, and then pass the information along to others meeting in older forms of 
mobilization.  Facebook did impact the first protest and subsequent larger unified messages in 
later demonstrations. 
YouTube 
YouTube played a much larger role in Syria than other social media did.  It opened 
people’s eyes to the horrors of the military and police forces.  Since both domestic media and 
foreign media were censored and restricted during the rallies, citizen journalists who captured the 
brutalities on camera became the new news source.  These people posted videos to YouTube 
because it would get more notoriety and views than other video based websites such as 
DailyMotion.  YouTube is used more universally throughout the world than DailyMotion, and 
the use of YouTube will ensure that foreigners, especially Westerners, see the footage of the 
protests.  People both within Syria and outside of the country watched these videos and were 
appalled at the treatment of demonstrators.  More people in Syria could view the YouTube 
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videos than the calls for protest messages on Facebook because a larger portion of people have 
access to the Internet but do not use social networking sites.  Only one percent of the Syrian 
population goes on Facebook but about twenty percent of people have access to the Internet.
305
   
Videos of Hamza’s dead body and funeral were posted on YouTube.  They were used as 
rallying techniques to mobilize people to the streets.  It was a YouTube video of Hamza’s dead 
body that showed all of the abuses that had been done to him over his month in detention.306  
Hamza was a rallying tool because he represented the innocent people who died for freedom.  
One YouTube video exemplifies that by depicting him in a coffin with “his angelic grin and 
thick head of black hair … below the gold-framed photo lies his body. ‘He was taken alive and 
he was killed because he called for freedom,’ says the voice-over.”307  The government of Syria 
understood how motivational these videos could be, which is why President Assad created a 
response and put that on state run television.308  The program had a doctor and a psychologist 
who explained the “real truth” about the death of Hamza.309  In the special, Hamza’s death was 
attributed to being shot during a protest, and that the other markings on his body were created by 
protesters so that they could blame the child’s death on the government.310  The government 
knew that the death of Hamza had angered Syrians and continued to redirect support from the 
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president to the protesters.  Therefore, President Assad wanted to show those who were not yet 
involved in the revolution that the death of Hamza was not the government’s fault. 
YouTube was essential for providing an outlet for people to see first hand the actions of 
the government.  Violent protests did not break out in bigger cities such as Damascus until later 
in the revolution; Damascus did not become the third largest protest station until late July.  The 
people who reside in the capital of Damascus have access to Internet but not the ability to see the 
protests in their town.  Therefore even if only twenty percent of people had access to the Internet, 
it was populations like this that were impacted and enraged by the YouTube videos.  These 
videos were mobilization tools.  The video based website mobilized people to the streets by 
showing them how their beloved leader treated those who wanted more freedoms.  The 
thousands of deaths and ability to see the bodies of those who were martyrs changed people’s 
opinions but also changed demands of protesters from more freedoms to a new government and 
different leader.  People could no longer tolerate President Assad. 
Impact of Social Media in Syria 
 Syrian’s impact of social media on the revolution is harder to discern because the 
revolution is still going on.  President Assad has stated that he has no intentions of stepping 
down as leader.  After almost a year, protesters are not any closer to gaining the freedoms and 
government that they want because any concessions made by Assad cannot be trusted and often 
do not materialize.  Therefore, some say that social media was not that important because Syria, 
unlike other Arab Spring nations, has not achieved its goal to rid the nation of President Assad.  
Scholars deem that there was some coordination of social media networks but not enough 
organization of the people as a whole since no changes have been made (Abouzeid 2011). 
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Scholars indicate that the general person is not taking action so actors like the Muslim 
Brotherhood have taken on the challenge to change the government.  This revolution is the first 
that has opposition parties that are calling the shots on when and how to protest.  After the first 
few months of protests, “opposition groups publicly declared their support for the protesters’ 
demands and in November several announced the formation of a united front, Syrian National 
Council (SNC).”311  Leaders of this group include members of the Muslim Brotherhood as well 
as Burhan Ghalioun, who is a Paris-based dissident.  The goal of this opposition group, which 
Sunni protesters identify with, is to provide "the necessary support for the revolution to progress 
and realise the aspirations of our people for the overthrow of the regime, its symbols and its 
head.”312  Another small opposition group that has been active since before the protests began is 
the National Co-ordination Committee (NCC).  This opposition group has also found its own 
group of protesters who connect with it.  Since there are multiple opposition groups that are 
leading the protests, the need for social media to organize and inform is not as strong in Syria as 
it was in other nations.  Since these groups have taken over organization, people are getting 
instructions through face-to-face contact or older forms of communication.  There are multiple 
opposition groups who are trying to conduct protests in different manners so one giant Facebook 
group no longer meets the needs of the entire population.  Therefore, social media is not as 
important as it was in the beginning of the revolution because people know about the cause and 
are just trying to find ways to succeed.  Older forms of organization have begun to be utilized 
again. 
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Whether the revolution has not been as successful as those in Tunisia and Egypt could be 
attributed to fractions within the protesting groups and different opposition groups, the extensive 
use of force by the military, or the lack of social media organization for every protest.  The cause 
is still being determined and the impact of social media will not be fully known until the 
rebellion comes to an end.  Yet, scholars like Abouzeid (2011) who claim that social media was 
not used after the initial start to the revolution or that it was not used enough for organization, are 
discounting the use of Facebook and YouTube to inform.  I believe that social media kept the 
uprising going and indicated why people should be angered by the government. 
Social Media Was Utilized in Syria 
 In order for a country to be classified as being in the first school of thought, it has to have 
used social media to organize protests and mobilize people to the cause for democracy.  
Organization of protests online must have happened before people began storming the streets 
during protests for more freedoms or a change of government.  These factors were present within 
Syria.  There were calls for protests that were made between February 5 and March 15, 2011, 
online.  The Facebook Page “Syrian Revolution 2011” was used to discuss when and where these 
protests would start.  Analysts decided that the revolution officially began in Syria on March 16, 
2011, which is after the online organized protesters took action in the real world.  The specifics 
of these protests were first formed in the digital world and then moved into the physical world. 
  Social media outlets were not only used for establishing the first few protests and then 
larger days of revolt after March.  YouTube was used to encourage those who were not already 
fighting in the streets on Fridays to join the rallies.  Videos of protests, police beatings, and the 
dead Hamza had voiceovers that demonstrated why people should join the cause for democracy 
and a new leader to the government.  The YouTube videos were more than pictures or footage.  
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They had people explaining what was happening in the country and why Syrians should be 
outraged at the treatment of fellow citizens.  
 Syria falls into the first category of schools on the impact of social media.  Social media 
was necessary for the revolution to begin and essential for it to continue.  Without the 
mobilization tactics of YouTube people in areas where violence was not occurring would not 
have known and potentially would not have joined the ongoing protests.  People could have 
settled for the concessions that President Assad was giving the population, but with the videos 
depicting the violence of Assad’s government towards the people of Syria, the demands of 
demonstrators changed.  People no longer wanted more freedoms, they wanted a new leader after 
seeing what Assad was capable of doing to his own constituents.  YouTube was vital in helping 
the people make the decision to call for his removal.  The protests would be different, if they had 
even happened, in Syria had social media not been present. 
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Chapter 7: Social Media’s Impact in the Arab Spring 
 Social media was used to some degree in each of the Arab Spring nations.  Each country 
in the Arab Spring was different in the way that its protesters started the revolution and how they 
executed them.  Of the four countries that I analyzed, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria, the 
people in two nations have been successful at overthrowing their leaders and those in the other 
two are still living in a state of repression.  Tunisians and Egyptians have exiled their former 
dictators to foreign soil, while the citizens of Syria are still protesting for President Assad to 
leave and those in Bahrain are recovering from a harsh government crackdown that ended 
protests.  Neither of the governments that are still in power after the Arab uprising have made 
major concessions or changes to the lives of their constituency.  Of the two nations that did have 
government changes, one falls under the school of thought that social media was not needed to 
start the revolution or sustain it, while the other nation falls under both of the remaining 
categories of thought: social media was essential for the revolution to begin and to continue to 
mobilize people to the cause throughout the protests, as well as without social media foreign 
nations would not have changed their preconceived notions about the rallies from pro-dictator to 
pro-democracy.  Therefore, this thesis takes into account two types of victories.  Countries could 
successfully use social media as a protest tool if demonstrators utilize social media technologies 
for organizing and mobilizing the revolution, or targeting foreigners to change their opinion 
about the regime and leader.  Countries can also be considered successful if the protesters 
accomplished the demands of the population.  However, I cannot conclude that social media is 
what led to the success of the Arab Spring and removal of dictators.  It is still too early to be able 
to ensure that if a specific technique or form of communication is used a dictator will then be 
overthrown. 
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Schools of Thought in Each Case Study  
 In two of the countries that were analyzed, Egypt and Syria, social media was a driving 
force in the protests and in the other two, Tunisia and Bahrain when it was briefly used, social 
media did not make a difference to the success or failure of the rallies.  Of those countries that 
were successful in overthrowing their regimes social media did not contribute to the success in 
Tunisia, but Egyptians utilized social media in numerous ways.  The use of social media in 
Tunisia fell under the second school of thought, for it did not add to the protests or mobilize 
people into the streets.  President Ben Ali would have been ousted from his post whether his 
people used social media to mobilize or not.  Even if some scholars deem that cell phones, the 
most effective media outlet for the country, did bring more people into the movement, it was not 
a large enough percentage to push the threshold from unsuccessful to a change in government.  
Tunisian demonstrators would have rid the country of Ben Ali with or without the use of social 
media. 
The Egyptian protests were exactly the opposite of those in Tunisia.  Without social 
media the date, time and other important details of the January 25, 2011, rally would not have 
been agreed upon across the nation.  Activists chose the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled 
Said” to discuss grievances and to make sure that this protest succeeded when previous ones had 
failed.  Once the movement was taken from the digital world to the streets, social media was key 
in helping convey to outside countries how President Mubarak’s government was treating the 
protesters.  Through tweets and videos that were posted online, those in Western countries could 
change their opinion of the Mubarak regime.  Before protests most people were content with his 
leadership and even as protests began governments were hesitant to back the revolutionaries.  
However, after seeing videos of the revolution opinions changed in favor of those who were 
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protesting for democracy.  Therefore, the Egyptian rebellion falls into both the first and third 
schools of thought; social media was necessary for the revolution to start and continue, and 
social media was used to change the opinions of foreigners to be aligned with those in the 
movement. 
 Of the two countries that maintained their leader, protesters in one used social media to 
organize rallies and depict the brutality of the police and military toward the people of the nation 
while the other country shied away from using social media to benefit the revolution.  In Syria 
the people used both Facebook and YouTube as social media outlets.  This country falls under 
the first group of schools because social media was used to start the revolution and mobilize 
people to the cause for democracy.  Even though President Assad has not left office, more and 
more people piled into the streets after viewing videos of the ongoing protests in other parts of 
the country.  The underlying cause of rebellion changed from more freedoms to people joining 
the rallies after watching graphic videos of the violence used against fellow citizens.  If it were 
not for social media, a less diverse grouping of people would have rallied for more rights and 
regime change.   
While Bahrain has the highest number of people with access to Internet, Facebook and 
cell phones, it is the country that employed social media the least.  Since these digital devices 
were not used during the protests to organize or mobilize, Bahraini protests fall under the second 
school of thought, which indicates that social media was not needed for the protests to occur.  
Bahrain was also the only country where the rebellion was completely crushed.  Before jumping 
to conclusions that the lack of social media was the main reasoning behind the failure of this 
revolution there are other factors that could also have played a part.  In Bahrain the government 
infiltrated social media sites and posted false updates to corner activists and those who opposed 
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the government.  Those who were against the monarchy were rounded up and detained without 
access to a lawyer.  Therefore, social media was not a safe option for demonstrators to use to 
organize protests.  With a population of roughly 800,000 citizens it is significantly smaller than 
other countries in the Arab Spring.  The population makes it is easier to control outbursts and 
crush the uprisings.  Thirty islands comprise the nation of Bahrain and the majority of the 
protests were occurring at the capital of the main island.  This central location also added to the 
ease with which authority figures could crush the small and confined uprising.  Lastly Bahrain 
was the only country of the four that were analyzed that brought foreign troops to its soil to help 
crush the protests.  Bahrain hosted the Gulf security forces, which means it had an added 
numbers of troops to crush the population who were protesting.  All of these reasons could have 
combined with the lack of social media use to make it the least successful of the revolutions in 
the Arab Spring of 2011. 
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    Table 5: Comparison of the four case study countries. 
 Tunisia Egypt Syria Bahrain 
Month that 
Revolution began 
December January March February 
Length of 
Revolution 
29 Days 18 Days One Year 31 Days 
Used Social Media 
(at any point) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Successful 
Revolution 
Yes Yes No No 
Successful SM use No Yes Yes No 
Population 10.4 million 82.5 million 22.5 million 800,000 
Population 
Median Age 
30 years 24 years 22 years 31 years 
Literacy Rate 78% 66% 84% 91% 
Unemployment 
Rate 
16% (2011) 
Youth = 30% 
12.2% (2011) 8.1% (2011) 15% (2005) 
Accessibility to 
Internet 
34% 24% 19% 81% 
Percentage of 
Facebook users 
19% 6% 1% 24% 
Percentage of Cell 
Phone users 
93% 85% 52% 99% 
Affected by 
Blackout 
No Yes Yes No 
Organization 
through Facebook 
No Yes Yes No 
Frequency of 
Protests 
Daily Daily Fridays Daily 
Central Meeting 
Place 
No Tahrir Square No Pearl Roundabout 
Social media 
outlets used 
Phone, Facebook, 
DailyMotion 
Phone, Facebook, 
Twitter, 
DailyMotion 
Facebook, 
YouTube 
Twitter, YouTube 
Government Type Dictatorship Dictatorship Dictatorship Monarchy 
Military 
Crackdown 
No, switched to 
support protests 
No, switched to 
support protests 
Yes, killed 
thousands 
Yes, killed over 
forty 
Ethnic Conflict No No Shia/Sunni Shia/Sunni 
Outside Influence No Yes Some No 
School of Thought Second First and Third First Second 
Sources: The United Nations (2011) and The World Factbook (2011) websites. 
Note: The information is correct as of the end of February 2011.  
 
Contributing Factors to Social Media Use 
Table 5 compares the four countries that I have analyzed.  The use of social media, 
including what types of social media were employed, and if they were used for organization are 
depicted above.  The table is important because it also looks at other factors that could explain 
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why one country used social media when another did not.  The table tries to depict all of the 
factors that can contribute to why the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt resulted in the resignation 
of dictators while those who reside in Bahrain and Syria still live under the governments that 
they rebelled against. Through my analysis I attempted to indicate if when or where the protests 
occurred also played a role in the success of the rallies.  Three of the nations protested daily 
while those in Syria mostly rebelled on Fridays after the 2 P.M. prayers.  The economy, working 
schedule and way of life was not as disrupted in Syria if most of the protests were on Friday; this 
factor also makes it easy for the government to predict when the next big rally will happen.  
Additionally if those who were in the streets met in one distinct spot to camp out for the 
revolution or if the population merely demonstrated throughout the country was another element 
that was analyzed.  Yet neither of these seemed to play a role in which nations protesters 
succeeded in their revolution and which ones were crushed by the governments. 
Looking at characteristics of the countries that were not directly related to social media 
mattered too.  The median age of the population, population size, and literacy rate of the citizens 
indicate how much social media can impact a nation.  When the population of a country has a 
median age in the twenties, the nation would be more likely to utilize social media than if those 
who reside in the country were over thirty.  The youth of the Middle East are the people who are 
active on the Internet (Lynch 2007).  The countries of Egypt and Syria had a younger citizenry 
and more online social media was utilized too.  These two nations tried to organize through 
Facebook rather than cell phone.  Additionally knowing the population size of a country is 
important.  This indicates how large a state is and puts other figures such as Internet accessibility 
into perspective.  It is easier to visualize how many people have the ability to use the Internet 
when the total population is known too.  The literacy rate should also indicate if social media 
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was used versus older forms of communication.  A high literacy rate usually is associated with a 
wealthy country.  This would also mean that the nation would have a high access rate to the 
Internet and a high use of mobile phones.  Moreover, if the literacy rate in rural parts of a 
country is low, then reading a post on the Internet would not be possible, but listening to 
someone at a local Mosque discuss the prospect of a revolution would be a better organizational 
tool.  Therefore, the higher the literacy rate the higher the probability that a country will organize 
a protest through social media.  However, after further analysis the population size and literacy 
rate of the nation had no impact on whether social media was used in the demonstrations. 
A nation’s access to the Internet will also impact what types of social media are used in 
the revolution.  The nations where protesters did use Facebook or Twitter successfully were 
Egypt and Syria, which had lower availability to the Internet than both Tunisia and Bahrain.  
This seems contradictory because more people could have been rallied through this form of 
social media in the countries with the larger Internet access; it could have been a successful 
organization tool.  Along with those numbers, the percentage of Facebook members is key to 
understanding if a country utilized this form of social media when organizing demonstrations.  
However, these were not indicators of which countries utilized social media in the Arab Spring. 
Success of Social Media 
When analyzing the success of social media in the revolutions in the Arab World in 2011, 
there are two forms of success.  The first is success of new technology and social media to 
enable the revolutions to happen in the first place, which both the Egyptian and Syrians protests 
achieved.  Success of social media does not necessarily equate to the success of the revolutions.  
The second form of success was dethroning the current leader and forming a democracy.  Social 
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media could have helped to accomplish this second form of success but it was not necessary 
because only the Egypt revolution benefitted from social media usage. 
Revolutionaries in Egypt and Syria both successfully used social media to organize 
people before protests began and mobilize people to the cause of the rebellion; however, only the 
people of Egypt dethroned their dictator.  Yet I would still consider both nations to have been 
successful when using digital media.  Without this new form of technology the protests would 
not have been organized and unified across the nation and the Egyptian people would still reside 
in their repressed state of being.  Unrest has occurred and while President Assad is still in power 
in Syria there is pressure from outside countries, both in the Middle East and in the West, for him 
to renounce his seat in office and turn the country over to the people.  Syria has been kicked out 
of the Arab League as of November of 2011.
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  The Arab League and United Nations are trying 
to come up with a peacekeeping mission to prevent the country from falling into a civil war.
314
.  
The only countries that oppose the call for Assad to step down are China and Russia.  Even with 
minor roadblocks, the people of Syria are on their way to gaining more rights because Assad’s 
days are numbered, whether he chooses to realize this fact or not.  If and when the people’s 
perseverance pays off, it will be remembered that the revolution began online through the use of 
social media.  The citizens will be able to say that they achieved both forms of success. 
 Protesters within both Egypt and Syria utilized Facebook to begin their revolution.  
People organized specific dates and times for the initial uprising and numerous marches after the 
rebellion began.  One central Facebook page was used to air grievances against the government 
and its treatment of citizens.  In both of these revolutions one person died and became the martyr 
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image of the uprising.  His picture circulated the population in hopes that it would rally more 
people to the streets to fight for democracy.  The people of the two nations used differing 
techniques to spread the image and message that the martyr died for more rights.   Egyptians 
used cell phones to pass around photos of Khaled Said and Syrians chose to make YouTube 
videos featuring Hamza al-Khatib’s dead body.  Both methods were effective in increasing 
awareness of the issues of protesters and increasing the number of people who wanted 
governmental change.  Egyptians and Syrians both used social media to their benefit and initially 
changed the mood of the people within the country.  Neither group of citizens was willing to live 
in a subdued society where they were complacent about their lack of freedoms anymore.  Action 
needed to be taken to ameliorate the lives of people in their nation, and people deemed that the 
use of social media, along with other tools, was a good way to gather people across the country 
to protest the same message and rise up against the dictatorship at the same time.   
What Social Media Factors Distinguish Tunisia and Egypt’s Protests 
 While social media use was successful in some countries, the purpose of the rebellions 
was to change the leadership of the nation.  So far this has only been accomplished in Tunisia 
and Egypt, and it did not necessarily need social media to happen.  Yet when looking at what set 
these two states apart from the Syrian and Bahraini demonstrations, some practices of social 
media usage were different in the successful countries and were neglected to be used in the 
nations that are still living under repressive rule.  Besides the timing of the revolutions, the cell 
phone was a key factor that was used in both Tunisia and Egypt but was not a component in the 
rallies of Syria and Bahrain.  
In all four countries more people have access to a cell phone than the Internet or 
Facebook.  In Tunisia approximately thirty-four percent of people have access to the Internet 
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while ninety-three percent of the country has a mobile phone.  Egypt’s Internet access is about 
twenty-four percent for the whole population but eighty-five percent of people have a cell phone.  
In Syria the number of people who have a cell phone is more than double of that who can use the 
Internet.  While in Bahrain both Internet and cell phone usage are high, almost the entire country 
has their own cell phone.  Therefore, the cell phone would be the most beneficial social media 
outlet for protesters in a country to use to send important news and messages.  Even with these 
statistics, only Tunisians and Egyptians utilized the mobile phone as a form of communication. 
Cell phone usage was utilized in the protests in Tunisia and Egypt but not in Syria and 
Bahrain.  This form of communication has specific perks that are not available through Internet 
based social media outlets.  Mobile phones allow for the recipients of SMS messages to know 
who sent them a message.  Additionally the receiver most likely trusts the person who sent the 
information that they are getting to their personal cell phone.  By using mobile phones more the 
protesters could have prevented the complications that occurred with anonymity on websites like 
Facebook and Twitter.  The people of Bahrain did not use social media because they could not 
discern between government officials and actual demonstrators on the Internet.  The use of a cell 
phone takes away the issue of trust.  People will respond in a more positive fashion to a 
guaranteed safe source such as SMS messages from friends and family.  Another added 
advantage of mobile phones is that when pictures of a dead or mutilated Bouazizi or Khaled was 
sent to a protester’s phone, an individual could forward it to everyone on their contact list with a 
few clicks of a button.  It is harder to do this on the computer than through the use of a mobile 
phone.  For starters phones can be used anywhere, where as in order to receive a Facebook 
message or send one a person needs to be at a computer or possess a Smartphone.  Most Middle 
Eastern people do not own Smartphones, which are mobile devices with Internet connectivity.  
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Moreover pictures are more easily restricted on social media sites such as Facebook compared to 
a SMS message, which the government cannot detect.  It is a fast and easy way to remind people 
why they are fighting for more rights and reforms.  Each country had its own Bouazizi, and this 
technique seemed to be effective in the Tunisia and Egypt revolutions, so it would most likely be 
successful for protesters in Syria and Bahrain.  If it was used in more countries than just Tunisia 
and Egypt, it could have aided in the success of more revolutions. 
Mobile phones were utilized in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions but not by those in 
Syria and Bahrain.  It is unknown exactly why these two nations did not try to communicate 
through cell phone.  However, one can speculate that in Syria any item that had a recording 
device was taken by authority figures and destroyed.  Even simple phones, which are not 
Smartphones, come with video recorders now; therefore, since the government of Syria did not 
want videos of the brutality to be posted on the internet, military figures were instructed to take 
all cameras.  Taking out a phone in the middle of a rally was not the best decision in Syria.  This 
may have led the people to use other forms of organization and mobilization rather than the 
phone.  The people of Bahrain did not trust any source of social media.  They were unsure of 
what the government had infiltrated.  Early on in the protests the demonstrators decided not to 
trust any new form of media.  Even with a device that was safe and hard for the government to 
monitor, the revolutionaries aired on the side of caution.  If a demonstrator could not directly see 
the person who was providing them with information, even if it came from a friend or family’s 
phone, then he or she was hesitant to listen.  For these reasons the people of Syria and Bahrain 
stayed away from mobile phones and resorted to other social media forms, or none at all. 
Another potential reasoning behind the successful demonstrations of Tunisia and Egypt 
and the failures of Syria and Bahrain could be the timing of the revolutions.  The protesters in 
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both Tunisia and Egypt caught their respective governments off guard.  They occurred very close 
together in timing, which did not allow for President Mubarak of Egypt to learn from the 
mistakes of President Ben Ali in Tunisia.  By the time that the people of Syria and Bahrain 
revolted, the leaders could anticipate what activists would do.  This made it harder for protesters 
in Syria and Bahrain to succeed.  They needed to be more creative than those in the first two 
Arab Spring nations, and the governments also were more creative in how they deterred people 
from joining the revolution or how to stop videos of the revolution from getting online.  The 
governments of Syria and Bahrain placed social media blackouts on the people of the nation 
much quicker than the previous two nations.  Syrian authorities began taking away and 
destroying cameras or recording devices so that footage could not be leaked, and the monarchy 
in Bahrain even impersonated protesters to detain other activists.  It was harder for Syrians and 
Bahraini people because their leaders had learned how not to handle a revolution from Ben Ali 
and Mubarak.  Since the movements of those in the street could be predicted and the government 
could control the outcome, the protests became longer and the likelihood of a successful 
revolution decreased.  The revolution in Tunisia was twenty-eight days and the rebellion in 
Egypt took only eighteen for Mubarak to leave.  The revolution in Syria and Bahrain lasted for 
longer time periods, or would have if they had not been crushed.  During these revolutions 
concessions happened later but they were not earnest attempts by the government to make any 
change to the lifestyles of the citizenry.  Timing was an essential factor in the successes in 
Tunisia and Egypt and could have played a role in the failure of protests in Syria and Bahrain. 
Other Potential Reasons for Success in Tunisia and Egypt 
 The two countries that did succeed in dethroning their leader share numerous qualities 
with the ones that did not accomplish this end.  The protesting tactics used by all four countries 
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were similar in that they all rallied in the streets in different cities, while heading towards the 
capital, and to some extent disrupted the economies by fighting for changes rather than going to 
work.  Stationing outside of government buildings meant that the protesters could not be ignored 
and change should have been inevitable.  However, there are a few things that set the revolutions 
of Tunisia and Egypt apart from Syria and Bahrain.  In all of the countries the military was 
ordered to use force against those who were protesting in the streets; “every ruler ordered his 
military and security agencies to suppress protests by force (including lethal force). In some 
cases, the generals said yes; in others, they said no because they calculated that their own and 
their country’s interests would be best served by regime change” (Barany 2011, 26).  In Tunisia 
and Egypt the military turned against the regime and sided with the protesters, but in Syria and 
Bahrain the military used aggressive and excessive force against the people of the country 
(Barany 2011).  In Syria the number is growing but currently over five thousand people have 
been killed at the hands of the security forces, and in Bahrain, which enlisted Bahraini, Saudi 
Arabian, and United Arab Emirate forces, over forty people died while protesting for more 
rights.   
The reasoning behind each country’s military actions can be related to how the forces 
were treated by the government and the relationship that the two parties shared.  When the ruler 
of a regime generally satisfies the political and economic demands of a military force then the 
troops will back those who are currently in power (Barany 2011).  This applies to the people of 
Syria and Bahrain because the military was comprised of the ruling minority party rather than the 
majority ethnic group.  The armed forces of both respective countries lived in a state of luxury 
compared to the average citizen.  Moreover, when a state pays well and treats the military with 
respect, the government will receive ample support during times of unrest (Barany 2011).  Since 
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the militaries of Syria and Bahrain were treated with respect, they had no incentive to turn 
against the regime in favor of the poorer protesters whom they could not relate to.  Additionally 
in the cases of Syria and Bahrain, a leader that is prone to human rights abuses creates an army 
that will back the government.  Military officials fear that if they join the side of the 
demonstrators and back the revolution, that they will get backlash and be prone to violence from 
those in the streets.  This is a concern of the authority figures because when acting on behalf of 
the regime they previously committed acts against the population and those who were protesting 
could want revenge (Barany 2011). 
On the other hand when forces turn against their regime it occurs when there is distrust in 
the relationship between the authority figures and the ruler of a country.  This will lead to friction 
and fractions within both units (Barany 2011).  In Egypt the military had been treated relatively 
well, so at first it was thought to be unlikely for this group of individuals would turn against 
President Mubarak.  The military was much more central to “the support base for Mubarak 
(himself an air force general) and never came under opposition or media criticism” (Barany 
2011, 28).  When the protests began Mubarak heavily leaned on the military to help subdue the 
movements.  The military is only comprised of 1.4 million people, which was a small number 
who were given the responsibility of controlling the millions of protesters in Tahrir Square and 
across the country.  It strained the military, as well as, put them into an awkward position.  The 
conscripted army had a good relationship with the people of the country and played an active 
role in society.  The generals did not want to shoot at their own people, so they took matters into 
their own hands by turning against the regime.  For the military, backing the regime did not 
provide a positive future for Egypt and they quickly renounced President Mubarak’s request to 
shoot peaceful protesters (Barany 2011). 
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 Another factor that could have contributed to the success of rallies in Tunisia and Egypt 
is the composition of the people within the nation.  Each of the four nations is predominately 
Muslim (eighty percent or more), which means that they are comprised of both Sunni and Shiite 
Muslims (The World Factbook 2011).  What sets Tunisian and Egyptian protesters apart from 
those in the street in Syria and Bahrain is that the Muslims within the countries wanted the same 
outcomes from the revolution.  In both Tunisia and Egypt the revolution was a class war against 
the government.  Those who were family or friends of those in power were rich but everyone 
else lived below the poverty level.  Friends of the regime could be either sect of Islam.  In Syria 
and Bahrain one sect of Islam ruled and repressed the other, which caused more divisions 
between the people on the nation.  The minority ruled over the majority and this bred resentment 
from those living in a state of poverty.  When demands were made and concessions could be 
talked about, those in the street had opposing views on how to change the government and what 
direction to take the country in.  When it came time to discuss actual alterations to the 
government in Syria and Bahrain the only thing that Sunni and Shia Muslims had in common 
was the removal of the current party.  The minority party did not want to give up power to the 
majority because that would include loosing their status within the nation and potentially their 
wealth too.  Concrete demands provide for more change, which is why the people of Tunisia and 
Egypt dethroned their leaders. 
 Social media can be an asset to protests but it is not necessary for their success.  Social 
media was essential for organization and mobilization of people in Egypt and Syria.  While those 
in Tunisia did not employ social media tactics to begin or sustain the revolution, they were also 
the first Arab Spring nation to protest.  Demonstrators in Tunisia caught the government, region, 
and world off guard.  People poured into the streets because of anger and a long subdued passion 
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for a new government.  Even though this country did not need digital media to succeed, social 
media was necessary for other nations to have rallies prosper.  Yet, it cannot be said that by 
having this added technique of organization all countries would be better off.  Bahrain’s use of 
social media backfired quickly and therefore was not utilized during the demonstrations for fear 
of what negative results could be attained.  
This thesis concludes that for these four countries social media can help a revolution but 
it is not necessary for one to succeed.  It is still undetermined what factor helped lead these 
nations to their respective successes and failures but social media cannot be the sole contributor.  
Not all of the protesters in the nations that rid their countries of dictators used social media, just 
as not all of the demonstrators who still reside under corrupt regimes deterred from using this 
new form of communication.  Social media was beneficial to countries that used it but protests 
were no less successful in countries that organized through older more traditional forms of 
protesting.  Social media did not lead to the successes of the entire Arab Spring.   
Research Limitations 
 The Arab Spring occurred in the Middle East just over a year ago.  Information about the 
nations and their protests are still being discovered and analyzed.  I am confident that at the time 
of my writing it was apparent through the research that social media was used in some nations 
but not utilized in others.  In general social media can add to a revolution but is not necessary for 
the success of protests.  It is also not the sole cause of a revolutions victory.  However, my 
findings could have been different had I changed certain aspects of my thesis or had my research 
been done at a different time. 
My research could have been more thorough had there been more available information 
on the protests.  New information about these uprisings is being written about and uncovered 
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daily.  Additionally the people in the Middle East generally speak Arabic.  Hounshell (2011) 
depicted that when organization happened online it was usually in Arabic.  The wealthy and elite 
are the people who have the ability to learn English.  Therefore, all of the original tweets and 
posts that I obtained during this process were from the upper class.  If I could understand and 
read Arabic, then my results could have been different.   I could have better understood the 
common man, who felt the grievances of corruption and economic hardships.  Instead I had to 
interpret, through news articles of people who were present for the rebellions, why this 
population began protesting in the first place.  Having the ability to comprehend organization 
techniques in Arabic may not have changed my results, but it would have given me a deeper 
knowledge of the Arab Spring. 
Numerous changes happened over the time I wrote my thesis.  When I began the people 
in only three nations had successfully dethroned their leaders.  However, since that time various 
government alterations have occurred including: President Qaddafi being killed, the president of 
Yemen finally stepping down, and foreign nations putting pressure on Syria, as well as 
government officials within the country leaving the regime to join the protesters.  Once 
everything has settled and there is more stability in the region, then how social media affected 
the Arab Spring can be analyzed further.  In Syria the people are still attempting to rid the 
country of President Assad.  Each day more pressure is put onto the government and more 
people from within the nation are joining the opposition parties in the street.  On March 8, 2012, 
the Deputy Oil Minister, Abdo Hussameddin, left the Syrian government to join those in the 
street who are demonstrating for the Assad family to leave and a democratic nation to be put in 
his place.
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  He announced his resignation from the government through a Youtube video, which 
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demonstrates the social media use in the nation.  Hussameddin is the highest-ranking government 
official to leave Assad’s regime in the last year, since the uprising began.316  Rallies are still 
occurring and those in power will have no choice but to make concessions or leave.  Had this 
thesis been written at a later date, once more time had passed, then it could have analyzed the 
information in a different manner.  I began researching and writing mere months after the 
victories and failures of the Arab Spring nations, and had to adapt to the changes that occurred 
with the protests that were still ongoing. 
Lastly my results could have been different had I looked at all six countries, a different 
set of four nations within the six Arab Spring countries, or analyzed some of the states that are 
not considered to be in the Arab Spring but had protests at the same time.  I chose Tunisia, 
Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria because they had the most in common with each other.  Through 
social media use in each of these nations I felt that I could best extrapolate how social media was 
used in the Arab Spring as a whole.  As of the beginning of March four of the six Arab uprisings 
have been successful.  Different countries used social media in different ways though, so had I 
analyzed other nations there is potential to conclude that social media was essential for the 
protests or that it was unnecessary.  Yet, for the nations of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria, 
under the criteria that I created, it is clear that social media can help a revolution succeed but is 
not necessary for one to take place.  Social media was not the leading cause in the victories of the 
Arab Spring. 
Future Social Media Revolutions 
 While it cannot yet be decided that social media use was necessary for the success of the 
Arab Spring as a whole, it did contribute to the protests in Egypt and Syria.  Without these new 
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media tools, the protests would not have occurred on the same scale.  At varying degrees 
Facebook and YouTube were utilized in both of these countries.  Through censorship of the 
Internet this may not be as possible for those wishing to overthrow their governments in the 
future.  Since the revolutions of 2011, companies such as Facebook and Twitter have come out 
with new policies, or have decided to more strictly enforced policies that were already present 
within the organization.  These guidelines will not help the rights of those under a repressive 
government and will hinder those wishing to follow in the footsteps of Arab Spring nations.  
 Of the three big American players in social media websites during the Arab uprising of 
2011, only Google (which owns YouTube) is a member of the Global Network Initiative.  
Facebook and Twitter have refused to join the organization, which has created a “collaborative 
approach to protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy in the [Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT)] sector, and have formed an Initiative to take this work 
forward” when concerning human rights of freedom and privacy in different countries (Global 
Network Initiative 2011).  In other words it creates a way for these ICT companies to comply 
with the domestic laws of a foreign country without compromising the treatment of the 
indigenous people (Global Network Initiative 2011).  Yet, some companies do not want to sign 
into this agreement because they presume that it will hurt their business in countries with strict 
free speech policies.  Therefore, instead of aiding citizens and protecting their right to revolt, the 
corporations are thinking in a capitalistic manner.  By siding with governments the companies 
will infiltrate more countries and make more money.  Facebook and Twitter have altered core 
values but YouTube should remain unchanged and can be used in future protests against corrupt 
governments. 
 
 175 
Facebook 
 Facebook will no longer be an organizational tool during revolutions akin to those in the 
Middle East and North Africa in 2011.  Facebook does not want to take credit or even 
acknowledge that its website was used during the protests of 2011.  The company, which has just 
begun to gain users within the Arab region, does “not want to be seen as picking sides for fear 
that some countries — like Syria, where it just gained a foothold — would impose restrictions on 
its use or more closely monitor users.”317  The executives at Facebook are downplaying the role 
of their website in the revolutions.
318
  One executive stated that bravery and determination 
mattered more than technology during the protests; these company figureheads are trying to 
place the impact of social media into the second school of thought: it was unnecessary for the 
success of the rallies.  Facebook, even if it will not come out and say it, is more worried about 
the economics behind its corporation and the number of users than how the people of the world 
are actually using the website.  They do not want to lose business in any country so the 
organization is cracking down on its enforcement of policies.  When the uprisings began, 
“Twitter and YouTube, which is owned by Google, [were] more willing to embrace their roles in 
activism and unrest” than Facebook was during this time period.319  However, since this time the 
social media sites of Facebook and Twitter have changed their policies to downplay the role their 
technology played in the Arab Spring countries. 
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The people who created pages such as “We Are All Khaled Said” or “Syrian Revolution 
2011” used anonymous names on the Internet.  This was for safety purposes because the regimes 
that they lived under had strict freedom of speech policies.  If their true identities had been 
revealed prior to the beginning of protests then they would have been captured, detained and 
tortured, or possibly killed for writing opposing views of the government.  Facebook claims that 
it has always held a policy that “require[s] users to sign up with their real identities. The 
company says this requirement protects its users from fraud.”320  The company is unwilling to 
change this policy and maintains that it provides a safer environment for all of its members.
321
  
This statement is simply untrue because it presents security risks to users in developing countries 
or under repressive regimes.  
Facebook deems that it did not know of the false identity of Wael Ghonim, which is why 
the page remained untouched for so long.  Additionally since the Egyptian victory over President 
Mubarak, Facebook has taken down the “We Are All Khaled Said” webpage.322  This Facebook 
page was still being used for discussions in November of 2011, when it was removed.  People 
commiserated over the lackluster improvements since the change of regime.  However, Facebook 
officials claim that it could not remain on the website since the founder of the page had used a 
pseudonym when creating the page.  The use of a pseudonym was a violation of Facebook 
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policy; therefore, the page had to be removed.
323
  The company is cracking down on policies of 
anonymity.  In future rebellions people will not be able to organize through Facebook if they are 
forced to use a real name.  If they do use a pseudonym and are discovered then all the effort put 
into organization will be lost since the page will be deleted.  This policy will now be enforced in 
a harsher manner.   
While Facebook cannot find every member that is using a pseudonym, it can check up on 
the identity of people with thousands of friends, or on users who create pages and groups that 
over a short span of time gain thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of members.  By 
instituting this form of looking for pseudonyms, the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said,” 
would have been found and shut down months before the January protests.  After just a few 
hours of making the page in June of 2010, “300 people had joined it. Three months later, that 
number had grown to more than 250,000;”  this type of activity would have been a red flag for 
employees of Facebook to check the identity of Ghonim.
324
  The company would have 
discovered that his name was fake and dismantled his pages.
325
  The enforcement of this policy 
ensures that Facebook will not be used in future revolutions. 
Facebook has been battling to defend itself on the issue of privacy and pseudonyms since 
the Arab Spring began.  It has continually reported that all members must use their real name to 
ensure the safety of Facebook users.  In mid February of 2012, the company released a statement 
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that they would alter this policy.  It appeared that justice was coming for those in foreign nations.  
Yet the Facebook announcement was depressing.  If a person happens to be a celebrity with over 
20,000 friends or people who subscribe to their page (subscribing is a way for one individual to 
see information about a Facebook member without actually being a friend of that person) then 
they may use a pseudonym.  This change of heart came after looking at Facebook members and 
pages such as Lady Gaga or Snoop Dog, who before this had to go by Stefani Germanotta and 
Calvin Broadus respectively.
326
  Now by being famous or a celebrity, an individual gets the perks 
that those in developing countries trying to fight against corrupt regimes should be granted.   
Twitter 
 Twitter has also taken measures that initially set off a form of panic among users across 
the globe.  Even though during the actual revolutions Twitter was helpful in numerous ways, for 
those with Internet access and even those who wanted to send out tweets but were in Internet 
blackouts, with new policies it will hinder revolutions.  In Egypt, after the Internet was shut 
down, both Twitter and Google provided a way for people to reach foreign nations with their 
protest updates.
327
  By using foreign correspondents’ phones Egyptians could “leave voice mail 
messages that would be filed as updates on Twitter. Biz Stone, one of Twitter’s founders, used it 
as an opportunity to emphasize the positive global impact that comes with the open exchange of 
information.”328  The new service network that was created for this purpose was known as 
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speak2tweet.
329
  Another tactic that Twitter used to help demonstrators during the Arab Spring 
was to allow its users to use pseudonyms instead of real names and identities.
330
  The widespread 
use of Twitter even inspired the company’s “chief executive … to call it ‘the free-speech wing of 
the free-speech party.’”331  Yet instead of helping citizens find ways around government 
blackouts, now Twitter is censoring itself too.  It is hindering protests when just months ago it 
was advocating for social media use during uprisings. 
 No longer will Twitter be used to communicate with the general population within a 
country.  Now it would mostly be used to target foreigners and change their opinion on protests.  
In January of 2012, “in a sort of coming-of-age moment, Twitter announced that upon request, it 
would block certain messages in countries where they were deemed illegal.”332  Twitter wants to 
respect the laws of other countries.  In nations with regimes that restrict certain content or words, 
Twitter will voluntarily take down any post when a government provides a valid reason for 
deeming the content illegal.
333
  People across the globe were outraged because they felt that this 
was a new form of censorship.
334
  To the users of Twitter the language of the policy is a 
euphemism for suppression and censorship.  Dictating that a ‘valid request’ is all that is needed 
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for Twitter to remove a post falls under wide interpretation.  To a dictator any post can have a 
valid reasoning for why it is illegal.
 335
  One person in Sweden posted, “‘Thank you for the 
#censorship, #twitter, with love from the governments of #Syria, #Bahrain, #Iran, #Turkey, 
#China, #Saudi and friends.’”336  People around the globe saw this as a death sentence to any 
future revolutions in countries with no freedom of speech.  Any government could petition for 
opposition comments to be taken offline because they were illegal.  Therefore, Twitter is playing 
into the hands of the governments and their restrictions. 
 Twitter has tried to defend itself against the attacks and potential boycotts from users.  
Representatives of Twitter have indicated that instead of simply deleting inappropriate posts that 
were on the website, they will appear but have a gray box indicating that something was 
removed.  Before this new decree, “removing a post meant it would disappear from Twitter 
worldwide; now such removals … could be limited to individual countries. Elsewhere, the post 
would still appear.”337  Therefore, if a protester in the Arab Spring tweeted the time or day of a 
protest, it would be deleted from that country but any other nation in the world could see it.  It 
would have stopped people within a country from being able to mobilize or communicate 
through Twitter.  This would have been detrimental in Egypt, when citizens utilized Twitter to 
talk amongst themselves about how to enter Tahrir Square.  If the Egyptian revolution happened 
today, Twitter would only be used to inform outside countries about the demonstrations against 
Mubarak.  Twitter’s example of how the new process works was: 
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So if someone posts a message that insults the monarchy of Thailand, which is punishable by a jail 
term, it will be blocked and unavailable to Twitter users in that country, but still visible elsewhere. 
What is more, Twitter users in Thailand will be put on notice that something was removed: A gray 
box will show up in its place, with a clear note: “Tweet withheld,” it will read. ‘This tweet from 
@username has been withheld in: Thailand.
338
 
 
The company’s defense of this new system was that users could still tell that a post had been 
tweeted.   
Twitter also tried to quell the outbursts by noting a loophole in the system.  Twitter 
identifies where a person lives by their Internet Protocol (IP) address, which indicates the 
location where a person updates their Twitter.  However, the social networking site also lets 
individuals set a location through the site.  Therefore, in the eyes of Twitter employees, a person 
could change their settings and indicate that their location is worldwide.
339
  If the user enables 
this then he or she would be able to circumvent the new blocking system.  The person could see 
the posts of everyone, even if those within their own country were blocked because of 
censorship.
340
  While this may work and allow people to see a broader range of posts, it does not 
redeem Twitter from changing its pro-revolution viewpoint towards more conservative pro-
government actions.  It is not backing the human rights of citizens in repressive countries.  The 
company is trying to gain favor with leaders to expand into more markets when it should gain 
favor with the common man who will use this social media technique to change the world.   
Twitter is making all of these changes because it is opening up offices in other countries, 
starting with a new London office.  Laws no longer apply only to the United States, and adding 
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the United Kingdom complicated things.
341
  Twitter’s usual statement of we are a US company 
and if you have a problem with our privacy policies, come try and sue us in America will no 
longer work since they will not only be operating domestically.
342
  Therefore, the organization 
now has to be in tune with the laws of foreign nations.  In order to have more offices and more 
influence abroad, it must adhere to foreign leaders. 
Social Media’s Impact in the Entire Arab Spring 
There are no sure ways to predict whether the use of social media, or a specific type of 
social media, will make a revolution succeed.  More time is needed to analyze the countries of 
the Arab Spring.  Since “one of the main reasons why recent Middle Eastern and North African 
events took so many observers by surprise was the sheer opacity of these countries…gathering 
reliable information about [these states] is extraordinarily difficult” (Barany 2011, 26).  Most of 
the countries did not allow for foreign media to document the protests, which makes it hard to 
discern what truly happened.  After more time, hopefully more countries will have overthrown 
leaders and there can be more data to describe the use and effectiveness of social media. 
Scholars are trying to conclude whether using social media will indicate that a new 
regime will be put into place.  They are trying to find criteria that can be used to predict a 
protest’s victory.  The use of some social media tools was more useful than others in the Arab 
Spring.  However, it depended on the country, the ruler, and the way that the social media tool 
was implemented that made the difference of success or failure.  For example Twitter was 
beneficial to the protests in Egypt but detrimental to those in Bahrain because the sources were 
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unreliable and often incorrect.  Social media usage was beneficial to demonstrators in countries 
in multiple ways including: online organization before enacting the plans in the streets and using 
mobile phones since they are harder for the government to restrict.  Yet no one social media type 
or implementation of a social media device can be pinpointed to lead to a revolution’s success.  
Hopefully with more time and more social media revolution successes, a clearer path for 
demonstration victories can be created.  There can never be a true cause and effect for every 
rebellion but a better understanding and analysis of the role of social media to organize, 
mobilize, and change the opinion of people within its own country and foreign nations will be 
recognized and perceived. 
Social media use for more than just a mere social networking device, and in such a wide 
scale as the Arab Spring, is still new.  There are not enough case studies to be able to predict 
whether using cell phones versus Facebook versus YouTube or blogs as an organizational tool 
will ensure that protesters’ demands are met.  Revolutions and rebellions are variable to 
numerous factors.  What I can conclude about social media in the Arab Spring is that in 2011, 
without social media the Arab Spring still would have occurred, but it may not have spread so 
quickly or to as many countries if there was no social media usage.  Yet in 2012 with the harsher 
enforcement that true identities must be used online, and the policy that the host country has 
more authority over censorship of a social media site that is based in the West, revolutions like 
those in the Arab Spring will be unlikely to happen or spread to as many countries in the future.  
Social media facilitated or will enable certain countries to declare victory against their leaders 
but this will not be the case in future uprisings unless companies respect human rights and cater 
to the population rather than a corrupt autocratic regime. 
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